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Summary 
 
With limitations in the availability and accessibility of surface water, attention is increasingly 
directed towards groundwater resources as the most reliable source of fresh water for 
different sectors. Accordingly, groundwater is over abstracted in many countries of the 
world. The overexploitation of groundwater renewable and non-renewable aquifers for both 
urban use and irrigation results in a drop of the water table and, frequently, in a reduction in 
groundwater quality. This study focuses on the use of groundwater for irrigation purposes in 
desert areas of the MENA region. The objective of this thesis is to contribute to conserving 
and sustaining the use of limited groundwater resources in desert agriculture, by analyzing 
the current unsustainable use of groundwater, focusing on groundwater policy on the one 
hand, and on the specificities of desert agriculture on the other, with a focus on Azraq basin 
in Jordan. 
This study consists of eight chapters, starting with an introduction, six core chapters, and 
ending with a synthesis chapter. The introduction chapter reviews the general context of the 
thesis, while chapter two briefly reviews the general features of groundwater-based 
agriculture in the MENA region and explores the management and policy options available to 
regulate this sector. We then document 'desert agriculture' in selected countries of the 
MENA region, examining in particular how farms access the key production factors of land, 
water, labor, capital. The physical and historical context of Azraq basin, our case study area, is 
then outlined in chapter three. Chapter four explores the Azraq Basin using spatial analysis 
GIS tools and all available data, providing a wider view of the windows of intervention for 
groundwater resource use and management. Chapter five, six and seven emphasizes the 
driving forces behind the development of desert agriculture in the Azraq basin: Chapter five 
focuses on the issues of land tenure in historical and present contexts, as access to land is as 
one of the prime factors fueling desert agriculture, either for profit or land speculation or 
both. Chapter six deals with water, another key production factor of farming in Azraq basin, 
and discusses policy measures and tools deployed to regulate use of this resource, law 
enforcement, and how farmers have responded to these policy and regulatory measures. The 
chapter then documents how, in response, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation has recently 
enacted a series of creative counter-measures, both direct and indirect, in an attempt to 
toughen law enforcement. Chapter seven is based on the results of farm surveys carried out 
in the two main agricultural areas of the Azraq basin (Azraq and Mafraq). The chapter 
outlines farm typologies, calculates the level of farm profitability, and discusses the 
availability and relative costs of production factors (land, water, energy, labor, inputs) in 
desert areas, as well as the constraints and challenges currently faced by farmers and future 
prospects. The final chapter of this thesis builds upon the research findings to answer the 
proposed research questions and zooms out to the MENA region to put the lessons learned 
in comparative perspective. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Context 
Many countries face limitations in the availability and accessibility of surface water. As a 
result, groundwater resources receive increased attention as the most reliable source of 
fresh water for different sectors (Vrba and van der Gun, 2004; Llamas and Martinez Santos, 
2005; Hammani et al., 2009). Groundwater is the earth’s largest accessible stock of unfrozen 
fresh water and constitutes about 94% of all fresh water (Chevalking et al., 2008). Currently, 
groundwater meets over 75% of water demands in countries like Russia, Jamaica, Saudi 
Arabia, Georgia, or Libya (Vrba and van der Gun, 2004), and up to 100% in Denmark (Flindt 
Jørgensen et al., 2016). Globally, it was estimated that 70% of withdrawn groundwater is 
used for agriculture and that groundwater provides almost half of all drinking water 
worldwide (NGWA, 2016). 
The use of groundwater has grown exponentially during recent decades, especially in the 
agricultural sector (Chevalking et al., 2008). Global abstraction for groundwater-based 
agriculture has increased from a level of 100-150 Billion m3 (Bm3) in 1950 to 666 Bm3 in 2010 
(IGRAC, 2010). Groundwater extraction now supplies 43% of the water used in agriculture 
(FAO, 2010; WWDR, 2015). 
The increase in groundwater-based agriculture has been generated by different supply- and 
demand-driven factors (Shah et al., 2007). Supply-driven factors include easy availability of 
inexpensive pumps and drilling technologies that facilitate the access to groundwater 
through government subsidies for wells and pumps or agriculture in general, (Shah et al., 
2007). Demand-driven factors include the increase in population, which lead to increase in 
agricultural activities to support rural livelihoods and feed urban populations (ibid.). In some 
regions, the growing commitment of increasingly variable surface water resources made it 
necessary to complement supply with, and shift to, groundwater. 
The intensive use of groundwater has been a key factor that transformed rural economies in 
various parts of the world (van Steenbergen and El Haouari, 2011). Use of groundwater 
allowed for an increase in irrigation, resulting in higher cropping intensities and productivities 
and expansion of agricultural areas. For example, use of groundwater allowed farmers in 
China to cultivate two crops of maize and wheat per year instead of three rainfed crops of 
maize and wheat in a two-year cycle (Wang et al., 2006). As a result, some countries 
increased their agricultural production and even became exporters, like Bangladesh with 
regard to rice (Palmer-Jones, 1999) and Saudi Arabia with regard to wheat (Abderrahman, 
2003). 
Due to the intensive use of groundwater, groundwater is over abstracted and depleted in 
many regions (Konikow and Kendy, 2005). Abstraction of groundwater in specific aquifers 
exceeds recharge by 100% to 200% in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, 
Morocco and India (Hellegers et al., 2008; FAO, 2009a; MWI, 2009; Garduno et al., 2011), 
and 1000% in parts of the Ogallala aquifer, in the United States (Guru et al., 2000). 
Over abstraction manifests itself through declining groundwater levels in many major 
aquifers globally, with a typical range of 0.5 to 5 m/yr (Guru et al., 2000; Khater, 2002; Bajjali 
and Al-Hadidi, 2005; Elmore et al., 2006; Khair et al., 2010; Gaur et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 
Chapter 1 
24 
2013). This can be briefly illustrated by a few examples. The yearly decline in groundwater 
levels reaches 2-3 m/yr (or more) in Baluchistan, Pakistan (Khair et al., 2010). Elmore et al. 
(2006) noted a decline in groundwater level between 0.5 and 5 m/yr in the Owens Valley, 
Eastern California. Significant decline in groundwater levels in the Beijing Plain, China has 
been observed since the 1970s, with a total drop in groundwater of more than 20 m (Zhou et 
al., 2013). Prakash and Ballabh (2004) observed that in Northern Gujarat, in the west part of 
India, the water table declined by 2.5m/yr since 1960. These and many more examples 
illustrate a general state of overexploitation of groundwater in major irrigated agricultural 
regions globally. 
Although groundwater use may have led to rapid economic development in the short run, 
the excessive use of groundwater resources may also lead to a wide array of social, economic 
and environmental consequences, such as: increases in the vulnerability of agriculture mainly 
for small farms, increase in pumping costs and energy usage, competition for water between 
sectors, critical changes in groundwater flow patterns, decline in water quality, decline in 
stream base flow, and damage to springs and wetlands (FAO, 2003; Goode et al., 2013). 
The expansion of groundwater-based agriculture has accelerated, especially in desert areas 
where groundwater is the only available reliable resource to be used for irrigation. We define 
here groundwater-based agriculture as agriculture that only depends on groundwater 
resources for irrigation purposes and 'desert agriculture' as "the groundwater-based 
agriculture developed in steppe or desert regions where rainfed agriculture is impossible due 
to limited precipitation", and take it as the object of investigation of this research in the 
particular case of Azraq basin in Jordan. 
1.2 Research objectives 
The acceleration of groundwater-based agriculture globally has been associated with a deep 
concern for the overexploitation of aquifers resulting from the expansion of this type of 
agriculture. Controlling abstraction and keeping it close to whatever target is defined as 'safe-
yield' is proving almost impossible in contexts where agriculture users are in high numbers 
and spatially scattered (Molle and Closas, 2017). 
But beyond the central issue of water access, desert agriculture also comes with distinct 
characteristics and challenges: these possibly include remoteness and lack of transportation 
means, higher costs of marketing, limited availability of labor, harsher climatic conditions 
(wind, frost, etc), the need for considerable capital to kick start cultivation, problematic land 
tenure status, higher energy costs (e.g. no connection to the grid, pumping from deep 
aquifers, etc). These possible specific challenges are worth being studied in more details in a 
context where 'desert agriculture', most notably that which corresponds to large-scale 
corporate investments, seems to be on the rise globally (Dixon, 2017). 
The main objective of this thesis is to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of 
limited groundwater resources in desert agriculture. This study has therefore analyzed the 
current unsustainable use of groundwater in desert agriculture, focusing on groundwater 
policy on the one hand, and on the specificities of desert agriculture, on the other, with view 
to discussing the future of the latter in the particular case of Azraq basin in Jordan. Several 
questions are addressed to achieve this research objective. 
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1.2.1 Research questions 
The main research question of this research is: 
What are the physical, economic and political conditions that undergird the development of 
desert agriculture in Jordan, and most specifically Azraq Basin, and what is the future of this 
type of agriculture? 
This main research question leads the researcher to define several sub questions: 
 RQ1: What are the driving forces of desert agriculture development in Jordan 
and the Azraq basin? 
 RQ2: How do public policies respond to the resulting overexploitation and 
depletion of groundwater resources? 
 RQ3: How do desert agriculture entrepreneurs access the various production 
factors needed for cultivation in such a specific environment and what 
particular problems do they face? 
 RQ4: Is desert agriculture in Azraq basin economically feasible, and 
environmentally sustainable? and what are possible prospects for the future? 
 RQ5: What lessons can be drawn from the study of Jordan for desert 
agriculture in the MENA region? 
1.2.2 Research hypotheses 
This research hypothesizes that, despite its recent boom, desert agriculture faces specific 
challenges (accessibility and availability of land, water and production factors) that need to 
be unpacked and analyzed in order to better comprehend its present and future states; the 
researcher also posits that the centrality of groundwater in Jordan’s limited water 
endowment, and the overexploitation of this resource, makes it a prime example to study the 
effectiveness and diversities of groundwater policy measures that can be brought to bear in 
the face of such extreme challenges. The lessons drawn from this research will be valuable 
for the many countries in the world – most particularly those of the MENA region – which 
face or will soon face similar challenges. 
1.3 Research tools 
The research combines both physical and human geography, and has an empirical focus. It is 
based on the collection and analysis of three different types of information: textual 
documents, semi-structured questionnaires of key-informants, structured questionnaires of a 
sample of farmers in Azraq. 
1.3.1 Published information 
Extensive literature search has been carried out on core-issues related to this research, 
including groundwater policies, land tenure in the Arab world, desert agriculture in Jordan 
and in the MENA region. This included conventional scientific articles, theses, and consultant 
reports produced by the numerous aid/cooperation projects carried out in Jordan in the 
fields of groundwater and agriculture. 
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The researcher has also extensively resorted to press articles in English and Arabic which 
reflect government communication (e.g. with regard to implementation of groundwater 
policy and enforcement of law) but also report instances of conflict around land and 
groundwater in Jordan. 
Statistical and qualitative data from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water Authority of Jordan, Department of Lands and Survey, and Department of 
Statistics have also been collected to analyze trends in the water and agricultural sectors. The 
national database of law through the "Official Journal -Prime Minister" has been made use of 
to study the history of water and land laws. 
1.3.2 Semi-structured questionnaires of key-informants and conferences 
General or specific information has also been obtained through the interviews of nine policy-
makers, project consultants and experts - both foreign and Jordanian -, NGOs and 
associations (e.g. RSCN; Azraq Wetland, IUCN, UNDP, GIZ, Mercy Corps and USAID), 
academics and university professors. 
All these informants provided various data and perspectives on land, water, agricultural and 
political issues at different scales and levels. Because some information was sensitive or given 
under the condition of anonymity these informants were only referred to by their function 
('university researcher', 'expert', 'high-level MWRI official', etc). 
As a consultant involved in the USAID-funded project on "Groundwater Governance in the 
Arab World", I have also been involved in discussions with the researchers in the project and 
various officials, and in scientific roundtables and workshops where relevant information was 
provided and discussed: 
- Groundwater Governance in the Arab World: taking Stock and Addressing the 
Challenges, Research Update in Groundwater Policy, Management, Water 
Governance and Future Challenges in Azraq Basin, Jordan (Amman, 29 October 2014). 
- Regional Dialogue on Groundwater Governance (Cairo, 8 – 10 September 2015). 
- Groundwater Dialogue, Jordan Stakeholder meeting (23 – 25 May 2016). 
1.3.3 Structured questionnaires of a sample of farmers in Azraq 
As part of the abovementioned USAID funded project I carried out a detailed farm survey in 
two locations of the Azraq basin: Eastern Mafraq and Azraq wetland area proper. The 
fieldwork was carried out in 2013 and 2015, and 80 farmers (local residents, investors, past 
farmers) were interviewed through questionnaires. The questionnaires covered issues of land 
tenure, cropping patterns, production, water and energy sources and use, animal breeding, 
crop/farm budgets, future perspectives on Azraq, and responses to/perceptions of 
groundwater policies. Because of the sensitivity of the topic and the reluctance of some 
interviewees to be cited, the information gathered is anonymized and interviewees are 
referred to as 'Farmer'. 
1.3.4 Methodology and thesis structure 
The research is divided into three main successive parts, illustrated in Figure 1-1, and 
covering the physical, the policy, and the economic and sustainability contexts. The research 
starts with a review of the situation of groundwater use and depletion globally, as well as of 
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the different policy tools and approaches available to manage groundwater. The focus then 
moves to groundwater-based agriculture in desert areas of the MENA region, highlighting the 
driving forces and specific conditions and constraints of such an activity in five selected 
countries of Middle East and North Africa. This topical review is followed by a general 
description of Azraq Basin, the case study chosen for this thesis, with a spatial explorative 
analysis elaborated using all available data related to the area in order to define windows for 
possible intervention. 
The thesis then moves to examining in more detail the key areas of land and groundwater 
policies, with detailed historical studies and analysis elaborated. They combine two 
approaches. The first one is a formal study that analyzes historical land tenure and 
groundwater laws and by laws. The second approach is based on interviews and interaction 
with groundwater users, governmental bodies, and policy makers via face-to-face meetings. 
The study of land tenure focuses on land conflicts in semi-desert and desert areas of Jordan, 
connecting it with the expansion of irrigated agriculture within the Azraq basin. A historical 
review of land tenure issues is provided, examining the different ways by which state land 
can be privatized, highlighting the conflicts around rights to desert land in the past 30 years, 
while focusing on Azraq basin as a case study. The study results lead us to discuss legal 
pluralism and the interplay between state and tribal power, and to analyze the twin 
strategies of accessing land and groundwater in desert areas. 
After studying land tenure and how it affects the expansion of agriculture in Azraq basin, the 
thesis moves to the area of groundwater policies. I first study groundwater laws and by laws 
and their amendments throughout the years, examine the main tools implemented by the 
Jordanian government to control well expansion and water abstraction. I then use results 
from field work to go beyond formal legalism to study the application of policies on the 
ground, how farmers react toward these measures, and how government in return reacts to 
farmers’ behaviors. This offers a crude perspective on the limits of state regulatory power. 
I then turn to the economic and sustainability contexts of desert agriculture in Azraq, with an 
in-depth survey based on a questionnaire applied in the two main agricultural areas of the 
Azraq basin (Azraq and Mafraq). Two farm typologies are elaborated based on the 
questionnaire results, and the variability of farm gross margins highlights the differences 
between the two agricultural areas. Current cropping pattern are described, water 
productivity and consumption assessed for each farm, and annual farms profit calculated, 
with averages for each farm type. 
Finally, several scenarios are presented about the sustainability of farming systems in Azraq, 
reviewing the constraints and changes in the access to, and costs of, land, energy, water, 
labor and input factors in desert agriculture, reflecting on their bearing on current dynamics 
and future prospects of Azraq’s agriculture. The thesis ends with a short regional perspective 
on how Azraq case relates or differs from the expanding desert agriculture in the MENA 
region. 
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Figure 1-1. Structure of the thesis 
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2 Chapter Two: Groundwater Management and Desert Agriculture in the 
Middle East and North Africa Region 
2.1 Groundwater resources in Mena region: usage and management 
This section reviews the general features of groundwater usage in agriculture in the MENA 
region and explores the management and policy options available to regulate this sector. It 
documents 'desert agriculture' in selected countries of the MENA region, examining in 
particular how farms access the key production factors of land, water, labor, capital. 
2.1.1 Groundwater usage 
Due to limitations in surface water resources and an increasing water demand associated 
with population growth and the priority given to domestic use, groundwater in Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region is now the key to both urban and agricultural development, 
especially in desert areas where it is the only available reliable and accessible resource for 
irrigation. Each country in the MENA region has its own specific purposes when it comes to 
groundwater use in agriculture, including urban expansion into deserts, achieving national 
food sufficiency, economic growth through agribusiness development. 
Until 1970s groundwater was extracted using traditional tools and the dependably on 
groundwater use for irrigation was very minor, but the reliance on groundwater use for 
irrigation has increased since then, along with irrigation development, new drilling and 
pumping techniques, and energy availability. As a result, the percentage of irrigation based 
on groundwater is estimated at 68 % in Algeria, 11% in Egypt, 60% in Syria, 53% in Jordan, 
40% in Morocco, 61% in Tunisia, 100% in Yemen, 99% in Libya and 22 % in Lebanon (FAO, 
2009b). 
In most cases, governments support and subsidize groundwater use in agriculture. The level 
and type of government encouragement varies from country to country. In Algeria, 
groundwater-based agricultural development is encouraged through bank loans for farmers 
and fund irrigation improvement and tractors (Imache et al., 2010). In Egypt, groundwater-
based agriculture has been developed through land reclamation projects with the objective 
of reclaiming desert land to expand the total area of arable land and settle populations 
(Allan, 2001; Adriansen, 2009; Dixon, 2017). In Syria, the large-scale expansion of 
groundwater-irrigated areas was initiated when the government encouraged and supported 
the drilling of wells (Munlahasan, 2007; Aw-Hassan et al., 2014). Farmers have access to 
generous loans to drill wells and install pumps, and heavily subsidized energy prices (De 
Châtel, 2014). In Jordan, government encourages this activity by giving loans to farmers and 
subsidies for irrigation systems, and allocating state lands to peasants (UNDP, 2013). In 
Morocco, despite the worrying status of the main aquifers, the government has provided 
subsidies to well drilling and micro-irrigation (Molle and Tanouti, 2017). In Tunisia, farmers 
are offered subsidies of 40 to 60 percent of their total investment costs for water saving 
irrigation technologies (Frija et al., 2014). In Yemen, groundwater-based agriculture is 
encouraged by bank loans for drilling wells (Closas and Molle, 2016). In Libya, farmers have 
benefit from the heavily subsidized energy (World Bank, 2007). In Lebanon, groundwater-
based agriculture has been encouraged by crops and micro irrigation technique subsidies 
(Nassif, 2016). These encouragements and subsidizes boosted the expansion of groundwater-
based agriculture and increased the reliance on groundwater resources. 
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As a result, the cultivated areas have increased exponentially in all countries. In Egypt, the 
cultivated area is in continuous increase as the government has recently launched a new 
project to further expand desert reclamation by 16.8 million du based on groundwater and 
Nile resource (MetaMeta, 2015). Cultivated area in Syria increased from 3 million du in the 
1980s to 7 million du within a few years (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014). In Jordan, the cultivated 
area in the highlands increased from 362,110 du in 1994 to 761,685 du in 2016 (DoS, 2017). 
In Yemen, the cultivated area increased from 370,000 du in 1975 to around 4 million du in 
2005 (NWRA, 2009). In Libya the total groundwater-irrigated area in 1990 was estimated at 
4.7 million du, with plans to expand up to 7.3 million du by 2025 (Khater, 2002). In Lebanon, 
the irrigated area rose from 400,000 du in 1960s to 1.2 million du in recent years (MoA and 
FAO, 1963, 2010). 
The increase in cultivated areas is associated with increasing in agriculture wells number. The 
number of existing wells provided by official statistics usually underestimate reality because 
inventories are rarely up-to-date, and the proportion of unknown wells can be large. Even 
with such uncertainty, reported numbers are staggering. In Algeria, the number of wells 
increased from few thousand in the 1980s reaching 113,600 wells in 2008 (FAO, 2008b). In 
Egypt, the total number of wells in the whole delta was estimated by the ministry of water 
and irrigation in 1992 with 10,420 wells and increased in 2012 to 23,000 wells (MWRI, 2012). 
However, a study conducted by El-Agha et al. (2017) about the groundwater based 
agriculture in the central Nile Delta highlighted that groundwater use remains a blind spot 
and estimated that the total number of wells in the delta could now exceed 73,000 wells, 
seven times higher than it was in 1992 (ibid.). In Syria, the total number of wells in the 1980s 
was estimated at 53,000, but this number boomed in the 1990s and in 1994 the (official) 
number of wells reached 124,000 (Aw-Hassan et al., 2014). Number of wells in Jordan 
increased from few hundreds in the 1980s up to around 4000 wells in 2017 (Molle et al., 
2017a). In Tunis, the total number of wells doubled between 1980s to 2000 reaching 120,000 
wells (Gaubi, 2008) and then it increased to more than 137000 wells in 2008 according to 
FAO (2009c). In Yemen, the number of wells increased from a few thousands in the 1970s to 
more than 50,000 in 2007 (Hellegers et al., 2008). In Lebanon, the number of wells in the 
1970s did not exceed 3000. In 2003 the number increased to around 10,000 registered wells 
and at least 40,000 non-registered wells (Ghiotti and Riachi, 2013; World Bank, 2003). More 
recently, UNDP (2014) estimated non-registered wells at around 59,000, against 20,500 
registered wells. 
The intensive use of groundwater in the MENA region has caused severe depletion of the 
resource due to abstraction exceeding the safe yield in most aquifers. This extensive use has 
caused a decline by up to 1 m/yr in the North Algerian aquifers (FAO, 2008b) and in the 
Egyptian west Delta aquifer (Dixon, 2017). In Syria, a study done by Margane (2003) found 
that in the 1993-2002 period groundwater levels in the Ghuta (Damascus) and its 
surroundings dropped by more than 6 m/yr. Groundwater was found to be declined in Jordan 
with an average value of 0.8 m/yr (Goode et al., 2013). Decline in groundwater tables was 
observed in Morocco by 30 m on average in the past 25 years (FAO, 2008a; Saidi, 2012). In 
Tunis, water table was noticed to be declined by 1-14 m in the different piezometers 
controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture (Ben Hamouda, 2008). In Yemen, JICA (2007) 
reported a yearly decline in groundwater levels by 7 m in Sana’a basin and overdraft of 
around four to five times the recharge, 5 m in Northern Highlands basins, 4 m in Taiz basin, 
while overdraft in Wadi Hadhramout basin was seven times the recharge. Ben Ghashir, the 
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heaviest groundwater extraction zone of the Jefara Plain in Libya, faced an extensive decline 
in water table with groundwater levels falling from 17 m below the ground surface in 1958, 
to 37 m in 1970, and to 92 m in 1989 (Salem, 1991). In Lebanon, groundwater in the Beqaa 
valley, has drawdown reached 40 m between 1970 and 2010 (Nassif, 2016). 
Such dramatic drops in water levels have come along with a host of negative consequences. 
Sea water intrusion was noticed in some costal area countries such as Gaza (Al-Jamal, 1996), 
Bahrain (Zubari and Lori, 2006) and Algeria (FAO, 2008b). A sharp decline in springs natural 
flows was recorded in Lebanon (Nassif, 2016) and Morocco (van Steenbergen and El Naouari, 
2010), while other springs dried up in Jordan or Syria (Margane, 2003; De Châtel, 2014). 
Increase in water salinity and deterioration in water quality were observed in Tunis (Faysee et 
al., 2011), Syria (Arraf, 2016), Jordan (El-Naqa, 2010), Egypt (Dixon, 2017) and Lybia (Khater, 
2002) as result of tapping deeper layers of the aquifers. 
What can be concluded from this overall review of groundwater use in the MENA region? It is 
observed that groundwater use in agriculture has been accelerated since 1970 with a direct 
and indirect government encouragement. This use is associated with increase in cultivation 
area and wells number. The intensive use of groundwater causes a pattern of severe 
overexploitation, with water tables dropping by an average between 0.3 and 3 m/yr., 
seawater intrusion in coastal aquifers, drying up of springs and river beds, uncertainty when 
it comes to the number of functioning wells and huge numbers of illegal wells. Much of this 
imbalance has been initially generated by state subsidies supporting well drilling or 
agricultural expansion. 
The next section will focus on tools and instrument of groundwater management at aquifer 
level in the MENA region and how these tools often encourage groundwater-based 
agriculture rather than controlling it to some extent. 
2.1.2 Aquifer management 
While the preceding section has focused on documenting the status of groundwater use in 
the MENA region, we turn here to the types of management approaches and tools that can 
be found in the region. Molle and Closas (2017) have classified state-management tools 
according to the policy objective: 1) augmenting supply; 2) controlling the number and 
expansion of wells; 3) controlling abstraction in existing wells (Figure 2-1). The researcher 
chose here to follow OECD (2015), Faysse and Petit (2012) and others to distinguish between 
1) regulatory tools; 2) supply augmentation; 3) demand-management; 4) community-
management options. 
2.1.2.1 Regulatory tools 
Management of groundwater resources use in MENA region is controlled by legislation and 
regulations. Faysse et al. (2011) and Closas and Molle (2016) have listed and discussed a 
number of policy instruments and tools for groundwater management and where these are 
applied in the Arab world (Table 2-1). 
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Figure 2-1. Main groundwater policy objectives and tools (Molle and Closas, 2017) 
Table 2-1. Main regulatory tools used in MENA countries (adapted from Closas and Molle, 
2016) 
Tool Examples of implementation  
Permits Syria, Morocco, Egypt 
Well spacing Lebanon 
Well drilling prohibition zones or well bans Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon 
Limitation or ban of electric connections to wells or labor 
permits 
Tunisia, Jordan 
Well buy out or backfilling  Jordan  
Control of drillers Jordan, Oman, Yemen 
Quotas Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen 
Well zoning  Syria, Tunisia 
Well control can be achieved using different tools such as introducing a well registry and/or 
permit system, defining a minimum spacing between wells, or delineating prohibition areas 
were aquifers should be conserved. 
New technologies are adopted to assist in groundwater management, like GIS and remote 
sensing which help control illegal well drilling and cultivated area expansion. 
All MENA region countries have introduced a registry system for wells whereby licenses or 
permits are required. Different licenses are sometimes granted for the act of 
drilling/constructing the well first, and then for exploiting the well (e.g. Lebanon, Jordan). The 
procedure for obtaining well licenses may vary from country to country: in Yemen for 
example, wells should have licenses permitting a specific amount of abstraction under the 
Manage supply
Deepening/cleaning wells
Water harvesting
Artificial recharge (injection)
Water harvesting structures
Bring substitute surface water
or treated/desal water
Licensing wells
Prohibition zones
Well spacing
Backfill illegal wells
Control drillers
Buy out wells
Ban new wells
Sanctioning
Do not allow
deepening/rep.
Community  
rules
Revert to
rainfed
Subsidize micro irrigation  
(& control expansion)
Awareness raising
Water pricing
Control electricity grid
Restrict crop type
Impose quotas
(per ha, per well)
Input or output
subsidies
Policy
objectives
Micro-
irrigation
Change crops
Collective
rules
Control the 
number and
expansion 
of wells
Control
abstraction
by existing
wells
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control of the National Water Resource Agency (Morill and Simas, 2009), although no 
tangible monitoring takes place and most wells do not have a permit (ibid.). In Jordan, drilling 
first requires a permit and all working wells should then have licenses or permit and a 
metering system. Each well has its own specificity in allowable water abstraction and fees for 
water use (Molle et al., 2017a). In Lebanon, a well permit is a must for wells that are deeper 
than 150 m and use fees are applied for wells that discharged more than 100 m3/day (Molle 
et al., 2017b). 
Oftentimes, when registration systems are established or tightened up, the question of the 
legalization of existing wells comes up. As documented by Molle and Closas (2017) for 
countries like Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, but also Mexico or South Africa, this is a tedious 
and never fully achieved process. Faysse et al. (2011) have also stressed the difficulties of 
well registration in Morocco, where farmers have been suspicious of the state intention of 
giving them a period for well registration. Generally, they only declared their boreholes if 
they needed a deepening authorization or a subsidy for micro-irrigation (Faysse et al., 2011). 
In Tunisia, the lack of farmer technical knowledge about the aquifer status and a weak law 
enforcement, compounded after the Arab spring in 2010, have caused an increase in the 
number of illegal wells (Frija et al., 2014). 
Countries can also control illegal expansion of well drilling indirectly, by controlling well 
drillers. In Yemen, all drilling rigs must meet technical specifications issued by the NWRA 
(Morill and Simas, 2009). In Oman, only government registered contractors are allowed to 
construct and maintain wells and install pumps (ibid.). In Jordan a driller permit is issued for a 
period of one year and it is subject to yearly renewal, with penalties in case of illegal practice 
(more details in Chapter 6). Yet, such regulations have been insufficient to wipe out illegal 
well drilling. 
2.1.2.2 Supply management 
Historically, water resources management and policies were supply driven only (Bakir, 2001). 
Countries in the MENA region have developed large-scale infrastructure and public irrigation 
schemes, mostly based on surface water diversions. This includes large-scale projects in the 
Tigris-Euphrates plain (Syria and Iraq), the Ghab (Syria) and Jordan Valley (Jordan), expansion 
of cultivation in the Nile Delta and its vicinity, and several large- to medium-size schemes in 
'Maghreb countries, notably Morocco. Withdrawals for all types of use, whether planned or 
not, have taken their toll on river systems and, later, aquifers, following classic trajectories of 
'river basin closure' (Molden et al., 2001; Molle et al., 2010). Although water-demand 
management has then been promoted, it is always tempting for decision-makers to attempt 
to mobilize more water, even if this is economically irrational. Spreading costs over the state 
budget is invariably seen as a better political option than adopting regulations or tools which 
would result in people having less or more costly water (Molle, 2008). With renewable fresh 
groundwater being almost fully exploited, supply augmentation options, aside from 
additional dams, have considered non-conventional sources of supply, such as wastewater 
treatment, desalination, managed aquifer recharge or water imports (Bakir, 2001; Khater, 
2002). It is hoped that resorting to available alternative supplies will help conserve the 
limited remaining groundwater (Khater, 2002; Shah, 2007), but more often this 'new' water 
only helps absorbing growing needs, if not spurring more use and consumption (Molle et al., 
Forthcoming). In general, the use of non-conventional sources of water is costly. Wastewater 
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needs a treatment plant, seawater desalination needs expensive technology and a lot of 
energy, and water transfers need pipes, canals, tunnels and pumping stations, and frequently 
have third-party and environmental impacts. 
Artificial groundwater recharge is one of the means to manage and conserve groundwater 
resource that will enhance available groundwater stocks (Abu Jaber, 2001; Khater, 2002; Al 
Raggad and Jassem, 2010; Hamdane, 2014). Artificial recharge can be done directly by 
injecting fresh water directly into aquifers or indirectly by building dams, ponds and 
catchment to 'harvest' runoff during the wet season(s) (El Naqa and Al-Shayeb, 2009). This 
method is already implemented in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, UAE, Tunis and Qatar 
(Khater, 2002; UNESCO, 2014; Closas and Molle, 2016). In Tunis, aquifer recharge using small 
dams accounts for 4% of the total recharge volume of the country (Hamdane, 2014). 
Treated wastewater, and sometimes even desalinated water (e.g. in Abu Dhabi), can be used 
to artificially recharge groundwater aquifers. Despite the advantage of artificial recharge, 
problems might still occur in some countries as land to construct recharge facilities may not 
be available or may be too expensive to acquire. Aquifer contamination and change in water 
physical and chemical properties are also problematic, especially when the source of 
recharged water has different quality than the water preserved in the aquifer (Bakir, 2001 
and Khater, 2002). Tunis is one of the countries that use wastewater to recharge 
groundwater aquifers (Louati and Bucknall, 2009; Ouelhazi et al., 2014). 
Use of treated wastewater for agriculture is one popular option nowadays in MENA region 
countries (FAO, 1997; FAO, 2009b; Bakir, 2001). In 1997, FAO reported that Jordan has 
started using 50.3 Mm3/yr of this source for irrigation since in the Jordan Valley (FAO, 1997). 
In many countries farmers abstract wastewater directly from drain and rivers, whether it is 
partially treated or not at all (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, Morocco). In Tunis, wastewater is used for 
agriculture since 1989 (FAO, 2009c), it represents around 30% of the country’s agriculture 
water supply. Bahrain has expanded its infrastructure in non-conventional water sources with 
a total capacity to treat wastewater in 2012 of 36.1 Mm3 (Al Insari, 2013). Oman also has 
introduced wastewater reuse (Zekri, 2008). 
Desalination is an important source of alternative water supply in the Gulf States as it 
accounts for more than 55% of the total water withdrawn urban area of Bahrain, UAE, Qatar 
and Kuwait (UNDP, 2013). Saudi Arabia and UAE jointly produce more than 30% of the 
world’s desalinated water (UNESCO, 2012; Ragab, 2013). Tunis started in 1995 a large 
program of investment to improve water quality of public drinking water, tourism and 
industrial through installation of desalination plans (Gaubi, 2008). Bahrain also started to use 
treat wastewater and desalination water for agriculture use and keep the groundwater 
resource for drinking purposes only (Zubari and Lori, 2006; Al Insari, 2013; Al-Zubari, 2014). 
Local and transboundary water transfers are also considered as one of the options to bring in 
more water and meet demand and/or reduce groundwater depletion. Jordan tried to explore 
this option with Turkey but it was never applied for political reasons. On the other hand, it 
worked for the Syrian part but for a small-scale water transfer only, helping Jordan to 
alleviate the summer water shortage (Bakir, 2001). Morocco has future plans to transfer 
water from the north of the country to the south, as indicated in the country’s water strategy 
for 2030. It expects to transfer around 845 Mm3/yr (OECD, 2017). Closas and Molle (2016) 
indicated that the transferred water can be used for drinking purposes in Marrakech city, 
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which will decrease the pressure on already stressed Haouz aquifer (ibid.). Egypt also has a 
plan to transfer Nile water to the groundwater-based West Delta area (Barnes, 2012). The 
implementation of this project has been delayed due to the 2011 Revolution and other 
problems (Closas and Molle, 2016). 
Water transfers are also resorted to in Tunisia, from the north and west of the country 
towards the more urbanized coast and the Cap Bon core agricultural region. Water is in 
particular transferred from the Medjerda basin (north-east) to Sfax (western Tunisia). They 
are also very common in Algeria, where water from surplus catchments from the west, and 
from fossil aquifers in the south, is transferred to the north-western coast with both surface 
and groundwater deficits (Demmak, 2010). 
2.1.2.3 Demand management 
Demand management means "the application of a range of physical and economic measures 
to achieve higher efficiency in the way water is utilized" (Khater, 2002). It can also be defined 
as "the management of the total quantity of water abstracted from a source of supply using 
measures to control waste and undue consumption" (Herbertson and Tate, 2001). Brooks 
and Wolfe (2007) defined demand management as "getting the most from the water we 
have, it includes any action that reduces the amount of fresh water we need, or that keeps 
water cleaner than it otherwise would be." 
Demand management can take many forms, from direct measures to control water use -
through institutional reforms, updates of water policies and monitoring the implementation 
of regulatory tools and instruments -, to indirect measures such as market mechanisms, 
financial incentives and public awareness programs (Khater, 2002; Brooks and Wolfe, 2007; 
USAID, 2011). 
Introducing water tariffs and fees, metering systems and using technologies are considered 
as options to control groundwater abstraction. However, hardly any country in the region 
charges for groundwater use in agriculture. Jordan is an exception. Water pricing is generally 
ineffective because the water charge remains small compared with other agricultural inputs, 
and because in any case the rate of fee recovery is low to nil and not recovered (e.g. 
Morocco or Lebanon) (Saghir, 2004; Brooks and Wolfe, 2007; Al Naber et al., 2010; Al Naber 
and Molle, 2017). Water pricing, but also the implementation of quotas or any volumetric 
management, depends on the existence of metering. Jordan, Syria and UAE are among the 
MENA region countries that imposed metering systems for groundwater wells to control 
extraction (Stephan, 2007; Venot et al., 2007a, 2007b). However, it has been noticed from 
several studies that not all groundwater wells are equipped with a meter in the mentioned 
countries above. For example, in Amman Zarqa basin, Jordan, 90% of the wells had a 
metering system, yet only 61% were working less than ten years after their installation 
(Chebaane et al., 2004; Venot et al., 2007a). Chebaane et al. (2004) emphasized farmers’ 
perspective about meters, seen as unreliable tools for monitoring and controlling 
groundwater pumping, and the widespread occurrence of tampering and vandalism 
(Chebaane et al., 2004). 
Raising users’ awareness about water scarcity is another avenue. In Jordan, USAID assisted in 
developing a water demand management strategy for the country since 1999, including 
projects like 1) Water Efficiency and Public Information for Action (WEPIA) which aimed to 
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promote water conservation among Jordanians and introduce water demand management 
principles, 2) Education and Information Program to Improve Irrigation Water Use Efficiency 
(KAFA’A) that aimed to initiate water conservation among Jordanian farmers in selected 
areas, 3) Community-Based Initiative for Water Demand Management, that aimed to enable 
poor communities in rural areas to establish water efficiency programs, 4) Groundwater 
Monitoring Project, which helped the WAJ to enforce the Groundwater By-Law (USAID, 
2011). Lately in 2007–2011, USAID implement the IDRA project in Jordan with the aim of 
strengthening institutional capacity for water demand management in a number of entities 
of the water sector. 
A key objective of any demand management program is to reduce water losses (Khater, 
2002). In most MENA countries, irrigation water system efficiency ranges from 80 – 50%, 
which means that loss by seepage at the plot level ranges between 20% and 50% (Khater, 
2002; Lee and Schwab, 2005). Reduction of leakage by improving irrigation system efficiency 
increases water supply availability and saves costs (Khater, 2002). Implementation of limited 
leakage detection programs in the Gulf States succeeded in reducing leakage by 8% in 
Bahrain and 15% in Qatar (Khater, 2002). Irrigation techniques should therefore be changed 
from basin/gravity irrigation to drip irrigation to improve irrigation efficiency. In addition, 
national programs and trainings should be conducted to guide farmers on when, how and 
how much water to apply to different types of crops. 
However, in many cases water savings at the plot level do not translate into more water 
being available at the system of basin level. Molle (2017) has analyzed the case of Morocco, 
where policymakers introduced subsidies to convert gravity irrigation system into micro 
irrigation system with the aim to conserve water and increase farmers’ profit and farm 
productivity. Taxes on importing micro-irrigation equipment have been reduced and even 
canceled since 1982 (MAPM, 2007; Laamari et al., 2011). Subsidies to drip was gradually 
increased from 30-40% in 2002 to 60% in 2006, and 80% for large farms and 100% for farms 
under 50 du in 2008 (Molle, 2017). By 2014, the annual rate of conversion to drip irrigation 
was estimated at 500,000 du/yr. Regarding water savings, in 2016 the Ministry reported that 
the conversion to drip implemented so far had estimated saving of 800 million m3 (Mm3), and 
that "farmers had been able to diversify their production systems and achieve up to three 
times more production with half the water" (quoted in L’Economiste, 2016). Molle (2017) 
shows that while "drip irrigation and other measures do indeed have a positive impact on 
land and water productivity", the quantity of water applied is not necessarily reduced, and 
even where this is the case farmers take advantage of the new system to cultivate crops in a 
more intensive way (e.g. by intercropping and increasing the density of trees) (ibid.). 
One of the points emphasized by Molle is that irrigation does not necessarily reduce soil 
evaporation significantly as less soil is wet but it is wet for longer period, while crop 
transpiration is increased due to increasing in irrigation frequency which causes an increase 
in productivity (Burt et al., 2004; Molle, 2017). On balance, the safer –and quite conservative- 
working hypothesis, also arrived at after a review of the literature by Perry and Steduto 
(2017), is that drip irrigation reduces applied water on average but is neutral in terms of 
water effectively consumed. 
This situation, also observed in other countries such as Tunisia (WaterWatch, 2008), implies 
that the real water savings that can be achieved are limited. This physical limitation adds to 
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those mentioned for economic tools. But major constraints to demand-management also 
relate to administrative weaknesses and lack of political will. All in all, Brooks and Wolfe 
(2007) describe water demand management in the MENA region as a failure as it is linked to 
the policy "even if policies avow support for water demand management, they commonly 
falter in application and implementation" (Brooks and Wolfe, 2007). 
In conclusion, demand management is a key policy objective but its potential may be less 
than usually expected or wished for. This includes hydrologic (e.g. scale issue and water 
savings), socio-economic (e.g. limits to pricing), political (e.g. lack of political will to enforce 
measures impacting uses and users) and logistic reasons (lack of continuous monitoring of 
practices). 
2.1.2.4 Community-based management and co-management 
Groundwater is one of the common-pool resources characterized by costly exclusion and 
subtractability of units (Ostrom, 2003; Bravo and Marelli, 2008). Common-pool resources are 
shared by different users, which may generate competition around their utilization, often 
leading to their degradation and destruction (Hardin, 1968; Bravo and Marelli, 2008). 
As groundwater is a fundamental natural resource for life, strategies for sustainable 
management are a necessity, especially in arid water stressed countries. Local community 
and participatory approaches are found to be one of the solutions for natural resource 
management, if proper understanding of over-abstraction and social capital can prompt a 
collective response by the community of groundwater users (Dayton-Johnson, 2000; Chirenje 
et al., 2013). 
Groundwater community management can either be endogenous or exogenous, or a mixed 
process between both (Closas and Molle, 2016). Endogenous groundwater community 
management can be found in a place where oasis, springs, qanats are found. Users in such 
places have learned to manage village resources through a collective management approach 
(Wade, 1987; Pinkerton, 1989; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Stevenson, 2005). Such management is 
well illustrated by Oman, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. Farmers have also been capable of 
defining collective arrangements to invest in and manage collective wells, like in Morocco or 
Algeria (Hammani et al., 2009, Faysse et al., 2011; Closas and Molle, 2016). But managing 
collectively an aquifer is a different matter. 
Closas and Molle (2016) consider that "the use of traditional groundwater management 
system in the Arab world demonstrates that communities have the capacity to manage and 
share groundwater orderly and cooperatively." Petit (2004) explains that in a situation of 
water stress local stakeholders often recognize the common character of groundwater 
resources and try to find adapted solutions to overexploitation. Ghazouani et al. (2012) also 
demonstrated that farmers are reasonably aware of the constraints of Nefzawa oasis in the 
south of Tunisia environment due to their long term practical experience. Yet, examples of 
pure community-based management of local aquifers are hard to find, with Yemen standing 
out as a country where some local regulations have sometimes been put in place (Taher et 
al., 2012). 
Exogenous types of community groundwater management allow to some extent the 
involvement of the state in the formation of collective groups or arrangements to oversee 
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management (Closas and Molle, 2016). This is well illustrated by Jordan where the 
government established water user associations in the Jordan Valley and with the GIZ 
initiative in the highlands through highland water forum. It is also presented in Tunisia’s GDAs 
(Closas and Molle, 2017). In such case we can talk of co-management between the state and 
users. 
In Jordan, the Highland Water Forum was a co-management initiative started by GIZ (2010-
2013) under the umbrella of Ministry of Water and Irrigation with an objective "to bring the 
conflicting water users, particularly the water-governing authorities and the agricultural 
community, to agreement regarding the causes for dwindling groundwater resources, and to 
collectively think of creative solutions. " The forum was akin to a multi-stakeholder dialogue, 
with participants from the farm to the policy level. The main outcome of the forum is an 
action plan for the sustainable management of groundwater, developed through several 
meetings with different actors in the basin. The plan was presented to the Minister of Water 
and Irrigation but no real action had been initiated as of late 2015 (Al Naber, 2016). 
In Tunis, the co-management approach is exemplified by the Bsissi case, were the GDA 
(Groupement de Développement Agricole) is involved in the aquifer management with the 
local administration (CRDA), with the central aim of controlling the proliferation of illegal 
wells for agriculture uses. A partnership between stakeholders was established in order to 
implement a management system for the aquifer. The partnership resulted in creation of the 
association for the development, monitoring, and exploitation of the Bsissi-Oued El Akarit 
aquifer. This association was involved in backfilling some illegal wells as well as preventing 
the drilling of wells (Hamdane, 2015). It also tried to reduce the amount of water used and 
the total irrigated area (ibid.). This case is believed to be a success but it has not been 
documented in detail and concerns a limited number of well/well users (100+). It is unclear 
whether it could be reproduced at a larger scale. 
From the above, it can be sensed that while communities in the MENA have proved to have 
the capacity to manage groundwater resource by themselves in the case of a small irrigation 
scheme, co-management solutions have to be found for larger/more complex situations.  
2.2 Desert agriculture 
2.2.1 Examples of desert agriculture 
Arid or desert areas usually have climatic features that preclude rainfed agriculture. But 
when a source of water occurs naturally (springs in oases) or can be tapped (groundwater, or 
surface water transferred, like in Toshka, Egypt), intense solar radiation and pest-free 
environments may become assets for irrigated agriculture. Expanding agriculture into desert 
lands may become a strategy for either individuals or corporate entities, or for the 
governments willing to provide settlement/livelihood opportunities and boost agricultural 
production and/or exports. Earlier I have defined 'desert agriculture' as "the groundwater-
based agriculture developed in steppe (badia) or desert (sahra) regions where rainfed 
agriculture is impossible due to limited precipitation." 
While the first Part provided a bird-eyed view of groundwater use and management in the 
MENA region, we focus here more specifically on desert agriculture in 5 selected countries of 
the MENA region, and then briefly reflect on the challenges posed by the need of accessing 
key agricultural production factors in such extreme environments. These examples will be 
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mobilized in the final synthesis part to better underline what is specific to our case study in 
Jordan, and what wider lessons can be drawn from it. 
2.2.1.1 Saudi Arabia 
Desert agriculture is quite prominent in Saudi Arabia. The country is characterized by desert 
climatic condition with limited precipitation and high temperature. Farming in desert started 
in the kingdom in the 1960s with a total cultivated area of 3.4 million du, increased to reach 
12,135,860 du in 2005 (FAO, 2009a) and up to 34,218, 540 du in 2017 (MEWA, 2017). This 
type of cultivation was encouraged by the government to achieve food self-sufficiency 
through agricultural support policies, including free-of–interest loans, price incentives to 
crops, and subsidies for machine and irrigation equipment (Abderrahman, 2005; Ouda, 
2014). The agriculture sector accounts for 88% of the country’s water withdrawals, while 
industrial and municipalities receive only 3% and 9% respectively (FAO, 2009a). Groundwater 
in the kingdom is the main source for irrigation since as much as 97% of irrigation water 
comes from groundwater resource, while the rest 3% is supplied from non-conventional 
water resources (FAO, 2009a). Sprinkler irrigation system is the most widespread system in 
the desert farms, with a share of 64% followed by surface irrigation with 34% and localized 
irrigation system with 2% only. Wheat is the main crop cultivated in the desert followed by 
fodders, vegetables and fruits. 
Figure 2-2 shows groundwater basins in Saudi Arabia. Farming in the desert is mainly located 
in two areas in the kingdom: Tabuk, with the Saq-Rum aquifer, and Wadi Ad Dawasir, based 
on Wajid aquifer (Figure 2-2). Saq-Rum is a shared aquifer between southern Jordan (named 
Disi or Rum aquifer) and the north of Saudi Arabia. It covers a total area of approximately 
560,000 km2, of which 82,000 km2 are in Jordan and 478,000 km2 in Saudi Arabia (UN-ESCWA 
and BGR, 2013). 
 
Figure 2-2. Groundwater aquifers in Saudi Arabia (arabgeographers.net) 
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The aquifer is a nonrenewable fossil aquifer with a thickness varying between 500 m up to 
4000 m (Charalambous, 2016). Currently, it is exploited from the Tabuk Plain in Saudi Arabia 
to Wadi Rum in Jordan. Groundwater in Tabuk is used to irrigate extensive wheat production 
since the late 1970s, with a later substantial shift towards fruits and vegetables produced by 
private companies (ElHadj, 2004; Ouda, 2014; Charalambous, 2016). In the 1980s, the annual 
abstraction from Saq-Rum aquifer in the Tabuk area was estimated at 20 Mm3, but it rose 
dramatically to reach 1,000 Mm3 in 1990 (Haiste in association with Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, 
1995). In 2000, the abstraction was reduced to 700 Mm3 through government initiative to 
decrease groundwater consumption and discontinue agriculture subsidies (Scott Wilson 
Kirkpatrick, 2002), although abstraction in 2004-2005 had increased again, reaching 1050-
1700 Mm3 (UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013; Ouda, 2014). More than 90% of the abstracted water 
is used for irrigation and the remaining is for domestic and industrial water supply of the 
town of Tabuk. Figure 2-3 shows a part of irrigation scheme in Tabuk area, Saq aquifer. There 
are two main agriculture companies located at Tabuk area: TADCO (which covers 350,000 du) 
and ASTRA (which covers 32000 du) (UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013). Both companies are 
privately owned, the former is dealing only with agriculture, while ASTRA invests in a wide 
range of sectors that include construction, mining, energy, food and agriculture, healthcare, 
Industry, etc.. Small farmers are also found in Saudi Arabia but they are working on a very 
small scale mainly to provide food locally or to their family and animals. 
While the aquifer is extensively used for agricultural purposes on the Saudi Arabia side, 
Jordan has lately discontinued agriculture partially to transfer this groundwater resource to 
fill the gap in water demand from Jordanian cities. In order to manage the shared aquifer, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2007 between Ministry of Water and 
Irrigation of Jordan and the Ministry of Water and Electricity of Saudi Arabia prohibiting the 
construction of production wells and the expansion of agricultural activities within 10 km 
from either side of the southern border of the two countries. In 2015 an agreement was also 
signed between both countries to enforce the prohibition of pumping in a buffer zone 
(Müller et al., 2017). 
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Figure 2-3. Cultivation in Tabuk area (Google Earth and Ministry of Agriculture and Water, 
Water Atlas of Saudi Arabia 1984) 
2.2.1.2 Morocco 
In Morocco, groundwater-based agriculture has developed around the oases along the 
eastern border of the country and in the south, more prominently in the Souss-Massa 
watershed, which we take here as an example of desert agriculture (Figure 2-4). The Souss-
Massa watershed is considered as one of the most dynamic and wealthy regions in the 
country, as it provides most of the Moroccan agricultural exports while covering local food 
requirements, in addition of its importance for fisheries, tourism and mining activities (Moha 
et al., 2017). The Souss-Massa watershed covers a surface area of 27,000 km2, with a total 
population of 2.56 million (RGPH, 2014). The Souss-Massa plain is characterized by a semi-
arid climatic condition with an average rainfall of less than 200 mm/yr and potential 
evapotranspiration near 2,000 mm/yr (Choukr-Allah et al., 2017). The total water use is 
approximately 1,034 Mm3/year, where 36% is from surface water and 64% extracted from 
aquifers. 95% of the total amount is used in agriculture while the rest is drinking and 
industrial water (ABHSMD, 2007). 
The development of groundwater based agriculture in the plain started in the 1940s, after a 
hydrological study highlighted the presence of aquifers in the area. The cultivated area, 
estimated at 67000 du in 1950, increased dramatically within 6 years to reach 280,000 du. 
Lately in 2011, the cultivated agricultural area in the Souss-Massa totaled around 1.6 million 
du of which 780,224 du are irrigated lands and 820,186 du are rain-fed (Doukkali, 2011). 
Citrus, cereals and vegetables are the main crops found in the area. 80% of the farms are 
considered small with an area less than 50 du (ADA, 2013). Production of citrus and early 
vegetables in Souss-Massa represents 55% and 85% of the national export respectively 
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(APEFEL, 2014). About one fourth of the regional citrus plantations occurs in the El-Guerdane 
district (100,000 du), representing over 50% of the Moroccan citrus production, with the 
remaining devoted to annual crop cultivation (ADA, 2013). Flood irrigation system is still the 
most common in the area followed by sprinkler and drip irrigation system (Choukr-Allah et 
al., 2017). 
 
Figure 2-4. Souss Masa aquifer, Morroco (ABHSM, 2005) 
Groundwater in the plain is facing deterioration in terms of both quality and quantity 
(Houdret, 2012; Choukr-Allah et al., 2017; Moha et al., 2017). The Souss-Massa plain 
experiences a structural average deficit of 270 Mm3/yr (Closas and Molle, 2016). Water table 
is declining annually at a rate ranging between 0.5 and 2.5 m (Choukr-Allah et al., 2017). In 
the past three decades, water tables decreased by about 15 m in the upstream Souss basin, 
by more than 30 m in the middle Souss, and by 20 m in the downstream part (ABHSMD, 
2007). 
Two main projects have been implemented in the plain to face groundwater depletion: El- 
Guerdane PPP project and Chtouka project (Houdret, 2012; Moha et al., 2017). As mentioned 
above, El Guerdane supports the country production of citrus fruit. Groundwater depletion 
affected this cultivation negatively and some farms had to be abandoned. Accordingly, a 
project for saving the local citrus fruit sector was implemented via a public-private 
partnership with the aim of decreasing the pressure on groundwater resource and 
conserving the citrus production by transferring 45 Mm³ of surface water yearly from a dam 
located at a distance of 90 km to benefit 100,000 du citrus farms (Figure 2-5) (Houdret, 
2012). The second initiative is desalination of sea water to provide water for irrigation in 
Chtouka agricultural area where groundwater levels have dropped by 40 m over the past 20 
years (MAPM, 2012). 
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Figure 2-5. El Guerdane project scheme (Houdret, 2012) 
In parallel with both initiatives, the government tried to establish a contrat de nappe (aquifer 
contract) with local users, aiming in particular at freezing the expansion of irrigated areas in 
certain areas, shifting from gravity to drip irrigation systems, increasing the fees for 
groundwater user, and regularizing illegal wells (Closas and Molle, 2016). 
Guerdane stands out as a large-scale fully groundwater-based agricultural area which 
qualifies as desert agriculture, as defined earlier. Who is farming in Guerdane? Agribusiness 
investors, large holders and small farmers are presented in the project area. Most of the 
farms in Guerdane project are relatively large, with an average size of 160 du. Only 13% of 
the farms have an area under 30 du (Houdret and Bonnet, 2013). 
2.2.1.3 Algeria 
Abstraction of groundwater for agriculture purposes in Algeria occurs in the north via shallow 
wells and often in conjunction with surface water and rainfall (mainly in Mitidja and 
Ouarizane), and in the south (Algerian part of the Sahara Desert) using traditional foggaras 
systems and tubewells. Groundwater basins in the north are renewable while in the south 
they are largely fossil non-renewable aquifers (some exceptions can be found in western 
oases and at the southern foot of the Atlas Mountain). Most groundwater basins both in the 
north and the south are overexploited or being mined, with annual drops in water table by 1 
m or more (Imache et al., 2010). 
Farming in Algerian Sahara Desert has been promoted by the World Bank, stressing the 
necessity to diversify the oil-based economy of the country (The North Africa Post, 2013). 
Agriculture now features as the booming sector in the country, providing more employment 
than the oil industry. The government encouraged farming in the desert through cheap loans 
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and concessions to farmers willing to take up the challenge of toiling their farmlands in the 
desert (The North Africa Post, 2013). 
There are several types of farming in the Sahara Desert, from small-holder farming to 
corporate farming. Desert potato production started in the beginning of the 2000s in El Oued 
region, south of Algeria (Figure 2-6), mostly taken up by local small holders or migrants with 
limited investment capacity. This production was successful due to the presence of fossil 
aquifer water and favorable mild and sunny winter climate (Agroberichten, 2016). The 
potatoes are cultivated in one-hectare circular fields irrigated by locally developed and 
adapted center pivots (Agroberichten, 2016). This cultivation made El Oued as the largest 
potato production area of Algeria with two harvests per year and providing 40% of the 
country’s production (Potatopro, 2016). Constraints emerged lately, including a decline in the 
water table, an increase in temperature, plus the lack of efficiency/uniformity of irrigation by 
locally-made mini-center-pivots which affect production negatively (Agroberichten, 2016). 
 
Figure 2-6. Potato fields in El Ouda (Steinmetz, 2015) 
The Southern Agri-Food Complex (CAAS) is an example of joint-stock company established by 
local investors, with the aim to develop 300,000 du in the Adrar region through cultivation of 
cereals and industrial crops (tomatoes, beets, seed oil), as well as construction of an agri-
food complex to produce tomato sauce (Manseur, 2017). During 2003/2004 season, wheat 
yields exceeded all expectations, and tomato production and processing started in the plant. 
However, the situation did not last long as a few years later the plant stopped functioning 
due to lack of raw material. The purchase price of cereals did not make it possible to cover 
the production costs. In 2007, the production stopped, this failed experience of agribusiness 
in Algerian desert (Manseur, 2017) echoing that of the 1980s (Bisson, 2003). 
Recently, however, farming opportunities have caught the attention of large-scale 
international investors. New agribusiness Megaprojects are being implemented in the 
Algerian desert with national and international partnerships. A surface area of 6 million du is 
reserved for these projects, which will be oriented mainly towards the production of cereals, 
potatoes and milk (Manseur, 2017). Theoretically, these kinds of projects promise to provide 
more jobs and to enhance the country’s food production. A number of concerns were raised 
regarding these projects and Manseur (2017) describes them as "harmful and without a 
future" as there are based on agribusiness models focused on "capitalist and commercial" 
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farming without studying the social and environmental impacts. He stresses his concern 
regarding the future of small-scale farmers and peasant agriculture if the market is to be fully 
controlled by the megaprojects production. He also raises concerns about the impact of 
these projects on groundwater resources and the environment, as groundwater is the only 
source of irrigation in the desert and the aquifers are already partially depleted due to past 
extraction. 
2.2.1.4 Egypt 
Land reclamation in Egypt’s desert has been a major objective of several governments for 
more than 50 years (Stack, 2007). Interest in agricultural development in desert land has 
intensified due to several reasons: a) the increase pressure on food demand due to the 
increase in population, especially in the Nile Delta area; b) increase in the unemployment 
rate, especially among the youth; c) the need for new areas to settle people, as 78% of the 
population is concentrated in Nile River Valley or along the Mediterranean Sea; and d) to 
alleviate poverty (Adriansen, 2007; Boctor, 2007; Stack, 2007; Oxford Business Group, 2012). 
The government encouraged people to move to the new reclaimed lands by offering land to 
peasants, small business investors and even university graduates who could not find a 
decent-paying job in the cities (Stack, 2007). 
The original 1982 Horizontal Expansion Plan entrusted to the Ministry of Agriculture and Land 
Reform (MALR) and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation the reclamation of 11.3 
million du (9.1 million from Nile water, 1.4 million from deep groundwater and 0.8 million 
from reuse of treated wastewater). 340,000 du were reclaimed and converted from desert to 
productive land by the year 1997, when a new Horizontal Expansion Plan was adopted, 
aiming to develop 14.3 million du. In 2015, a new ambitious plan designed to reclaim 16.8 
million du has been announced by the government: the first phase already started with 4.2 
million du ('one million feddan') under reclamation in various parts of the western deserts, 
irrigated mostly from fossil groundwater aquifers. Intense well drilling is taking place and 
international drilling companies have been invited to supplement local drilling potential 
(MetaMeta, 2015), but the project is undergoing severe delays. 
Abu Minqar is one of the oases in the western desert that has been part of early land 
reclamation projects based on the drilling of wells in the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer for 
agriculture purposes in the late 1980s. Before this initiative the area was like "bleak 
moonscape" as Stack (2007) described it, while now it is a green area cultivated with wheat 
and lemon trees. The government supported people to relocate there by providing each 
family with a house and 10 – 25 du at minor rate of 35$ to 52$. The area is well served with 
roads, electricity and network of canals for irrigation (Stack, 2007). Experts, researchers and 
locals have raised a number of concerns about this project as well as others, as it does impact 
groundwater quality and quantity (Tutwiler in Stack, 2007), and because the state has failed 
to build lined canals and provide proper drainage, causing losses by evaporation and 
infiltration. 
While the western deserts/oases are the focus of President’s Sisi 'one million feddan' plan, 
expansion in desert land is also occurring west of the delta, in Wadi El Natrum area where it 
is possible to tap the Moghra aquifer. The development of groundwater use from the 
Moghra aquifer has accelerated with reclamation projects that lease land to large and 
medium-sized agricultural enterprises. Cultivation started in the Wadi el Natrum since 1960s 
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by small holders’ farmers followed by large-scale investors. The cultivated area in 2015 was 
estimated to be 90,000 feddan (378,000 du), consuming 5000 m3/feddan annually of 
groundwater. As groundwater resources in the Moghra aquifer is non-renewable, the 
sustainability of this resource use is by nature non-existent, but excessive abstraction 
accelerates the overall depletion of the resource and increases the risk of salinity hazard 
(MetaMeta, 2015). 
Last, two major desert agriculture initiatives can be found in the south of the country. The 
first is located close to the border with Sudan in the East-Oweinat area, and chiefly includes a 
series of pivots managed by the army. The second project is that of Toshka, or the New 
Valley. The project started in 1997 with the purpose of reclaiming 2.26 million du of land. The 
government hoped to move about six million Egyptian from the Nile Valley to reclaimed land 
in Toshka (Boctor, 2007). Toshka is located to the west of Lake Nasser and was initially 
irrigated through groundwater wells, but in 2005 irrigation water was supposed to come 
from Lake Nasser through a pumping station, known as the world’s largest one, and a canal 
(Oxford Business Group, 2012; Farag, 2003) (Figure 2-7). The station pumps around 14.5 
Mm3/day (Farag, 2003; Boctor, 2007). The farms in Toshka were expected to employ about 
60,000 workers (Fulmer, 2000), but here again development has faced many problems and 
remained a far cry from planned intentions. 
 
Figure 2-7. Cultivation in Toshka, Egypt (Google Earth) 
2.2.1.5 Jordan 
Groundwater-based agriculture in Jordan is concentrated in Azraq, Amman Zarqa and Disi 
basins. Desert agriculture in Azraq basin is the core topic of this thesis and is described in 
more detail in the coming chapters. I briefly refer here to the cultivation in Rum and 
Mudawwara region located in the southern part of the country and irrigated from the 
transboundary Disi aquifer. The total population of these areas is 250,000 inhabitants. Jordan 
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started using the Disi aquifer groundwater since 1977, with an average rate of 5.4 Mm3/yr 
and the water was used for various purposes including agriculture (Abu-Ajamieh et al., 1988). 
In the beginning of 2000 extraction reached 70 Mm3/yr, of which 55 Mm3 to agriculture 
sector (Barthelemy et al., 2010). According to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation reports, 
the average annual abstraction rate was reduced in 2009 to 65 Mm3/yr, including 40 Mm3/yr 
for desert farming (MWI, 2009; 2011). 
 
Figure 2-8. Cultivation in Wadi Rum operates by farmers small cooperatives and big farms 
companies (Photo credit; Andreas Renck, 2009). 
The government encouraged farming in southern deserts by giving licenses for 25 years 
(starting in 1980) to five agriculture farming companies: Rum Company (50,000 du), WAFA 
Farm (14,480 du), ARICAT Farm (21,150 du), Jordan Financing House Co. (14,810 du) and 
GRAMCO Farm (16,380 du), bringing the total licensed area to 116,760 du (Barthelemy et al., 
2010). Figure 2-8 shows an example of cultivation in Wadi Rum. As the Jordanian government 
planned to transfer water from Disi aquifer to Amman for drinking purposes, it started not 
renewing the contracts with the above-mentioned agriculture companies, which –after some 
court case- had to discontinue their operations. The Disi-Amman Water Conveyance Project 
started in 2014 extracting about 100 Mm3/yr and raising total abstraction in the basin to 
around 146 Mm3/yr (Molle et al., 2017a). Small farmer cooperatives are still functioning in 
the area but on a very small scale. Raising groundwater abstraction resulted in a drop in the 
water table from the mid-1980s onward (Margane, 2011). 
2.2.2 Key production factors 
It stands to reason that mobilizing the production factors associated with agricultural 
activities (land, water, labor, input, capital) may come with specific difficulties when farming 
desert land. We briefly review here how these difficulties have been dealt with in the case of 
some of the countries selected and introduced above and also in some countries outside the 
selected examples in the above section. The researcher will come back to this issue in the 
synthesis chapter, comparing the findings on Azraq with these other countries. 
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2.2.2.1 Land 
Desert lands, at first sight, are of little value. But the necessity of urban expansion and 
potential economic opportunities from utilizing lands in different ways fuel the expansion of 
human settlements in these often-neglected areas in the MENA region. The expansion of 
human settlements in desert lands can be either state-driven or private-initiative-driven (with 
or without state permission). Many states in the MENA region have supported the expansion 
of settlements in the desert through land reclamation projects, encouraging the population 
to relocate by providing subsidies to buy lands with low price or for agricultural equipment, 
and sometime by land reforms, distributing land to peasants, young jobless universities 
graduates, investors or large companies (illustrated in Chapter 5). Expansion through private 
initiative includes initiatives by both small farmers (e.g. along the Nile Valley and Delta, or 
Souss region) or corporate firms of all size. Such initiative can be fully illegal (but tolerated), 
thrive on religious/traditional/legal disposition allowing desert to be reclaimed and 
ownership of land later claimed ('wadaa el yad' principle), or mediated by the government 
(with conditions for obtaining licenses often linked to wealth, influence and power). 
Desert areas suitable for agriculture due to the presence of groundwater are normally 
located in areas where the local population is limited and often confined to herders, either 
settled or transhumant, who exploit the badia (steppe), a land where extensive grazing is 
possible but not agriculture. Land is generally held under customary law, often collectively. In 
the Arab world, uncultivated lands have often been formally put under state ownership 
during the time of nationalist, Baath, or socialist post-WWII experiences. That is in particular 
the case in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Libya or Algeria. As this land became locally valuable, 
the state sought to redistribute it under different modalities, both to small farmers or urban 
youth and to investors/companies. 
Hereby a general description about land tenure in some selected countries of MENA region 
where desert agriculture occurs. In the case of Morocco, although there are cases of claims 
by local Berber tribes or otherwise over state irrigation project areas (like in the Gharb 
scheme, for example), expansion is either done by smallholders expanding into adjacent 
lands or by investors/outsiders. In that case these investors will secure land titles but the 
situation varies widely depending on the tenure status of the land. Morocco is known for its 
complex land regime, with categories of collective lands in particular, but there is growing 
commercialization of land under traditional tenures (see Molle and Tanouti, 2017). In the 
Souss-Massa, investors secure deeds from the government or rent collective land and tenure 
security is usually not seen as a major problem. 
In Algeria, desert land development programs have started since 1983 with the aim to 
develop and reclaim these neglected areas. Accordingly, public land access was simplified to 
land users, important public investments in infrastructure (roads, electrification, and 
collective boreholes) and direct farmers subsidies were granted (Ben Hounet et al., 2011; 
Daoudi and Colin, 2016). Consequently, desert lands witnessed the arrival of new farmers 
coming from the northern part of Algeria, agriculture was intensified mainly with vegetables, 
increase of informal sale of land and lease on the land market were noticed (Daoudi and 
Colin, 2016). 
In Egypt, as mentioned in the above section (2.2.1.4), expanding agriculture in the desert 
through land reclamation projects has been on the political agenda since the 1950s and used 
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as a remedy for a variety of problems like desertification, poverty, and reduction of graduate 
unemployment. The idea was first implemented by El Nasser in the 1950s through a plan 
labelled the 'Five Feddan1 Scheme' (Johnson, 2004), and this idea continued throughout the 
Mubarak era (Adriansen, 2009), until its last embodiment in President Sisi’s 'one million-
feddan Plan'. The importance of land reclamation project comes with the increase in 
population and the needs to expand horizontally and provide more economic opportunities 
and food by utilizing desert land through the development of new water resources (mainly 
groundwater) for irrigation and other beneficial uses (Taylor, 1976; Allan, 2001). 
Egypt is notable for the diversity of actors who have been allowed to acquire land in State 
land reclamation projects, including small farmers, land less farmers, graduates, investors of 
all sizes, big corporate or public companies, and even the army (Sims, 2015; Adriansen, 
2009). Officially, all desert land in Egypt belongs to the state, since 1820-30 (Rae, 2002). Yet, 
like in many other places of the Arab world, it is often claimed by Bedouin tribes especially 
when the land is part of traditional grazing lands used by these tribes. Formally excluded 
from land they consider as theirs, Bedouins therefore resort to illegal ways to extract a 
benefit from the land mobilized by the state for its reclamation projects. In the Nubaria area, 
for example, cooperatives of settlers of state projects, have to pay annual 'fees' to local 
Bedouins, officially in charge of 'security' (Molle, pers. com. 2016), although they reportedly 
do little and even sometimes get involved in theft of electric wires or transformers (ibid.). 
Dixon (2017) report that investors who owning lands located to the west of the delta, has to 
pay some 'compensation money' to Bedouins. In desert areas where investors have moved, 
either with limited state planning and intervention (e.g. the Wadi el Natrun area, see 
MetaMeta, 2015) or illegally, outside of any formal scheme (e.g. areas south of Nubaria canal 
and recently the Sadat City reserved perimeter, see Abe, 2015 and Hamid, 2016), Bedouins 
are reportedly exacting payment for settlers for 'protection' and only powerful persons with 
their own armed guards escape this practice (Molle, pers. com. 2016). Accessing land is 
therefore potentially problematic and/or with a cost, but this cost is still limited compared 
with expected gains from agriculture, and even more so from speculative purposes where 
this applies. 
Land tenure in Jordan is well illustrated in brief in Chapter 5. Outside of the selected 
countries examples in the above section, it was found that in Tunisia, the revolution in 
groundwater use unfolded in parallel with the land reform in the beginning of 1970s, as the 
state nationalized the land that was owned by the French (Closas et al., 2017). This 
nationalization gave Tunisian farmers more space and more water to cultivate (Geroudet and 
INA, 2004) as access to and abstraction of groundwater were linked to land property and land 
access (Closas et al., 2017). In the beginning of 1970s land was allocated to private owners 
via decree and in some cases via property titles (Closas and Molle, 2016). Closas and Molle 
(2016) indicated that "in many cases land division was not done officially and families 
organized their own land plotting and allocation via inheritance and not official allocation." 
We have noted how government involvement helped in expanding groundwater based 
agriculture in MENA region through land reforms and land distribution or lease. But 'empty 
lands' in the MENA region are not under absolute control from government; there are 
                                                        
1 1 Feddan = 0.42 ha, 4.2 du 
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different laws defining land uses, ownership and how to obtain lands but in practice land 
management is more complex and faces situations of legal pluralism. 
2.2.2.2 Water 
The availability of water in desert land, and the possibility to develop agriculture, depends on 
groundwater. The availability of groundwater generally leads to the formation of oases as 
water occurs through springs, shallow aquifers tapped by wells or qanats, or deep (generally 
fossil) aquifers that are tapped through tube wells. Availability depends on both physical and 
legal factors. 
In terms of physical availability, groundwater in the desert may be available under artesian 
conditions, like in parts of the Egyptian or Algerian desert; be rather shallow, like initially 
around the Azraq wetland where it could be accessed through shallow dug wells, or in parts 
of Algeria where palm trees are grown in small depressions that allow them to access 
groundwater; or be very deep, like in Mafraq, Jordan where it can be at 350 m or in Liwa, Abu 
Dhabi at average depth of 260m (Fragaszy and McDonnald, 2016). It is often little no 
nonrenewable. Of course, these differences result in contrasting abstraction costs, which 
make agriculture – or specific crops - more or less profitable and therefore attractive. 
But access to water is also in general regulated by state laws. Just like for land, post-WWII 
regimes in the MENA region put the custodianship of water resources under the state, which 
through laws and decrees regulate and allocate groundwater resources. Several typical 
measures introduced by states are shown in Table 2-1 (Faysse et al., 2011; Closas and Molle, 
2016). Wells are controlled using various means: through permits (case of Algeria, Morocco, 
Jordan), well spacing (case of Jordan and Lebanon), announce prohibition zone, wells 
backfilled (case of Jordan), water tariff (case of Jordan and Syria), metering system (case of 
Jordan, Morocco (but not applied) and Syria), controlling the irrigated area expansion (case of 
Jordan) and also through capacity building and social learning (Faysse et al., 2011; Closas and 
Molle, 2016). 
In Saudi Arabia, the ministry of agriculture and water is responsible of controlling and 
management of groundwater resources. In 2001, the ministry has adopted several 
regulations to control groundwater abstraction such as permits for well drilling and the 
supervision of drilling activities (Burchi and D’Andrea, 2003). These regulations were applied 
to farmers whose land exceeded 25 du (ibid.). Well drilling is banned in over-pumped areas 
or in areas where aquifers suffer from declined in water level, and penalties were sit to 
unlicensed drilling companies as well as well owners without permits (ibid.). In Saudi Arabia, 
water for agriculture is not priced and once the well has been drilled, the owner has the right 
to abstract water at his own cost without tariffs being collected by the water authorities. 
In Morocco, abstraction permits are needed for wells deeper than 40 m and extraction 
charges have been defined for each type of water use (Adnane, 1989; Del Vecchio, 2013). 
The abstraction permits are given under certain conditions specifying the allowable 
abstraction volume of groundwater, the maximum discharge per hour, the depth of the well, 
purpose of abstraction, and the area to be irrigated in the case of agriculture. The request of 
a well permit must contain a map of the land plot indicating the position of the well, the 
official land deed, a feasibility study of the project showing the impact of abstraction on 
water resources, cultivable lands and aquatic ecosystems (the latter is not mentioned in the 
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official form provided for permits requests). The law also specifies pumping tests to be 
carried out and minimum distances between wells to be respected (Closas and Molle, 2016). 
But in reality farmers manipulate the law in several ways. Some have benefitted from the 
well regularization process opened by the government to legalize old wells by declaring 
recently drilled wells as 'old' and turning them legal (BRLI and Agro-Concept, 2012). Others 
apply for well maintenance permit (deepening), or apply for wells to be used for domestic 
proposes or livestock use, while using them for irrigation instead (Closas and Molle, 2016). 
The ministry of Agriculture actually offered several ways to bypass the control of River basin 
Agencies so that farmers could drill wells and apply for micro-irrigation projects (BRL and 
Agro-Concept, 2012; Closas and Molle, 2016; Molle, 2017). Wells meters are not being 
installed and groundwater use in agriculture is not charged. 
In Algeria, the monitoring and management of groundwater resources at national level is 
under the authority of Ministry of Water Resources (Benblidia et al., 2011). Based on Water 
Law 05-12 of 2005, the local governor is in charge of regulating wells through the granting of 
permits (Imache, 2014). The 2005 Water law introduced the establishment of protection 
areas where new wells should be banned and active ones should have an abstraction limit in 
order to protect drinking water supply (Algérie, 2005). Imache (2014) mentions that meters 
are only applied for state-owned wells that supply water for drinking. As in Morocco, the 
request for a well permit should include a land map with the well location, pumping test, use 
purpose, project technical documents, duration and abstracted amount (Closas and Molle, 
2016). Closas and Molle (2016), based on Bellal et al.’s (2015) review, observe that "water 
use in agriculture remains a blind spot to which authorities have turned a blind eye, ignoring 
existing laws". Bellal et al. (2015) also note that the control of water is an elusive goal since 
most of agriculture wells in Algeria are not even registered. In other words, accessing water is 
not so much a legal or regulatory problem and the government is still keen to promote 
agriculture in the desert, where groundwater regulation has not yet become a subject of 
concern. The constraint, rather, is the cost of pumping –in some areas only- and the need to 
preferably be connected to the electricity grid. 
In Egypt, the Ministry of Irrigation is responsible for groundwater use and permits through 
the Irrigation and Drainage Law of 1984. Based on the law, all wells need to be permitted 
regardless of their depth. The extraction permit is theoretically renewed every 3 years and 
lasts for 10 years. In case the pump is replaced a new request must be made. Applications 
requires many documents (land deed, maps with the location of the well, all neighboring 
wells (legal or otherwise) and their distance to the projected well, soil sample analysis, 
commitment to use the wells with the discharge and type of irrigation technology indicated, 
payment of fees, etc2), which explains why few farmers bother declaring their wells. A new 
groundwater law under drafting aims at tightening control over groundwater development 
through stricter licensing, registration of drilling contractors, monitoring and protection of 
groundwater abstraction, identification of violations and applied penalties, and application of 
metering system (El Arabi and Dawoud, 2012). 
Water policy in Jordan is well illustrated in brief in Chapter 6. Outside of the selected 
countries examples in the above section, it was found that, in Tunisia, the authority for 
groundwater and user right management is under the umbrella of the Ministry of Agriculture 
                                                        
2 http://gis.nacse.org/rewab/docs/Law_12_1984_Irrigation_and_Drainage_en.pdf  
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and the 1975 water law (Closas and Molle, 2016). Groundwater users who have wells deeper 
than 50 m are required to obtain an authorization for water abstraction (Bachta et al., 2005). 
The procedure to obtain authorization goes through the Regional Commissions for 
Agricultural Development (CRDA). The application should contain an official land deed and an 
official technical report from a private company authorized by the CRDA. The CRDAs study 
the application and evaluate whether the use will affect groundwater negatively, and give 
their recommendation to the Ministry of agriculture. When the authorization is approved, 
farmers have the right to use the water in any mean as long as it is for agricultural purpose 
(Closas and Molle, 2016). Licenses are supposed to be renewed on a yearly basis, which 
makes farmers not willing to apply in the first place (Closas and Molle, 2016). In order to 
protect sensitive areas with groundwater aquifers, the Ministry can declare prohibition areas 
where drilling wells is banned and abstraction by existing wells limited by quotas (Closas and 
Molle, 2016). 
The country is encouraging groundwater based agriculture through subsidies on well drilling, 
new irrigation technique, pumps, piped networks, and energy with an objective of expanding 
livelihoods opportunities in the countryside. However, there is a lack of law enforcement, the 
number of illegal wells is increasing, metering systems are not installed, abstraction is 
occurring in prohibited areas, while Gaubi (2008) describes the current water law as 
"insufficient to provide a legal framework for a strategy of integrated groundwater use". 
In Lebanon, a depth limit of 150 m above which wells need to be licenses has prevailed for 
almost one century (Molle et al., 2017b). Under this limit well owners should submit a 
declaration and receive a receipt specifying the number, the date of registration of the 
application and location of prospection (ibid.). Wells with a productivity over 100 m3/day 
should pay an annual fee (ibid.). These fees have been gradually increasing over the years 
and are set now at USD 333/year (500,000 L.L/yr) for the drilling fee, USD 0.066/m3 (100 
L.L/m3) for irrigation use and USD 0.4/m3 (600 L.L/m3) for industrial use (Molle et al., 2017b). 
In 2010, a new Decision (No.118) was issued by the Ministry for Electricity and Water which 
established a system of registration through private companies which have the responsibility 
for the technical aspects of permit application, field visits and well meter installation (Molle 
et al., 2017b). But the process costs US$ 935 per application and it is therefore no surprise 
that no agricultural well owner has applied for a license, nor regularized existing well (ibid.). 
In Syria, groundwater abstraction permits were introduced in 1973 (article 10 of law 3) 
(Saade- Sbeih, 2011). Further legislation was issued in 1999 (Circulaire No.13, 31/08/1999) to 
regulate groundwater abstraction limiting well with depths to 150 m, and permits granted for 
either 1 to 3 years or 10 years. The ministry of irrigation is responsible for well permits. In 
1999, the government banned new wells and the renewal of licenses for dried-up wells In 
2000/01 it decreed the installation of meters, the indication of a maximum allowable 
abstraction volume, while wells without permits were subjected to fines (Stephan, 2007). But 
despite these decisions, 57% of wells are still unlicensed and wells continue to be drilled 
without permits (Saade-Sbeih, 2011; de Châtel, 2014), like in Salamieh area, where 80% of 
wells are without permit (Saade-Sbeih, 2011). The government requires well licenses to be 
renewed annually but, according to de Châtel (2014: 12), "this engendered widespread 
corruption as security personnel or officials forced farmers to pay bribes for new licenses, 
which in turn triggered strong resentment in rural areas." 
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2.2.2.3 Labor 
Labor is, expectedly, a constraint to large-scale corporate agriculture in the desert, even 
though technology helps reducing the need for labor. In Egypt, the experience in Toshka was 
undermined by the difficulty in attracting people to areas with little infrastructure and very 
harsh climatic conditions (Oxford Business Group, 2012). The Army, in East Oweinat and 
other places, can count on drafted labor. Even in state-sponsored land reclamation schemes 
close to the delta it took many years for people to permanently settle, and many gave up and 
returned to their village in the Valley or the Delta (Adriansen, 2009). 
In Jordan, the agriculture sector is minimal and Bedouins often not keen to take up 
agricultural activities (although some do). Urban investors and other absentee owners would 
not be able to find Jordanian laborers willing to live in isolate and harsh conditions for a 
modest salary. Just like in the Gulf, the solution found was to 'import' foreign laborers 
(mostly from Egypt but also from Yemen or a few other countries), who would accept such 
working conditions. As we will see in Chapter 7, the right to use such foreign laborer was 
abused and generated a rent for those taking up agricultural activities. 
In Algeria or Morocco there is little reporting of labor problems and they do not seem to 
constitute a major obstacle to investments in desert farming. The reservoir of jobless people 
within a country or in neighboring ones is sufficient for solutions to be found. 
Agricultural laborers in Saudi Arabia are generally foreigners who enter the country through 
permits from the Ministry of Work and Social Security, and are controlled by agricultural 
cooperatives (Arabian Business, 2016). 
2.2.2.4 Input incentives 
In the MENA region it is hard to find a state that does not encourage agriculture in one way 
or another. In almost every country several government policies directly or indirectly give 
incentives to farming. The incentives come in the form of barriers to import, domestic price 
support, subsidized credit and energy subsidies (World Bank, 2007). Table 2-2 shows where 
these incentives and in which countries they apply. 
Table 2-2. Incentives for irrigation (World Bank, 2007) 
Country Barriers to 
imports 
Domestic price 
support 
Subsidized credit Energy subsidies 
Algeria Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Bahrain No No Yes Yes 
Egypt Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Jordan Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Lebanon Yes Yes No Yes 
Libya Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Morocco Yes Yes No No 
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Syria Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Tunis Yes Yes Yes No 
Yemen Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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There is also hardly an agricultural policy that does not promote or subsidize micro-irrigation 
as a key to achieve irrigation efficiency and/or poverty alleviation (Molle, 2017). In Morocco, 
the subsidies on micro irrigation techniques started at 17% in 1990, were raised to 30-40% in 
2002, and 60% in 2006. With the National Program for Water Savings in Irrigation (PNEEI) 
subsidizes for micro irrigation finally reached 80% for large farms and 100% for farms under 5 
ha (Molle, 2017). In Algeria, subsidies for micro irrigation techniques adaptation reached 
100% (Amichi et al., 2015). In Tunisia, subsidies were offered to farmers of 40-60% of the 
total investment cost for water saving irrigation technologies (Frija et al., 2014). 
The expansion in groundwater-based agriculture in Syria was mainly encouraged by 
government input subsidizes such as diesel fuel subsidy and crop procurement price support 
(Aw- Hassan et al., 2014; Gül et al., 2005). Aw-Hassan et al. (2014) and Gül et al. (2005) found 
that subsidies amounted to around 80 percent of the local purchase price. In 2008, Syria 
canceled these subsidies on diesel and fertilizers, shifting diesel prices from 7 Syrian pounds 
to 25 pounds/liter (Saade-Sbeih, 2011). This situation caused many farmers to either depend 
on rainfed agriculture or to stop agriculture (de Châtel, 2014). 
In Yemen, establishing barriers to fruits import to the country caused a large increase in 
groundwater-based fruit cultivation (Closas and Molle, 2016). Subsidies provided to the 
private sector to import pumps, engines and well rigs, enhanced well drilling in the country 
(World Bank, 2001). Yemen’ Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank provided loans at 
subsidized rates for irrigation and diesel and electricity prices (Handley, 2000; Hellegers et al., 
2008). The subsidy on fuel reached 22% of all government expenditures (World Bank, 2001 
and van Steenbergen, 2015). 
In other words, what these examples show is that most governments tried, and with some 
exceptions like Jordan are still trying, in different ways to encourage agriculture in general, 
and groundwater-based farming in particular. Making machinery, energy, and agrochemical 
more affordable, while sometimes establishing protected markets, helped make this activity 
profitable. Whether forced by the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (e.g. Syria, 
Yemen) or because of changes in policy thinking (Saudi Arabia), things have started to change 
in a few countries. 
The energy source for groundwater based agriculture in the past was mainly diesel. Farmers 
started to shift to electricity based pump instead of fuel as it is cleaner, cheaper (but also 
subsidized), and appropriate for submerged pumps in tubewells. In many countries (e.g. 
Jordan, Tunisia) land and wells should be legal in order to get the benefit of using the public 
electricity grid. Recently, farmers have started adopting solar energy system (e.g. Jordan, 
Algeria, Morocco), which takes energy prices down. 
Fertilizer and pesticides are generally controlled by private firms and it is hard to do a 
comparison as their prices vary from company to company, and from country to country. In 
general, the relative isolation of desert agriculture works to increase transportation costs. 
However, it must be noted that in many cases this activity is (very) profitable and therefore 
largely covers the costs of input factors other than water. 
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2.2.2.5 Capital 
Engaging in groundwater-based agriculture generally needs important amounts of capital in 
order to buy land, drill wells, obtain licenses, and install irrigation systems. 
However, this is not always the case. In Algeria, for example, public land is distributed at a 
very low cost, drilling wells is largely subsidized, and in some parts water even comes under 
artesian conditions. Investors of all types and size can start farming with relatively limited 
capital. This also applies to parts of Morocco when collective lands can be negotiated and 
leased at a rather low price, and where agriculture is receiving tax exemption. 
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3 Chapter Three: Case Study Description: Azraq Basin, Jordan 
3.1 Case study description: Azraq basin 
3.1.1 Physical and social setting 
This section presents the main physical and human features of the Azraq basin, together with 
the status of agriculture and groundwater use. Some of these background data are briefly 
referred to in the different papers for the sake of – each time – introducing the readers to 
the context of the case study, but the researcher provides here a more detailed description. 
3.1.1.1 Geographical location 
Jordan has twelve groundwater basins (Figure 3-1) and fifteen surface water basins (Figure 
3-2). Some basins are fully located inside the country boundaries while some are partially 
shared and managed with neighboring countries. Ten out of the twelve-groundwater basins 
are considered renewable while two are largely non-renewable basins: Jafer and Disi. 
 
Figure 3-1. Groundwater basins in Jordan (Royal Jordan Geographic Center, modified by the 
author) 
Table 3-1 shows groundwater basins’ status and safe yield. As it appears, Amman-Zarqa basin 
followed by Azraq basin, are the most over-abstracted basins in the country with balance of -
66 and -27.6 Mm3/yr respectively. These data, however, are based on official abstraction 
values that have been shown to be underestimated (Molle et al., 2017a), which means that 
actual rates of over-abstraction are likely to be higher. 
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Table 3-1. Groundwater basins usage, safe yield and balance (MWI, 2009; Molle et al., 2017a) 
Groundwater 
basin 
Safe yield 
(Mm3/yr) 
Total extraction 
(Mm3/yr) 
Balance (Mm3/yr) % of safe yield 
abstracted 
No of 
wells 
  MWI, 
2009 
Molle et 
al., 2017a 
MWI, 
2009 
Molle et 
al., 2017a 
MWI, 
2009 
Molle et 
al, 2017a 
Molle et 
al., 2017a 
Yarmouk  40 55 54.16 -15 -14.16 137 135 203 
Jordan Valley 
Side Wadis  
15 12 46.73 3 -31.73 80 312 139 
Jordan Valley  21 38 17.02 -17 3.98 181 81 334 
Amman Zarqa  87 153 166.11 -66 -78.61 176 190 955 
Dead Sea  57 85 89.98 -28 -32.98 149 158 469 
Araba North 4 4 6.33 0 -2.83 100 181 37 
Araba South 6 5 8.48 1 -2.98 83 154 62 
Jafer  9 23 32.85 -14 -21.85 256 365 205 
Azraq  24 51.6 52.54 -27.6 -28.54 215 219 580 
Sirhan  5 1.5 1.71 3.5 3.29 30 34 23 
Hammad  8 1.3 1.87 6.7 6.13 16 23 15 
Disi Fossil 65 146.96    118 116 
This study focuses on the Azraq basin, a perfect illustration of desert agriculture in Jordan. 
Azraq consists of two basins; groundwater basin and surface water basin. The areas 
considered in this thesis are located in the central and northern part of the surface basin 
(Figure 3-2). The basin total area is 12,710 km2, with 94% of it located in Jordan, 5% in Syria 
and 1 % in Saudi Arabia (Shahbaz and Sunna, 2000; Addamat et al., 2006; Halah, 2007; Al 
Raggad and Jasem, 2010). 
Within Jordanʼs territory, Azraq basin overlaps with three Jordanian governorates: Zarqa 
governorate represented by Azraq district; Mafraq governorate represented mainly by a part 
of North Badia district; and Amman Capital governorate represented mainly by a part of Al 
Jiza district (DoS, 2008). This study covers the area of Azraq district and part of North Badia 
('Mafraq' in what follows). Azraq district includes eight sub-districts: South Azraq; North 
Azraq; Omari; Ein Al Baida; Eastern Farms area; Um Al Mathayel; Deghaila; and the air force 
base (Figure 3-3). The total population in the Azraq Basin area reached about 29,000 in 2010 
(DoS, 2010), while the total population of the district was around 12,000 (IUCN et al., 2007). 
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Figure 3-2. Surface water basins in Jordan with study area location (Royal Jordan Geographic 
Center, modified by the author 
 
Figure 3-3. Azraq district areas (Google Earth, modified by the author) 
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3.1.1.2 Community 
Azraq community is made up of three main ethnic groups: Bedouins, Chechens and Druze. As 
mentioned above, Azraq has 12,000 inhabitants, with 6500 for the Druze located mainly in 
North Azraq area, with a minority of Bedouins. South Azraq is home to approximately 4000 
inhabitants, mainly Chechens and Bedouins. Minor settlements can be found in the area of 
Ain-Al-Baida and the farm area, with 500 inhabitants, most of them from the Ahel Al-Jabal 
tribe. 350 inhabitants are settled in the military airbase and 400 in the Al-Omari area in 
addition to some families in the Um Al- Mathayel and Deghala areas (Mesnil and Habjoka, 
2012). 
Bedouins are spread all over the country as they traditionally have a semi to fully nomadic life 
style, moving from place to another according to the season (HCST, 1993). Today, Bedouins 
tend to settle in cities or on what they consider as their tribal lands, and are spread over the 
country as follows: in the North, Bani Hasan, Bani Khalid, Sardiyyah, Sarhan, ‘Isa, Ahl al-Jabal 
consists of four large clans: Masa’id, Shurafat, ‘Athamat and the Zbaid, a small portion of the 
great Rualla and ’Anayzah. In Central Jordan, there are Bani Sakhr and Belqawiyyahs. While 
Huwaytat and Bani Hamidah are present in the South (bin Muhammad, 1999) (Figure 3-4). 
The main Bedouins tribes residing and settled in Azraq districts are Bani Sakhr, Al Sarhan and 
Rtemeh from the Abad tribe, and the Al Masa’id (North Badia). The Bedouins are pastoralists 
by tradition and depend on trading and animal breeding for a living. When agriculture 
activities boomed in Azraq, Bedouins started cultivating lands legally and illegally (Chapter 5) 
to gain an easy profit, also using their tribal power in order to sell lands and laborers to 
outsiders as brokers. 
Chechens left Caucasus towards the Middle East, escaping from the war with Russia at the 
end of 19th century to preserve their religious freedom and culture (Nelson, 1973 and Mesnil 
and Habjoka, 2012). Some of the Chechens settled in Turkey and Syria whereas others settled 
in Jordan. The first wave of Chechens reached Jordan in 1902 and consisted of about 70 
families settled firstly in Zarqa then in Sweileh, in Amman (1904) and in Sukhneh (1911). The 
first wave of Chechens reached Azraq in 1912 and they settled in South Azraq, near the Qaa, 
named also as Azraq Ash-Shishan, in reference to them (Mesnil and Habjoka, 2012). They 
engaged in farming and cow milk production. Nowadays the total number of people claiming 
Chechen origin in Jordan is around 20,000. 
Druze in Azraq originally come from Jabal Al Arab (Jabal Al Druze), Al-Sweida’a governorate in 
Syria, located just across the border. In 1918s, after a confrontation with the French, some 
settled in North Azraq, also named after them as Azraq al Druze (Firro, 1992; IUCN, 2007; GIZ, 
2010; Janssens and Thill, 2013). Before building houses in Azraq, they first sheltered in Azraq 
castle (Firro, 1992; Quntar, 2005). Generally, the Druze are citizens of Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon. The main Druze tribe living in Jordan is the "Bani Ma’arouf" tribe. 
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Figure 3-4. Bedouin tribes areas (bin Muhammad, 1999) 
The most important source of income for the Druze people of Azraq was salt production. It 
started accidently in 1924 when a man dug out a hole in the ground as a lurking place for 
hunting purposes, and water running out of the hole evaporated, leaving the salt (Quntar, 
2005). Afterwards, extracting salt in the area known as Malalhat, near Azraq Qaá, became the 
main source of living for the population of Azraq together with farming, until the closing of 
the salt industry, after which the Druze converted to agriculture. 
Chechens and Druze have a Jordanian national identity number and are not treated as 
outsiders but as full Jordanian citizens. Relations between communities in Azraq are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
3.1.1.3 Geology, geomorphology and hydrology 
The basin of groundwater in Azraq overlaps with the surface basin and covers 18,504 km2. It 
consists of three hydraulically-interconnected aquifers systems, each with its own chemical 
and physical properties: the upper, middle and lower aquifers systems (Dottridge, 1998). The 
upper aquifer (shallow aquifer complex) is the main aquifer in Azraq. It is composed of 
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quaternary sediments, basalts, Shallala and Rijam formation (Joudeh and Abu Taha, 1978; 
Dottridge, 1998; Hobbler et al., 2001). The geological formation of Azraq basin consists of 
two main formations: the first one is basalt and is located in the northern part of the basin, 
while the second formation is the limestone B4 formation (Figure 3-5). The B4 formation 
together with the basalt are part of the upper aquifer complex. The thickness of the basalt 
formation in the upper aquifer system increases toward Jabal al Arab, where it approximately 
reaches 1500 m. Water table can be found within few meters near the surface in this aquifer 
in Azraq area district and groundwater quality is considered good (GIZ, 2010; Mesnil and 
Habjoka, 2012). 
 
Figure 3-5. Aquifer distribution in Azraq basin (Jasem and Al Raggad, 2010) 
The middle aquifer complex is a very old complex of hundred thousands of years old, which 
consists of Amman Wadi Sir limestone (B2/A7) (Dottrige, 1998). Water quality in this aquifer 
is mineralized with high Sulfurous concentration. The total dissolved solids concentrations in 
the aquifer ranges between 200 and 2500 (mg/L) (Hobbler et al., 2001). 
The lower aquifer complex (Disi Sandstone Aquifer Complex) is also considered old since it 
was recharged during the last humid period, probably about 5000 years ago (Hobbler et al., 
2001) (Dottrige, 1998). The depth of this aquifer reaches around 900 m below surface with 
bad water quality. 
The basin is under arid to semi-arid climatic conditions characterized by hot and dry summers 
and fairly wet and cold winters. The mean annual precipitation into the basin ranges from 50 
mm/yr in the Azraq district area, up to 500 mm/yr in the Syrian part. Annual rainfall patterns 
in the Jordanian part of the basin vary between 100-150 mm in the west and north of the 
basin, 50-100 mm in the center, and less than 50 mm in the south and east of the basin (JMD, 
2011). The yearly average precipitation for the entire basin is 87 mm/yr, occurring between 
January and March. The mean daily temperature in winter is less than 10⁰C and the 
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maximum temperature is 45⁰C. The average potential evaporation rate in the area is 2,400 
mm/yr (El Naqa et al., 2007). The dominant soil type in the region is a silty clay loam soil with 
high soluble salt content in the subsurface horizon. Soils are primarily composed of limestone 
or covered with basalt boulders that resulted from volcanic out-cropping centered on Jabal Al 
Arab (DLU, 1994). 
The topography of Azraq basin is concave and Azraq Qaá (the mudflat and its wetland) is 
located at the center of it (Figure 3-6, adapted from Al Raggad, 2015). Groundwater flow is 
radial in the upper aquifer system toward Azraq Qaá; streams are also flowing toward it from 
all directions, accumulating in the Qaá, discharged by the springs and recharging 
groundwater. Four major springs used to discharge in Azraq; two in Azraq South (Al Soda 
spring and Al Qaisia spring), and the other two in Azraq North (Al Aura spring and Al 
Mostademeh spring). 
The main source of recharge in the basin comes in the form of precipitation that flows from 
Jabal al Arab, south of Syria and/or vertical hydrodynamic recharge through fractures and 
faults between the different aquifer formations systems (Mesnil and Habjoka, 2012; Al 
Raggad, 2007). The largest portion of groundwater recharge goes to the basalt formation 
(ibid.), while only a small amount of water reaches the B4 formation either through 
percolation from the basalt or directly during rare thunderstorm events (ibid.). MWI 
estimated that the northern part of the basin has an annual recharge rate of 11% against 3% 
for the southern part % (MWI and WAJ, 2010). 50% of the recharge is lost by evaporation and 
50% infiltrates into the ground (Huber, 2010). 
Several authors have attempted to estimate the recharge of the basin through either 
quantitative recharge estimates or qualitative studies (Table 3-2). From this table, it is 
obvious that there is uncertainty when it comes to groundwater recharge, as the numbers 
vary from one scholar to the other. 
 
Figure 3-6. Topography of Azraq basin (MWI, 2010; Al Raggad, 2015) 
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Table 3-2. Estimation of Azraq basin recharge (Noble, 1998; Sharif, 2009; El-Naqa, 2010; 
Shawaqfeh, 2015) 
Study Recharge estimate (Mm3/yr) 
Baker, 1956 32 – 240 
UNDP, 1966 20.9 
Barber and Carr, 1973 35 
Mudallal, 1968 30 
Howard, 1982 33.1 
Arsalan, 1976 35 
Noble, 1998 37 
Sharif, 2009 15 
El-Naqa, 2010 34 (infiltrated) + 20 (natural) 
MWI, 2010 34 
Shawaqfah, 2015 34 
Michael Baker, through the "Alia Project", was the first scientist who worked on estimating 
the basin recharge based on the estimate of Azraq’s four main springs discharge. The results 
showed an annual recharge of 32–240 Mm3. Based on this result, Baker gave a positive 
recommendation to use groundwater for extensive agriculture development in the area 
(Baker, 1956; UNDP, 1966). The results of Baker were not satisfactory to the government 
authorities and UNDP was asked to estimate the recharge again. They used Penman ET 
approach and found a recharge of only 20.9 Mm3/yr, recommending that only 10.3 Mm3/yr 
should be used in order to sustain the basin and springs for the near future (UNDP, 1966). 
The situation did not last long as the government decided in 1963 to divert and transfer 
spring water from Azraq to Irbid for urban purposes (UNDP, 1966; Nelson, 1973). A system of 
pumping stations and a pipeline was built in order to convey water over more than 125 km 
from the northwest of Azraq. Later, in 1980, the government also began to convey water 
through direct spring intake to Amman at an average rate of 900 m3/hr, which corresponds 
to around 75% of total spring discharge. In 1981, the Water Authority of Jordan replaced the 
spring flow diversion by fifteen artesian wells northwest of the Northern Azraq springs, which 
directly and dramatically affected spring discharge (IUCN, 2007). Urban abstraction in parallel 
with agriculture expansion affected groundwater quantity and quality in the basin negativity 
and in 1987 the north Azraq spring dried out, with only the springs of South Azraq still 
flowing, until they stopped in 1992. Table 3-3 shows springs discharge throughout the years 
in parallel with governmental abstraction for urban use (RSCN, 1990). Figure 3-7 estimates 
withdrawals from groundwater wells with springs discharge (RSCN, 1990). 
The Qaá area is the lowest part of the basin; it is located above the saline aquifer where 
water is characterized by high salt concentration. Precipitation events in Azraq occur with 
high intensity in a short period, causing floods from wadis and streams to accumulate in the 
Qaá. There are nine main wadies flowing to the Qaa from the north east and southwest of 
the basin (Figure 3-8). 
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Table 3-3. Estimated withdrawals from groundwater wells with spring discharge (RSCN, 1990) 
Year Withdrawal from government 
wells (Mm3) 
Estimated withdrawal from 
private wells (Mm3) 
Spring discharge (Mm3) 
1981  -  1.50  10.49  
1982  9.50  1.50  8.35  
1983  12.31  1.50  6.60  
1984  14.36  2.00  6.04  
1985  15.64  3.50  5.27  
1986  13.72  4.50  3.57  
1987  14.00  8.00  4.11  
1988  19.64  12.00  2.15 3 
1989  16.92  12.00  1.96 4 
 
Figure 3-7. Estimated withdrawal from groundwater wells and spring discharge (Mm3/yr) 
(RSCN, 1990) 
Accumulation of wadi and stream water has a minor contribution to groundwater recharge, 
as a major portion of it evaporates, causing an increase in salinity in the area. The Ministry of 
agriculture in cooperation with Jordan Water Authority has built three dams and several 
infiltration systems for harvesting the flood water in areas with higher permeability. 
Accordingly, the flooded water in the Qaá has decreased, which also affect the Azraq wetland 
system located at the heart of the Qaá (Al Naber, 2016). 
The official recharge of the basin estimated lately by WAJ and MWI equals 42 Mm3: 20 Mm3 
and 4 Mm3 are recharged by precipitation in the northern and southern part of the basin 
respectively, and 18 Mm3 is considered as groundwater subsuperficial-flow. Surface runoff 
contribution to the recharge is minor as water accumulates in Azraq’s Qaá and largely 
evaporates (MWI and WAJ, 2010). The estimated sub-superficial flow is questioned as 
overestimated by different researchers, pointing to the situation of overexploitation in both 
                                                        
3 Only Azraq South springs were flowing. 
4 Only Azraq South springs were flowing. 
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region Syria and Jordan, especially with the springs drying out (Mesnil and Habjoka, 2012; Al 
Raggad, 2007; Al Raggad, 2010; Jasem, 2015). The safe yield of Azraq basin is taken as 24 
Mm3, while the official current abstraction reaches 215% of the safe yield. 
 
Figure 3-8. Wadis and streams in Azraq basin (Nelson, 1973) 
Al Raggad (2015) studied the effect of climate change on the basin recharge. He indicated 
that if the average long term of rainfall increased by 20% then the recharge of the basin 
would increase by 60%, while if it decreased by 20% then the recharge would be affected 
negatively and decrease by as much as 52%. He also indicated that if the average long-term 
temperatures increased by 1⁰C then the recharge would decrease by 11%, and if it increases 
by 2⁰C then the recharge would decrease by 23% (Al Raggad, 2015). Al Zubi (2009) confirmed 
that annual recharge in Azraq basin would decrease under scenarios of increase in 
temperature and fluctuation in precipitation. 
3.1.1.4 The Azraq wetland reserve and oasis 
Azraq wetland reserve (previously Azraq oasis) is located at the lowest point of Azraq basin 
with a total area of 12 km2 (Figure 3-9). Azraq wetland is the only significant wetland located 
in Jordan and is managed by the RSCN (Royal Society for the Conservation of Nature). The 
oasis was formed from the accumulated natural discharges from streams, four springs and 
wadi floods from all direction toward Azraq (UNDP, 1966; Nelson, 1973; Daoud et al., 2006; 
Haleh, 2007; IUCN, 2007). In 1977, Azraq wetland was declared by UNESCO as an 
international Ramsar site under the part of Ramsar convention of 1971. The wetland is 
considered as an important reserve and a major station for migratory birds in the African–
Eurasian flyway (RSCN, 2017). Yearly, up to one million birds of different varieties stop in the 
reserve along their migration routes to rest and breed in the wetland (RSCN, 2017). In 
addition to birds, the wetland hosts a variety of flora, fauna, aquatic and terrestrial species 
including the Killifish Aphanius Sirhani fish, which can only be found in Azraq wetland reserve 
(Halah, 2007; IUCN, 2007). The favorable climatic condition and the wetland diversity 
Chapter 3 
71 
attracted a multiplicity of organisms, forming one of the most unusual ecosystems in the 
world (Scates, 1966; Jones, 2012). 
 
Figure 3-9. Azraq wetland reserve (RSCN, 2017) 
As the wetland reserve largely depended on the four Azraq springs flow, it lasted as an 
outstanding example of a wetland until the beginning of 1990s due to extensive use from 
government for urban use and from farmers for agricultural purposes (Al-Eisawi, 2012). In 
1980, the spring water flowing into the wetland was estimated at 10.49 Mm3. After ten years 
the discharge had decreased to 300 – 400,000m3 until it reached zero in 1992. As the natural 
flow to the wetland stopped the area of the water catchment decreased down to 90% of its 
former size. In 1994, the RSCN in collaboration with the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) started a project aiming to rehabilitate the wetland by pumping 
artificially from groundwater wells owned by WAJ. RSCN and UNDP on one side, and WAJ on 
the other, agreed on an annual volume of about 1.5 – 2.5 Mm3/yr for the wetland. The first 
amount of water pumped for the wetland was about 1.38 Mm3 in 1996, but this annual 
artificial recharge was never constant, as it depended on the basin groundwater situation and 
urban demands. The maximum annual recharge was recorded in 1999 (1.53 Mm3). After that 
year the pumped recharge decreased to reach only 406,000 m3 in 2012. The wetland only 
succeeded in recovering 10% of its earlier water catchment area. This action, however, 
sustained the biodiversity of the wetland, and Al Sirhani fish species still exist in the reserve. 
Birds continue to migrate. Figure 3-10 shows the fluctuation in pumped water to the wetland 
through years. 
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Figure 3-10. Artificial recharge into Azraq Wetland Reserve (m3/yr) (RSCN, 2013) 
3.1.1.5 The Azraq salt Industry 
Salt production started with the Druze in 1924, but it was only in 1986 that a salt industry 
was established in Azraq, named 'Azraq salt industry', through the Azraq cooperative society 
(KREBS SWISS, 1996). The cooperative was managed mainly by Druze, with 3% only of the 
members being Chechen (Ramsar, 1990; Ronay, 1993; KREBS SWISS, 1996). The main 
function of the cooperative was to control the production and distribution of salt inside and 
outside the country (Ronay, 1993). The industry was considered at that time as the most 
lucrative economic activity in the basin, as it provided job opportunities for Azraq locals (Al 
Naber, 2016). Groundwater was pumped to the surface in a place known as "Al Malalhat" 
(Figure 3-11), characterized by a groundwater with a high level of salinity. As locals indicate, 
pumping the saline water out of the aquifer contributed to decrease the salinity of the 
aquifer by 20% (Al Naber, 2016). 
Saline water was extracted between June and August through small electric pumps and 
accumulated in a pond for 24 hours for the sediments to settle (Al Naber, 2016). The 
extracted water was then conveyed through pipe to large shallow basins (8 x 50 x 1m) 
directly exposed to the sunlight (Ramsar, 1990; Ronay, 1993). The sun made the water 
evaporate, leaving a dry crystallized salt which was trucked to the salt factory for processing 
and packaging and distribution throughout Jordan and beyond under the brand name of 
'Azraq Salt' (Ramsar, 1990; Ronay, 1993). 
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Figure 3-11. Azraq surface and groundwater basin and Malahat area (Google Earth) 
The industry contributed to achieving Jordan’s self-sufficiency in salt and to a small export 
market to Iraq with an average total annual production of 40,000 ton (Ramsar, 1990). The 
success of Azraq Salt Industry lasted only ten years, as in 1996 a new salt industry was 
established in Jordan with a budget of €17 million under the name of "Safi Salt Company", 
producing salt from the Dead Sea (Al Naber, 2016). The presence of a new competitor in the 
salt production business affected Azraq’s salt industry negatively for several purposes: Safi 
Salt Company produced 1.2 million tons of industrial salt per year compared with only 40,000 
ton in Azraq; the production cost of Safi Salt was lower than Azraq Salt since pumping water 
in Azraq needs energy while it is available on the surface in the Dead Sea; and the quality of 
Safi salt is better than Azraq salt due to the high sulphate concentration in Azraq salt. 
Consequently, the market for Azraq salt decreased and the factory closed up in 2006 
(Ramsar, 1990; Ronay, 1993; KREBS SWISS, 1996). Figure 3-12 shows people working in salt 
production in Azraq. 
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Figure 3-12. Salt production in Azraq (Azraq wetland Facebook page) 
3.1.2 Agriculture development and the use of groundwater 
3.1.2.1 Agriculture and groundwater use in Azraq 
Groundwater use in Azraq basin started in the 1960 when the government decided to use 
the spring water and conveyed it to Amman, first, and then to Irbid and Zarqa for urban use. 
This was quickly followed by wells drilled by the governmental and abstraction for different 
purposes: domestic, industrial, agriculture and environmental use. As it appears from official 
data shown in Table 3-4, the total abstracted water from the basin is 51.6 Mm3, which is 
around 215% of the basin safe yield. The major consumer of groundwater is agriculture (28 
Mm3) followed by domestic use (23 Mm3) (MWI, 2009). 
Table 3-4. Groundwater abstraction in Azraq basin 
 Abstraction rate Mm3 
(2009) 
Safe yield Mm3 Abstraction 
rate % 
Private drinking wells 0.32   
Governmental drinking wells 22.9 
Industrial purpose 0.35 
Agricultural purpose  28 
Rural area 0.09 
Total 51.66 24 215% 
Desert agriculture has been developed in Azraq basin since the 1960s driven by the 
improvement in well-drilling techniques, the decrease in energy costs, land affordability and 
accessibility, and good water quality and quantity (Molle et al., 2017a). Farming in Azraq was 
considered as a prime investment option, and investors and local farmers enjoyed a good 
economic return from these activities. The expansion in cultivated area was encouraged by 
the government who freely awarded licenses for wells in the 1980s and early 1990s. Sensing 
the increase in groundwater use in the area in the late 1980s, the government tried to 
control abstraction by introducing special laws for groundwater use, with measures and tools 
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to control abstraction, including banning new wells, introducing metering, water tariff, 
restriction areas and control of drillers, etc (Chapter 6). However, abstraction continued to 
increase, and so did the number of illegal wells; the agricultural area expanded and 
groundwater became over-abstracted. Several recent studies conducted in the Azraq basin 
have found that actual groundwater use for agriculture in the basin might exceed three times 
the official recorded data (Al Bakri, 2015; USAID, 2014). According to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, cultivated land surface increased between 2005 and 2011 from 61,200 du to 
114,320 du (MoA, 2012) (Figure 3-13). 
The development of agricultural has continued with the introduction of new crops such as 
grapes and pomegranates, diversifying away from traditional olive trees. More recently, 
farmers have attempted to cultivate alfalfa due to its high yield and high revenue, despite its 
high-water consumption. Alfalfa cultivation is mainly grown based on illegal wells, or on wells 
without meter, so that farmers can avoid paying for their high-water consumption. The 
increasing trend in groundwater abstraction slightly subsided during the mid-2000s due to 
the decline in water table levels, the decrease in well productivity, and an increase in water 
salinity. 
 
Figure 3-13. Evolution of the cultivated area in Azraq (in dunum) (MoA, 2012) 
Agriculture first concentrated around Azraq city (Azraq north and south). In the beginning of 
1990s it expanded to eastern Azraq (farm area) and Mafraq. The characteristics of agriculture 
activities vary from Azraq to Mafraq. Water table in Azraq is near the surface, down to a 
maximum of 50 m, and extraction costs are low; in Mafraq in contrast water table can be 
found at a maximum depth of 550 m, which means very high well drilling and extraction costs 
compared with Azraq. Land in Azraq was cheaper, with an opportunity to speculate, while in 
Mafraq it was much costly since it is sold with an official land deed. All these factors are 
presented and further studied in chapter (7). 
3.1.2.2 Water level 
The Water Authority of Jordan has dug sixteen wells for monitoring purposes in Azraq (AWSA 
field). The monitoring results showed an increase in abstraction in parallel with the increasing 
number of wells and agriculture expansion, causing a decrease in water table levels by about 
25 meters during the last 28 years (Figure 3-14). The fluctuation that appears in the figure is 
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caused by the yearly recharge events but unfortunately these are not enough to offset the 
negative water balance between discharge and recharge. 
 
Figure 3-14. Decrease in water table data in monitoring AWSA well (MWI, 2013) 
Abdulla et al. (1999) studied the decline in groundwater level in Azraq basin using three-
dimensional groundwater flow model. They predicted the decline in groundwater level for 
four different scenarios for the years 2005, 2015 and 2025. The first scenario where the 
pumping rate is 45.5 Mm3; the second scenario where the pumping rate is 22.7 Mm3; the 
third scenario where pumping rate is 68.1 Mm3 and the last scenario equals to the basin safe 
yield. Results showed that water table will dropped 25 m in 2025 under the first scenario, 
while a pumping of 68.1 Mm3 would generate a drop of the water table of 39 m (Table 3-5). 
Table 3-5. Prediction of groundwater table decline (Abdulla et al., 1999) 
Scenarios Maximum drawdown (m) 
 2005 2015 2025 
SC 1 20.01 22.85 25.32 
SC2 12.9 12.53 12.46 
SC3 27.74 33.82 39.2 
SC4 13.6 13.53 13.68 
 
3.1.2.3 Groundwater wells 
Wells in Azraq can be divided into four categories according to their legal status: 
- Legal wells with a license (rukhsa) from WAJ; 
- Illegal wells registered in the WAJ database but which got a temporary permit (ijaza) 
- Illegal registered wells which have no permit; 
- Illegal wells unknown to WAJ 
Official abstraction rates are calculated based on meter readings of legal and illegal 
registered wells, or estimated based on the cultivated area and cropping patterns with help 
of satellite images for the un-metered wells. In 1984 the number of wells in Azraq were 
recorded at 254 dug (shallow) wells and 73 boreholes wells, abstracting in total around 8 
Mm3/yr (GIZ, 2010). Nowadays, all shallow wells have been closed or turned into boreholes 
wells. According to official statistics, the number of wells reached 1,316 in 2009 and the total 
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abstraction volumes reached around 51 Mm3, of which 28 Mm3 for agriculture. Molle et al. 
(2017a) indicated a decrease in number of well in the basin in 2017, as the official number of 
function wells were cited as 580 wells abstracting 52.54 Mm3 annually (Molle et al., 2017a) 
Figure 3-15 and Figure 3-16 shows the location of (most) active registered legal and illegal 
wells. Groundwater salinity in the basin based on WAJ database ranges between 100 and 
7,000 ppm. However, 206 wells out of a sample of 225 wells have a range of salinity of 500–
2500 ppm, with a few cases where salinity concentrations are above 4,000 ppm (found in 
Azraq south area due to high water salinity in the aquifer and the Qa’a) (Figure 3-18) 
 
Figure 3-15. Legal wells in Azraq (Google Earth and raw data from MWI, 2010) 
 
Figure 3-16. Illegal wells in Azraq (Google Earth and raw data from MWI, 2010) 
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According to WAJ, farmers using illegal wells abstract on average 50% more water than legal 
wells (WAJ, 2010) (Figure 3-17). 
 
Figure 3-17. Abstraction from legal and illegal wells in Azraq (m3/yr)(MWI, 2010) 
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Figure 3-18. Distributions of salinity in Azraq (Google Earth and raw data MWI, 2010) 
In the following chapters of this study, I will define and explain the agriculture driving forces 
and availability of production factors in Azraq basin and studying the sustainability of 
agriculture activity with the elasticity of water and land policies. 
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4 Chapter Four: Explorative Spatial Analyses to Support Stakeholder 
Deliberation on Groundwater Management 
 
Abstract: Society has to deal with an increasing pressure on the environment. It is essential to 
find feasible and socially acceptable solutions to manage these problems. Stakeholder 
involvement and participatory approaches are found to be a possible solution for natural 
resource management. However, during stakeholder meetings often a plethora of potential 
interventions is suggested. Increased data availability opens new avenues to carry out ex ante 
analysis to screen potential solution pathways and to focus the discussions. Explorative 
spatial analyses can be used to define the window of possible interventions and 
opportunities. The window of opportunity reflects the overlap between the feasible solutions 
and the options stakeholders consider being relevant and potentially achievable. A good 
example is groundwater management. With the increase in water demand, proper 
management becomes essential to safeguard limited groundwater resources for future 
generations. However, the overexploitation of groundwater aquifers for domestic, urban use 
and irrigation frequently results in a reduction of groundwater availability and quality. 
Groundwater policies have proven to be difficult to implement. The Azraq basin in Jordan 
suffers from overexploitation. The aquifer has been mined through intensive pumping during 
the last 20 years which caused degradation in water quality and quantity. This paper presents 
an explorative spatial analysis to visualize the window of opportunity in the catchment to get 
closure on the options for natural resource management. 
Keywords: Azraq basin, Jordan, Window of opportunity, Natural resource management 
4.1 Introduction 
Society is gradually facing more environmental problems related to the increased pressure 
on natural resources. The global community calls for intervention through a range of 
initiatives like the Sustainable Development Goals. These global goals have to be 
implemented at local or regional scales. They require a thorough investigation of the various 
dimensions of the problems and of associated biophysical and socio-environmental 
constraints to identify the solution pathways. However, in many cases there is a lack of 
consensus amongst stakeholders. Natural resource management involves a wide array of 
stakeholders who differ in their personal backgrounds, knowledge or experiences and 
priorities. Stakeholders attempt to make sense of a common challenge and contextualize it 
within a particular set of values, ideas or political agendas (McEvoy et al., 2013). Current bio 
physical and social conditions vary for each situation. The variation in stakeholders and 
conditions leads to a dispersion of solution pathways that are proposed. In addition, typically, 
the suggested pathways include both feasible and infeasible options. The multitude of 
solution pathways and the infeasible options hampers the debate around natural resource 
management. In the past decades, there has been a rapid advance in data availability thanks 
to new techniques of data collection like remote sensing and crowd sourcing, but also of data 
sharing through the internet and data warehouses. As a result, it has become easier to 
identify potential solution pathways and to support the decision-making process by aligning 
stakeholders along the biophysical available options given the social constraints (Ashford et 
al., 2006). 
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Accessible data can help in defining and opening windows of opportunity that overlap with 
various dimensions in natural resource management. This article aims at developing a 
systematic framework to analyse and capture interventions in natural resources 
management. We will focus on groundwater-based agriculture that often suffers from 
groundwater over abstraction, a very common problem in a number of countries with limited 
water resource. 
Typically, agricultural systems in arid and semi-arid regions face problems related to water 
stress. With most available surface water being used, the attention increasingly goes to 
groundwater resources. Consequently, groundwater usage has grown rapidly during the last 
decades. A continuous decline of groundwater levels has been observed in many countries in 
the past half century (Bajjali and Al-Hadidi, 2005; Gaur et al., 2001; Zhou et al., 2012). 
Groundwater depletion has been caused either by overexploitation for both urban and 
irrigation uses and/or reduction of groundwater recharge aquifers, which frequently result in 
a reduction in groundwater availability and quality (Konikow and Kendy, 2005). Over 
abstraction of groundwater aquifers exceed 100% of recharge in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, 
Tunis and Morocco, 95% in Jordan and 50% in Iraq. Figure 4-1 shows the total renewable 
groundwater resources withdrawn in the world by region (Vrba and van der Gun, 2004). 
About 60% of groundwater withdrawn is used by agriculture while the rest is almost equally 
divided between the domestic and industrial sectors. 
 
Figure 4-1. Percentage of total renewable groundwater resources withdrawn by region (FAO 
AQUASTAT, 1998-2002) 
The explosive increase in groundwater use has been driven by different factors. Supply-
driven factors, such as government subsidies, easy availability of inexpensive pumps, and 
drilling technologies have facilitated the accessibility of groundwater. Demand-driven factors 
have also resulted from groundwater’s capacity to provide flexible, on-demand irrigation to 
support vibrant, wealth creating agriculture in all climate zones, and from the growing need 
to provide food for urban populations (Shah, 2007). The Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO, 2003) identified a range of social, economic and environmental consequences related 
to the increased use of groundwater resources: i) an increase in the vulnerability of 
agriculture mainly for small farms, ii) increased pumping costs and energy usage, iii) a 
reduction in the access to water for drinking, irrigation and other uses, particularly for the 
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poor, iv) critical changes in patterns of groundwater flow to and from adjacent aquifer 
systems, v) a decline in stream base flow, and vi) damage to wetlands and surface 
infrastructure. 
Sustainable strategies to manage groundwater resources are essential especially in (semi-
)arid countries. Ostrom (1992) demonstrated the capacity of communities to manage 
common resources. However, in the case of groundwater, the conditions for crafting rules for 
sustainable management are generally not met (Schlager, 2007). Decision makers follow 
different approaches to conserve groundwater, either through the implementation of 
regulations or through a joint dialogue with groundwater users. Since groundwater policies 
have proven to be difficult to implement (Hammani et al., 2009; Bekkar et al., 2009; Macoun 
and El Nasser., 2000), stakeholder involvement and participatory approaches are found to be 
an alternative solution to natural resource management. Petit (2004) explains that it is often 
in a situation of water stress that local stakeholders recognize the common character of 
groundwater resources and try to find adapted solutions to over exploitation. Therefore, 
simple messages about over abstraction or pollution could be sufficient to prompt collective 
responses by the community of groundwater users. However, the perception and 
understanding of problems related to groundwater over abstraction are key but appear to 
vary considerably between stakeholders (White and Kromm, 1995; Shah 1993; Hammani et 
al., 2009). In the case of the Tadla and Souss irrigation scheme in Morocco, farmers were 
shown to have a reasonable idea about functioning of the aquifers and the water balance 
(Bekkar et al., 2009). They were able to put in place defensive farm strategies through 
collective access to save water when problems with groundwater exploitation occurred. 
Ghazouani et al. (2012) also demonstrated that farmers are reasonably aware of the 
constraints of Nefzawa oasis in the south of Tunisia environment due to their long-term 
practical experience. In the Amman-Zarqa basin (Jordan), farmers have expressed a degree of 
willingness to be part of a collaborative water management process. The participatory 
process helped them to present several practical options that were discussed with decision 
makers, private sector, and NGOs such as the establishment of an irrigation advisory service, 
buying-out farm wells, limiting groundwater abstraction, exchanging treated wastewater for 
groundwater, and increasing the efficiency of municipal and industrial water use (Chebaane 
et al., 2004). 
Brainstorming sessions and stakeholder workshops are often characterised by a wide variety 
of different views due to a wide range of users and different management approaches and 
priorities. While this is a potential richness for the meetings, it may also hamper consensus 
and a common view on the problem. Although available data are often not sufficient for 
detailed analysis, they do allow for simple back-of-the-envelope calculations that may guide 
the selection of realistic options and the definition of a window of opportunities. In this 
study, we explore the use of available data for back-of-the-envelope calculations to make a 
first cut between feasible and non-feasible solution pathways. We will first present a 
conceptual framework after which we will provide an example of an explorative study from 
Jordan. 
4.2 Conceptual framework 
Managing common natural resource such as groundwater typically involves cooperation of a 
range of different actors at different levels (from farmers at the lower scale level up to policy 
makers at the national level) but also from different sectors (representing agriculture, 
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industry, and municipalities). Different actors have different views on potential solution 
pathways to find a feasible solution for environmental problems between different related 
actors, and national dialogues, meetings and workshops are often organised. However, 
during meetings a plethora of potential interventions are generally suggested, reflecting 
differences among the participants in term of worldview, priority, knowledge and awareness 
of the problem, and ability to adopt changes. However, it is important to realize that not all 
the options that are considered by the stakeholders are realistic or will work in practice. 
Lemon (1999) distinguishes between the so-called decision space and opportunity space. The 
decision space is defined as the joint set of options that are considered by all the 
stakeholders. Theoretically, the opportunity space is the set of options that solve the 
problem. In practice, these options of course need to be tested for implementation and 
feasibility. Typically, the decision space and the opportunity space do not fully overlap. Three 
different categories of options can be distinguished:  
• Options that are considered by the stakeholders and that will actually work. This is the 
intersection between the decision space and the opportunity space and defined here as the 
window of opportunity. 
• Options that are considered by the stakeholders but that are not feasible solutions, 
this is the part of the decision space that does not overlap with the opportunity space, and  
• Options that are feasible but that are not considered by the stakeholders, either 
because they are not aware of them or reject them for some reason. 
Explorative studies to map and delineate the set of feasible solutions (window of 
opportunity) taking into account the biophysical, cultural and environmental constraints, 
before any meeting, can help in focusing the problem and highlighting the feasible available 
options. A quick, back-of-the envelop, analysis on the basis of available data and literature 
may help to define the opportunity space by considering factors and indicators. In the case of 
groundwater management, such an analysis may lead to an assessment of, for example, the 
recharge of the catchment, safe yield, water used, the (current and potential) agricultural 
area, the population living in the catchment and the elasticity of change adoption. More 
detailed research allows to narrow down the opportunity space to get a closer view about 
the introduced feasible management options. This allows us to define in more detail the 
window of opportunity. 
We define the set of options by a particular actor as his decision space. Different actors have 
different decision spaces as their views, aims and goals differ. For example, farmers at the 
farm level might aim at increasing his farm revenue while policy makers at ministry level aim 
at conserving the aquifer or at least extending its lifetime. Farmers typically have a decision 
space at the farm level whereas a water board or a ministry may define a decision space at 
the regional scale. As a result, their decision spaces do not necessarily overlap. To properly 
compare and evaluate the decision spaces, it is necessary to aggregate them into a joined 
decision space. 
Ideally, the decision space and opportunity space coincide, but reality shows that the two 
spaces typically only partially overlap (Lemon, 1999) (Figure 4-2). Explorative studies help in 
defining both space and define where they both overlapped to get closure of the window of 
opportunity for natural resource management. 
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Figure 4-2. Conceptual layout for windows of opportunities 
A number of global databases illustrate the growing availability of data. Various digital 
elevation models provide topographic information. For most parts of the world, data from 
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) provide elevation data at a 30-90m resolution 
(Jarvis et al., 2008). The GTOPO30 database (http://edcdaac.usgs.gov/gtopo30/gtopo30.asp) 
is available for the entire globe at a resolution of 30 arc-minute. Recently, this database was 
updated into the Global Multiresolution Terrain Elevation Data 2010 (GMTED2010) as 
described by Danielson and Gesch (2011). These digital elevation models allow to study the 
topography of terrain, identify watersheds, and calculate e.g., the topographic wetness index 
(Sørensen et al., 2006). Climate data are available at a 30 arc second resolution from, for 
example, WorldClim (Hijmans et al., 2005). In addition, the reanalysis project 
(https://reanalyses.org) provides a range of datasets describing weather conditions at a high 
spatial and temporal resolution (e.g., Uppala et al., 2005). A rapid increase in global soil maps 
area available including the Harmonized World Soil Database (FAO/IIASA/ISRIC/ISSCAS/JRC, 
2009), SoilGrids (Hengl et al., 2014), and S-World (Stoorvogel et al., 2017). Although soil data 
often lack details on soil physical characteristics they do provide enough information to 
derive hydrological data (like infiltration capacity or water holding capacity through 
pedotransfer functions; Gijsmans et al., 2007). Land use data is available as classified maps 
(e.g., Global Land Cover Characteristics Database; Brown et al., 1999) or basic data on 
vegetative cover from readily available satellite images from, e.g., SPOT. These data provide 
general information on climate, topography, land use, and soils to carry out some basic 
calculations for any location at the earth’ surface. The data have become readily available 
through a range of different data portals either disciplinary (https://reanalyses.org for 
weather data and http://www.isric.org/explore for soil data) or more general purpose 
(worldgrids.org and https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov). In addition, local data and an increasing 
amount of literature may provide additional site-specific data.  
The data and data portals allow us to provide detailed insight in most main aquifers. Using 
this data and information can help give a general idea or/and assess environmental problem 
boundaries before any field visit or farmers meeting and delineate feasible management 
options. Subsequently, a limited number of selected potential interventions with a certain 
elasticity can be evaluated in a more thorough manner in predictive studies that may involve 
additional data collection. 
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4.3 Case study 
4.3.1 Introduction 
This study focuses on the Azraq Basin, one of the Jordanian aquifers that is suffering from 
over-abstraction. The total area of the basin is 12,710 km2 with the larger part of the 
catchment (94%) falling in the North-eastern part of Jordan, and smaller parts in Syria (5%) 
and Saudi Arabia (1%) (El-Naqa, 2010; Abdulla et al., 1999, Shahbaz and Sunna, 2000). Part of 
three Jordanian governorates are located inside the Azraq basin Jordanian’s borders: Zarqa 
governorate represented by Azraq district, Mafraq governorate represented mainly by a part 
of North Badia district and Amman Capital governorate represented mainly by a part of Al 
Jiza district (Figure 4-3). Our study focused on agriculture activities in Azraq (Al Zarqa 
governorate). 
 
Figure 4-3. Azraq basin location (left) and the three governorates inside Azraq basin, Jordan 
The basin consists of three aquifer systems that are hydraulically connected in certain parts: 
upper, middle and deeper aquifer systems. The groundwater flow is from south Syria towards 
Jordan and the groundwater moves from all directions towards the Azraq depression (Figure 
4-4). Topographically, the basin is concave with the Azraq Oasis as a large fertile mudflat in 
the central and lowest part of the basin. The depth of groundwater in the upper aquifer 
varies from a few meters in the centre of Azraq oasis to 400 m due to topography in the 
northern catchment area. The middle aquifer system is considered as a confined aquifer 
throughout the basin, and it is recharged mainly from the Jabal Al Arab recharge area in the 
north of the basin. The deeper aquifer system has a low yield and poor water quality and is 
therefore of lesser importance. The main recharge of the upper aquifer system originates 
from infiltration through the basalt aquifer from high rainfall areas in Jabal Al Arab in 
southern Syria. Intensive thunderstorms and flash floods in the Azraq basin also contribute to 
a minor groundwater recharge. The estimated total recharge is about 34 Mm3/year (MWI, 
2010). 
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Figure 4-4. Azraq basin contour lines with groundwater flow direction in Azraq basin (left) 
and groundwater stream flow direction towards Azraq depression (right) 
Azraq basin is a semi desert area characterized by a hot and dry summer and fairly wet and 
cold winter. The mean annual rainfall ranges from 50 mm/yr in Azraq Oasis area to 500 
mm/year in Jabal Al Arab area. The average precipitation for the entire basin is 87 mm/year, 
which occurs between January and March. Rainfall pattern of Azraq basin inside the 
Jordanian territory is 100-150 mm in the west and north of the basin, 50-100 mm in the 
middle of the basin and less than 50 mm in the south and east of the basin (JMD, 2011). The 
mean daily temperature in winter is less than 10oC and the maximum temperature is 45oC. 
The potential evaporation rate in the area is 2400 mm/yr. The dominant soil type in the 
region is a silty clay loam soil, high soluble salt content in the subsurface horizon, soils are 
primarily composed of limestone or covered by basalt boulders that resulted from volcanic 
out crossing centred on Jabal Al Arab (DLU, 1994). 
Groundwater in Azraq basin is a major source of water for domestic use for the cities of 
Amman and Zarqa as well as the Azraq area itself, government abstracts about 23 Mm3 of 
Azraq basin groundwater every year for domestic purposes and only 0.35 Mm3 for industrial 
purposes. The abstraction for both uses are already equal the basin safe yield, taken at 24 
Mm3 per year (MWI, 2009). Irrigated agriculture is based on groundwater abstraction and is 
the main consumer of water in the basin. The Ministry of water and irrigation officially 
announced an abstraction of 28 Mm3 of water per year for agriculture purposes, which is 
nearly equivalent to the entire safe yield of the basin. Table 4-1 presents the abstraction rate 
according to the purpose of use of registered legal wells, knowing that Azraq has three types 
of functioning wells: legal wells, illegal registered wells, and illegal not registered wells. 
Groundwater–based agriculture has been developed in Azraq basin since the 1960s driven by 
the improvement in well-drilling techniques, the decrease in energy costs, land affordability 
and accessibility, and good water quality and quantity (Molle et al., 2017a). Olive and stone 
fruit trees were the main dominant cultivated crops in the basin.  
The expansion in cultivated area was encouraged by the government who freely awarded 
licenses for wells in the 1980s and early 1990s. Sensing the increase in groundwater use in 
the area in the late 1980s, the government tried to control abstraction by introducing special 
laws for groundwater use, with measures and tools to control abstraction, including banning 
new wells, introducing metering, water tariff, restriction areas and control of drillers. 
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However, abstraction continued to increase, and so did the number of illegal wells; the 
agricultural area expanded and groundwater became over-abstracted. 
Table 4-1. Groundwater usage in Azraq basin from the registered legal wells during 2009 
(MWI, 2009) 
 Abstraction rate Mm3 Safe yield Mm3 Abstraction rate % 
Private drinking wells 0.32   
Governmental drinking wells 23.00  
Industrial purpose 0.35  
Agricultural purpose  28.00  
Rural area 0.09  
Total 51.76 24 215% 
The development of agricultural has continued with the introduction of new crops such as 
grapes and pomegranates, diversifying away from traditional olive trees. More recently, 
farmers have attempted to cultivate alfalfa due to its high yield and high revenue, despite its 
high-water consumption.  
Farming in Azraq was considered as a prime investment option, and investors and local 
farmers enjoyed a good economic return from these activities. According to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, cultivated land surface increased between 2005 and 2011 from 61,200 du to 
114,320 du (MoA, 2012). 
The intensive pumping carried out through the last 20 years in the Azraq basin has caused a 
lowering of the basin's water table, and the drying up in 1993 of the four natural springs in 
the middle of the Azraq oasis that had discharged good quality water for thousands of years, 
spurring wildfires across the increasingly dry environment (Al Zu’bi, 2001). The lowering 
water table of the basin, in turn, has encouraged deeper excavation of wells that once 
provided large outputs of water for irrigation, which contributed to lowering and degrading 
the water table even further, increasing salinity and degradation in water quality. Empirical 
studies conducted by the Azraq Oasis Conservation Project (Al-Eisawi, 1995) indicated the 
presence of three problems related to agriculture activities in the basin: i) a large percentage 
of high quality water is consumed by low value crops, ii) soil deterioration due to the 
combined effects of fertilizers, and high evaporation, and iii) agriculture growing rapidly 
despite the unsustainable use of water (Al Zubi and Al Kharabsheh, 2003).  
The overexploitation of the aquifer for both urban needs and irrigation resulted in an 
environmental catastrophe for the wetland ecosystem, abandon of unproductive lands, 
trebling of the salt content of the aquifer, declining land productivity and rangelands, and 
reduced tourism potential. 
4.3.2 Methodology 
The methodology aims at defining the opportunity space, decision space and window of 
opportunity. To define the opportunity space, we collected available data from different 
sources. The main available data from the literatures and official documents that were used 
are: safe yield, recharge, cropping pattern, type of irrigation system, irrigation system 
efficiency, decline in water table, current trend of groundwater use and cultivated area. The 
available data that were used and retrieved from the web are: 
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 data on long term averages of total annual rainfall and mean annual 
temperatures at a 30 arc-sec resolution from WorldClim,  
 a digital elevation model from Aster at a 30 m resolution, and 
 a range of land cover maps at different resolutions derived from satellite imagery. 
Two types of analysis were elaborated to define the opportunity space: the first analysis 
includes a spatial data analysis for the Azraq basin using freely accessible GIS data on climatic 
conditions (Figure 4-5), elevation (Figure 4-6), land cover and Google imagery (Figure 4-7). 
 
Figure 4-5. Mean annual temperature in oC (left) and annual precipitation in mm (right) in 
Azraq basin 
 
Figure 4-6. Elevation map (left), streams link and Azraq depression area with elevation map 
for Azraq basin (right) 
 
The extent of the watershed was identified using the digital elevation model in a hydrological 
analysis in ArcGIS (including an analysis of flow direction, flow accumulation, streams and 
watersheds). In addition, rainfall data were analysed using the official boundary of the 
watershed in combination with the WorldClim database. Finally, the cultivated area in the 
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watershed is estimated using various global land cover maps based on satellite imagery. In 
the second analysis, groundwater abstraction was estimated using the areas of different 
cultivated crops, their water requirements cultivated areas and the drop in the water table. 
The governmental data on the various properties were also included in the analysis 
The decision space was defined on the basis of the proposed intervention of different 
stakeholders that are presented in the study area: the water authority of Jordan (WAJ), 
farmers, local people (not necessarily farming), Azraq Oasis wetland, and NGOs which work 
with different initiatives in the area.  
 
Figure 4-7. NDVI map for Azraq basin (left) and reflection of agriculture land near Azraq 
depression using Google earth map (right) 
The window of opportunity was defined as the overlap between opportunity space and 
decision space. 
4.3.3 Results and Discussion 
4.3.3.1 Opportunity space 
With the publically available data, four different elements were explored, including the 
extent of the watershed, total annual rainfall, and the extent and location of the cultivated 
area 
Extent of the Azraq watershed 
The extent of the Azraq watershed is often considered to be a given. However, different 
sources of information provide us with very different estimates. The extent that is typically 
being used is 12,710 km2. The commonly used GIS map indicates a small difference of 2.3% 
and covers an area of 12,414 km2. The limits of the watershed derived from the ASTER global 
digital elevation model provide a very different surface area covering an area of 10,601 km2 
or 16.6% less than the commonly used area. 
Rainfall amount 
JMD (2010) provides general information on rainfall quantities in the watershed. They 
indicate that the total annual rainfall varies in the watershed between 50 and 500 mm/yr 
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with an average of 87 mm/yr. This numbers are estimates based on a limited number of 
observations. The WorldClim database interpolated the weather station information using 
ANUSPLIN to interpolate the noisy multi-variate data using thin plate smoothing splines with 
latitude, longitude, and elevation as independent variables (Hijmans et al., 2005). An overlay 
of WorldClim and the GIS map of the Azraq basin indicates that the total annual rainfall varies 
between 47 and 310 mm/yr with a weighted average of 101 mm/yr. 
Cultivated area 
The Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture indicates that around 104 Km2 is cultivated in the Azraq 
basin in 2010. Other sources of land cover gave significantly lower estimates of the cultivated 
area. The GlobCov database indicates that only 8 km2 whereas MODIS indicates a cultivated 
area of 3 Km2 in the Azraq basin. The low estimates with the satellite imagery are probably 
underestimates. With the relative course spatial resolution the cultivated area is 
underrepresented as the very small parcels are not being recognized. 
Locating the agriculture area 
Locating the agriculture area was done using NDVI maps in combination with Google earth 
imagery. The NDVI can be used as a good indicator of the vegetative cover, but does not 
indicate whether it is natural or cultivated. The latter can easily be confirmed with the Google 
earth imagery. The majority of the watershed is covered by desert and rangeland. Less than 1 
% of the basin has intensive agriculture and human activities which are mostly located near 
the Azraq depression area. This area is the lowest part in the basin (500m asl) where 
groundwater is available a few meters below the surface. This is reasonable according to the 
presented climatic conditions in the basin. This result has a good reflection with the 
agriculture land that appears on Google Earth map. 
Estimation of groundwater abstraction 
The Ministry of Agriculture indicated that the cultivated area in Azraq covers 10,429 ha 
(0.82% of the basin) with vegetables, forage, fruit tree, grape and mainly olive trees (MoA, 
2010). Groundwater is the only source of irrigation in the district. In the Azraq basin four 
irrigation systems are used that differ in their water use efficiency: surface irrigation with an 
efficiency of 55%, open tube irrigation with an efficiency of 65%, micro spray or Virojet 
irrigation with efficiency of 60% and drip irrigation with an efficiency of 70% (Table 4-2). 
Net crop water requirements have been estimated for the actual cropping pattern in Azraq 
area (Venot et al., 2007, Fitch, 2001, Hanson, 2000 and Demilecamps, 2010). The total 
abstracted water was calculated based on the official data for cultivated area multiplied by 
the crop water requirement (CWR).  
The results are presented in Table 4-3. The total calculated abstracted groundwater equals 
74 Mm3/yr, which exceeds two and a half times the annual abstraction rate documented by 
the Ministry of Agriculture (28 Mm3/yr). The official abstraction rate combined with the 
official cultivated area would result in a water use of 160 mm/yr, which does not correspond 
to the cultivated cropping pattern. With the calculated abstraction of 74 Mm3/yr, the water 
consumption is around 700 mm/yr which is considered more realistic with the presented 
cropping pattern (mainly trees and alfalfa) and the climatic conditions. The large gap 
between the calculated groundwater usage and the official numbers can be caused by illegal 
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groundwater use. The Ministry of Agriculture, and/or the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
calculate groundwater abstraction on the basis of legal wells only. 
Table 4-2. Irrigation system types and efficiency in Azraq basin 
Irrigation system Surface Open tube Virojet Dripper 
Irrigation system efficiency 55% 65% 60% 70% 
Table 4-3. Estimated net crop water requirement for the actual cropping pattern in Azraq 
basin 
Fruit tree Area in du Net CWR m3/du/yr Net CWR m3/yr 
Apple Fruit 280 1000 280000 
No 165 1060 174900 
Peers Fruit 970 800 776000 
No 820 1000 820000 
Quince Fruit 200 800 160000 
No 0   
Peach Fruit 50 900 45000 
No 40 1040 41600 
Apricot Fruit 150 900 135000 
No 50 1040 52000 
Cheery Fruit 50 800 40000 
No 90 1000 90000 
Pomegranate Fruit 650 800 520000 
No 200 1000 200000 
Palm Fruit 450 600 270000 
No 1130 500 565000 
Others   40 1040 41600 
Sum Fruit 2800   4211100 
  No 2535     
Vegetables 
Winter Vegetables    
Tomato 2000 450 900000 
Eggplant 750 250 187500 
Zucchini 150 300 45000 
Pepper 250 250 62500 
Cauliflower 1500 450 675000 
Cabbage 1700 450 765000 
Green beans 50 300 15000 
Onion 320 320 102400 
Garlic 100 350 35000 
Others 120 400 48000 
Sum 6940   2835400 
Summer Vegetables       
Tomato 500 550 275000 
Eggplant 350 300 105000 
Zucchini 40 350 14000 
Pepper 20 280 5600 
Cauliflower 500 500 250000 
Cabbage 500 500 250000 
Water melon 750 400 300000 
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Melon 750 500 375000 
Onion 50 400 20000 
Garlic 100 450 45000 
Okra 50 550 27500 
Sum  3610   1667100 
Winter Cereal  
Wheat 450 450 202500 
Barley 3000 450 1350000 
Others 6000 500 3000000 
Sum 9450   4552500 
Olives  73330 750 54997500 
Grape  5620 1040 5844800 
Total water consumption MCM/yr 74.1084 
Total cultivated area in du 104285   
In order to monitor the groundwater table and water quality, the Water Authority of Jordan 
(WAJ) dug sixteen monitoring wells in a preserved area in Azraq (the, so-called, AWSA field). 
As the number of functioning deep wells has been increasing, the abstracted amount has also 
been increasing, causing a decrease in water table levels by approximately 25 meters during 
the last 25 years (Figure 4-8). Farmers interviews by Demilecamps (2010) indicated that the 
over exploitation of groundwater area led to a drop of the groundwater table by 1 to 3 m/yr. 
Farmers that settled in the 1980s testified during fieldwork visits between 2013 and 2015 to 
a drop in the groundwater table of around 25 meters since the 1990s. The same result has 
been confirmed also by HCST (1999). 
 
Figure 4-8. Fluctuation in groundwater table in Awsa field, Azraq (WAJ, 2014) 
The agriculture area in Azraq Governorate, as reported in the Ministry of agriculture's annual 
report, equals 104 km2. Given the fact that agriculture completely relies on groundwater, 
water requirements in the area roughly equal groundwater abstraction. As a result one 
expects a groundwater abstraction of roughly 104-312 Mm3/year. Alternatively the 
abstraction can be calculated on the basis of the drop of the groundwater table. Assuming a 
porosity of 20% in the aquifer, the amount of abstracted groundwater abstracted varies 
between 20 - 60 Mm3/year. However, the actual abstraction of the ground water could be 
higher if groundwater flows laterally to the agricultural area. 
4.3.3.2 Decision space 
An inventory done by stakeholders resulted in a list of options to regulate over-abstraction of 
groundwater in Azraq basin. The options are oriented towards regulations, the supply of 
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groundwater, managing water demand and community co-management (Table 4-4). The 
options differ additionally in their scale level, whereby some focus on the farm level and 
others on the aquifer level. Some of these options are feasible as they align with the current 
environment represented by the opportunity space. However, some of the options clearly lie 
outside the opportunity space. 
Table 4-4. Alternative options for groundwater management in the Azraq region 
Regulatory tools Policy tools and measures: selling wells, water tariff, well permits and 
licenses, control agriculture area expansion, subsidies 
Supply management Alternative source of water: desalination, treated wastewater, water 
transfers, artificial recharge 
Demand management New source of income: solar energy 
Saving water: cropping patterns, awareness campaigns 
Reduce water loss: irrigation efficiency 
Community co-management  
Regulatory tools include several options to be implemented at the aquifer level by policy 
makers. Supply and demand management include options to be implemented at both farm 
and aquifer levels and originate from stakeholders at different scales (including the 
government, farmers, and NGOs). While the community co-management of groundwater 
resources in Azraq basin is an option to be implemented at aquifer level were multi-scale 
level stakeholder contribute to water management jointly with the policy makers. 
4.3.3.3 Window of opportunity; discussion on potential solutions 
The exploratory analysis in this study provided new insights on the extent of the Azraq basin, 
the cultivated area and actual groundwater abstraction for agriculture, improving our 
knowledge about water requirements and the depletion of the aquifer. The analysis aims to 
identify feasible management options of the scarce groundwater resources. Ideally, the 
opportunity space should include or introduce a range of options to conserve the basin 
between the safe yield and recharge. But the results clearly show that current consumption is 
far away from both. Groundwater abstracted for domestic and industrial use already equals 
the entire safe yield of the basin. Accordingly, the boundaries of the opportunity space had 
to be redefined. The boundaries were extended considering a target to decrease the 
abstraction down to a theoretical allowable abstraction rate that will increase the aquifer 
lifetime instead of sustaining it. Stakeholders introduced a number of interventions into the 
decision space that help in reducing the current abstraction of groundwater, thus extending 
the aquifer life time. To achieve this goal, technical packages of regulatory tools, supply and 
demand management measures and co-management should be applied jointly to achieve an 
overlap between opportunity and decision spaces i.e., the window of opportunity. 
Some of the management options will be located in the opportunity space without 
overlapping with the decision space, since the stakeholders did not mention them, are not 
aware of them, or rejected them. Some of the management options will be located in the 
decision space despite the fact that they are not feasible with regards to the time scale or the 
current environment. Other options will lie at the intersection, that is within the window of 
opportunity. Regulatory management can decrease groundwater use. The result of using this 
approach can be observed at both short- and long-term time scale. The short-term options 
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are more likely to be included in the window of opportunity while the long-term options are 
more frequently located in the decision space due to time constraints. For example, the 
buying-out of wells by the government will decrease groundwater consumption instantly. 
Both government and farmers can gain from such an initiative as the government can control 
their use and extend the lifetime of the exhausted resources, while farmers will get financial 
compensation allowing them to start new alternative activities outside agriculture. 
Alternatively, subsidies to encourage cropping patterns with reduced water consumption, or 
a new activity like solar energy production, will also help in decreasing the pressure on the 
groundwater resource: the effects can be noticed shortly and fit well in the window of 
opportunity. The results of managing groundwater resource through controlling illegal wells 
by introducing well licences, permits and water tariff are normally observed in the long run, 
as it is always linked with social constraints and the willingness of users to obey the laws and 
of the government to implement it. Decreasing the agricultural area and limiting the 
expansion of already existing areas help in reducing water consumption, even if this is made 
difficult due to social issues, especially for farmers who only depend on their farm outcome 
for a living. Therefore, these options are more likely to lie within the decision space. 
Demand management introduce feasible and achievable options to decrease the pressure on 
groundwater resource and extend its lifetime. These options are more likely to be adopted by 
users compared with regulatory tools options and they are more likely to be included in the 
window of opportunity. For example, increasing irrigation system efficiency by adopting new 
irrigation techniques helps in reducing the water losses in the system, which will eventually 
lead to decreasing gross abstraction. The average efficiency of irrigation system in the area is 
65%, and increasing water use efficiency up to 95% would save 21 Mm3/yr lowering gross 
crop water requirement from 74 Mm3/yr to 53 Mm3/yr. However, such a technical change is 
unlikely to reduce net consumption (by ET) and might even increase it (Perry and Steduto, 
2017; Molle et al., 2017). Changing the cropping pattern by introducing new crops with lower 
water consumption and good profitability is also considered as a feasible option to be 
implemented. Converting to new non-agricultural activity like producing solar or wind energy 
(green energy) will decrease the demand on groundwater resources, an extensive study 
should be done in the area before addressing this option. Demand management options will 
be more attractive to users if paralleled with government subsidies for buying new irrigation 
systems, supporting less water consuming crops, or decreasing the cost of solar energy 
equipment. Supply management normally means providing users with new sources of water 
to meet their needs, which will decrease their current reliance on groundwater: they include 
treated wastewater, water transfer, desalination of brackish water and artificial recharge. All 
these options depend on government decisions and will be available if the social, economic, 
and physical environment allows that. These options are more likely to be located within the 
opportunity space, as normally decision makers are not aware of, or think it is not feasible or 
a priority, or don’t want to implement them due to political constraints. Co-management is 
often ignored by governmental parties as it needs institutional reforms before it can be 
adopted and bureaucrats usually do not favour such an option. 
It is useful to add that the options introduced above might be considered as feasible for some 
users but not for others. For example, subsidies are a good option to motivate farmers to 
change their behaviours toward water use, but policy makers might look at it as an 
encouragement to further expansion of current agricultural activities. The limitation of and 
decrease in the agricultural area, as well as closing illegal wells, might be feasible options 
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from the policy maker point of view. However, these options might affect farmers negatively 
if they are not implemented in a way that does not affect the farmers' revenue and economic 
situation. Some of the options are easy to implement. However, others are difficult to 
implement due to the social considerations and an economic dependency on the resource. 
Some of the options have a short-term effect while others have an effect in the long run. 
Actually, all options might be considered valuable, as there is not a fixed solution in 
management terms. Merging long and short-term effect options together and introducing 
them in meetings to policy makers and users to consider these options will decrease the gap 
in the decision space and help find an overlap with the opportunity space. Figure 4-9 shows a 
qualitative sketch of available options for groundwater management to achieve a longer 
aquifer lifetime in Azraq basin.  
4.4 General discussion 
The rapid increase of available data opens new opportunities. However, the results also 
clearly show that while in some cases the various data sources are in agreement, in other 
cases the different sources provide new insights and very different views. This confirms 
earlier results by e.g., Hendriks et al. (2015), which show that a wide array of different 
sources of soil information tell different stories about soil conditions in a study area in Kenya. 
The multitude of data can be used in different ways. Cross checking between different 
sources allows for the verification of data sources. Different sources can be used to indicate 
ranges or accuracies and be analysed in ensemble runs in which different data sources are 
evaluated (commonly used by climate change predictions). Finally, the data can differ 
because they were collected in different ways or with different assumptions. In the latter 
case, they may be complementary and provide additional information.  
An explicit exploration of the decision space illustrates explicitly the multitude of options and 
opens the stage for discussion and selection of the common denominator amongst the 
stakeholders. However, the plethora of options may be overwhelming and hampering the 
discussion as well. As a result, intersecting the decision space with the opportunity space may 
provide a screening of the options and lead to better focus the discussion. In the case of the 
Azraq, the situation was found to be rather extreme. The opportunity space clearly did not 
intersect with the decision space and had to be redefined to extend the lifetime of the 
aquifer rather than conserve it. 
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Figure 4-9. Window of ideal sustainable feasible solutions 
4.5 Conclusions 
Explorative spatial analysis using the rapidly increasing base of available accessible data, such 
as a high resolution digital elevation models, weather data, soil data, and land use maps, can 
help in selecting realistic options to define windows of opportunities for solutions to 
environmental problems. This may aid stakeholder meetings to better delineate the problem 
boundaries and the underlying causes of the problem, and facilitate the process of natural 
resources management. Subsequently the limited number of selected and potential 
interventions can be evaluated in a more thorough manner in predictive studies that may 
involve additional data collection. 
Generally, a more focused problem definition does not necessary lead to a sustainable and 
feasible solution. Instead, it might highlight the gap between the actual situation and the 
ideal one from a management perspective. There are many disconnects between what is 
desirable for the area and what could be done in terms of management. This disconnection 
can be revealed through the spatial explorative analysis. This types of analysis supports, 
facilitates and focuses the stakeholder deliberations on natural resources management 
options. 
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5 Chapter Five: The Politics of Accessing Desert Land in Jordan 
Abstract: With the dramatic increase of the population in Jordan, the value of land has 
rocketed up. Urban sprawl into semi-desert or desert areas, initially not surveyed or settled 
by the British and considered as state land, has brought to the surface the problematic status 
of those lands. Likewise, the profitability of irrigated agriculture based on groundwater has 
generated a demand for land in the Mafraq, Zarqa and Amman governorates. These trends 
have spurred tensions between local tribes and the state. This study focuses on land tenure 
and conflicts in the semi-desert and desert areas of Jordan, with a focus on the expansion of 
irrigated agriculture within the Azraq basin. It is based on field work and interviews with 
different stakeholders at various levels. We first provide a summary of the main historical 
developments regarding land tenure in Jordan, with a focus on the status of semi-desert and 
desert land. We move on to examining the different ways by which state land can be 
privatized and then review instances of conflicts around rights to desert land in the past 30 
years, further taking the Azraq water basin as a case study to shed light on the particular case 
of groundwater-based agricultural expansion. We then articulate our discussion through the 
lens of legal pluralism, look at the interplay between state and tribal power, and analyze the 
twin strategies of accessing land and water in desert areas. We conclude by showing the 
historical continuity of the land tenure relationships, while singling out Jordan’s state land 
management regime. 
Keywords: land tenure, legal pluralism, desert reclamation, tribal politics, Jordan, Azraq 
5.1 Introduction 
Arid rangelands or deserts are, at first sight, of little value. But in most of the Middle-East and 
North-Africa Region, necessity (urban expansion) and economic opportunities (e.g. 
groundwater-based irrigated agriculture, tourism or mining) are fueling an expansion of 
human settlements and activities into these hitherto neglected areas. This expansion and the 
associated generation of wealth, raise critical questions on land tenure and rights, challenge 
the category of 'state land' (Kelly and Peluso, 2015), and reignite tribal claims for desert lands 
(see for example Gertel et al., 2014 for Sudan, and Sims, 2015 for Egypt). 
Although the gradual transfer of land to investors and developers is a widespread 
phenomenon that may occur through the land market, it thrives on weak land management 
administrations and procedures, fuzzy and unregistered land rights (see Mahdi, 2014 on 
Morocco, for example), but also on the mechanisms through which 'state land' can be 
appropriated, rented or privatized (Kelly and Peluso, 2015). This is particularly true in Arab 
countries where the 'state land' category may have been inflated by land nationalization 
and/or includes (often dominant) marginal/unused/desert lands. The interests of local 
dwellers, farmers or herders –who more often than not belie the concept of an 'empty 
space'– may be threatened by state projects or state-sponsored large (often foreign) 
companies, diffuse homestead building and commercial agriculture, or the claims of other 
local tribes, as observed by Casciarri (2015) in Sudan. State ownership and the ways state 
land may be privatized are often challenged (or contradicted) by the principle of wada yadd 
(direct reclamation of unused public land), where unchallenged and uninterrupted use of 
land during a certain time (typically 15 years) may open a right to ownership (like in Jordan 
(Madanat, 2010) or Egypt (Sims, 2015)). 
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Nowhere is the growing value of desert land better illustrated than in Jordan. With the 
dramatic increase of the population in the country, notably through the successive waves of 
Palestinian refugees (1948, 1967, 1973), returnees from the Gulf (1991), Iraqis, and most 
recently Syrians – the value of land in Jordan has skyrocketed. Urban sprawl into semi-desert 
or desert areas, initially not surveyed or settled by the British or the Jordanian government 
and considered as state land, has brought to the surface the problematic status of those 
lands. In particular, the profitability of irrigated agriculture based on groundwater has 
generated a thirst for land in the Mafraq, Zarqa and Amman governorates, east of the Hijaz 
railway. These trends have spurred tensions between local tribes, claiming historic ownership 
of land, and a state unwilling, under the prevailing conditions of market boom and 
speculation, to give away what it considers as state ownership. This paper addresses the 
political tensions between the state and desert land appropriators, that speak not only to the 
future of the country’s vast desert lands, the affirmation of state power, or the political 
stability of the regime, but also to the resulting overexploitation and future of Jordan's 
precious groundwater resources. 
Most of the earlier studies on land tenure in Jordan have focused on settled areas (see for 
example, Palmer, 1999; Wahlin, 1994a, 1994b; Mundy, 1994, 1996), the Jordan Valley (Nims, 
2005), or urban/peri-urban areas (with the work of Razzaz, 1992, 1993), with little work on 
disputed rangelands and deserts (Tarawneh, 1999, is an exception), especially in the past 15 
years. This study contributes to filling the gap on this issue and focuses on land tenure and 
conflicts in the semi-desert and desert areas of Jordan, with a focus on the expansion of 
irrigated agriculture in the Azraq Basin. It is based on the collection of literature and 
newspaper articles on land tenure/conflicts in Jordan, interviews with 54 farmers/investors in 
this area, and semi-structured interviews of nine Key Informants from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources, and the Department of Land 
Survey from 2013 to February 2015. Whether coming from farmers or officials, information 
on land transactions is frequently limited and often ad hoc (the reasons for which will 
become clear later). Because of the sensitivity of the topic and the reluctance of some 
interviewees to be cited, we anonymized reported information and quotes. 
We first provide a brief summary of the main historical developments regarding land tenure 
in Jordan, with a focus on the status of semi-desert and desert land. We move on to 
examining the different modes by which state land can be privatized and then review 
instances of conflicts around rights to desert land in the past 30 years, further taking the 
Azraq Basin as a case study to shed light on the particular case of groundwater-based 
irrigated land. We then articulate our discussion through the lens of legal pluralism, looking 
at the interplay between state and tribal power, and analyzing the twin strategies of 
accessing land and water in desert area. We conclude by showing the historical continuity of 
land tenure relationships and situating our findings in the wider debate on desert land 
reclamation. 
5.2 Historical context 
The history of land tenure in the Ottoman Empire and during the British Mandate has been 
the subject of substantial scholarship. We provide here only a summary of the historical 
background, while the reader is referred to seminal works such as Fischbach, 2000; Mundy 
and Saumarez Smith, 2007; Owen, 2000, or Bunton, 2007 for further details. Early rules 
governing the usufruct of lands were a result of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire and 
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the conquest of new lands. Local inhabitants of Islamic faith, or converting to it, would pay a 
tithe called ushuri equivalent to one-tenth of the production of their land, while non-Muslim– 
if allowed to keep their land – would pay a tribute called kharaj. The Sultan could also grant 
iqtaa land to private individuals such as military officers as rewards for their services (with 
the obligation to cultivate the land). In all cases, the Sultan or Emir was to remain the 
ultimate owner of the land (Islamoglu, 2000; Sait and Lim, 2006; Mundy and Saumarez Smith, 
2007). 
The Land Code issued in 1858, in parallel with the Civil Code (Mejelle), aimed at making a kind 
of land inventory for taxation purpose and increasing tax revenue, and exercising greater 
state control over the empire (Carroll, 2011; Islamoglu, 2000). The Code organized a system 
of taxation that would apply to every piece of land, either privately owned (milk) or part of a 
domain called miri (land under the custody of the Amiri, or prince), that included all arable 
fields, pasturing grounds and woodlands. Miri holders would enjoy the use of the land after 
being registered officially and against payment of a fee (tapu), on condition that it remained 
cultivated (Fischbach, 2000). Milk land was directly composed of former ushuri and kharaj 
lands and also included land for dwellings with appurtenant plots not exceeding one dunum.5 
State ownership extended to two other categories of land, matrūka (such as roads, threshing 
floors or market places), and mawat ('dead' or wasteland such as mountains and rocky places 
far from villages). Anyone cultivating such land could "upon payment of a fee, be issued a 
title deed to the continued usufruct of the land" (or even gratuitously if it was considered a 
question of need) (Bunton, 2007: 35), the land being then reclassified as miri (Fischbach, 
2000: 27). Waqf land was another class of land dedicated to some pious purpose and put 
under the custody of God, and therefore "protected by the strongest legal and religious 
sanctions known to Muslim law from seizure by the state or its officers" (Shehadeh, 1982). 
Although not mentioned in the Code, the category of state land (amlak al-dawla) appeared 
during the Ottoman times and differed from miri in that the state did not sell usufructuary 
rights to it but rented it on a yearly or short-term basis, keeping greater control on this land 
(Fischbach, 2000: 52). Miri land left uncultivated for three years (and then called mahlul) 
would revert to the state. Large tribes such as Beni Sakhr and 'Adwan lost part of the land 
they considered as part of their dira6 to the treasury through this mechanism (Fischbach, 
2000). 
After being entrusted with a mandate over Palestine in 1921, the British confirmed the 
validity of the Ottoman law but passed several ordinances (Bunton, 2007), such as the Mawat 
Land Ordinance (1921) that made the reclamation and cultivation of mawat land unlawful 
(ibid.). The British first conducted a land valuation study, dividing the surveyed area in hawds 
('basins' of no less than 250 du) and ascribing a taxation figure for each of them, based on the 
estimated productive value of the land (grade). A land settlement program ensued, whereby 
plots would be ascribed to specific 'owners'. Between 1933 and 1950, altogether 7.77 million 
du of agricultural land belonging to 412 villages out of a total of 480 for the whole country 
were settled (Fischbach, 2000: 115 and 158). 
                                                        
5 One Turkish dunam = 919.3024 m2; the dunum has later been redefined as 0.10 ha, to fit European units. 
6 The tribe's grazing grounds and camping unit (Al Sirhan, 1998). 
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Two important points for our discussion must be noted. First the British land settlement 
program was limited to the villages of the provinces of Ajlun, Al Balqa, Al-Karak and Ma’an, 
where agriculture was practiced and where taxes could be levied. Tribes residing in or 
claiming semi-desert rangelands and desert lands could use them as pastureland, occasional 
agriculture, or dwellings, and could in theory apply for registration to have these lands under 
their names. Many tribe members refused to go to such an extent for fear of taxation or 
conscription, or to manifest their opposition to the state’s claims over land (Razzaz, 1992; 
Madanat, 2010). 
Second, the settlement gave rise to the expanding category of 'state land', which included 
not only the personal properties of the deceased Sultan Abdulhamid II, the waqf lands that 
were under the control of the Sultan’s treasury (Fischbach, 2000: 117), but also all the land 
considered as mawat, pastures and other collective land coming under the matrūka 
category, as well as forest land (already under government administration in the late 
Ottoman period). Altogether roughly 450,000 du were eventually sold by the state through a 
process called tafwid (delegation); in 1953, the state still possessed 2.64 million du out of the 
area registered during the settlement (40% of which were forested) (Fischbach, 2000; Baer, 
1957). 
After the establishment of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946, the Constitutions of 
1951 and 1952 amended but did not repeal the Land Code. Several important laws passed in 
the 1950s provided further rights to the miri landholder who could now sell, lease, rent or 
mortgage his plot, transferred all miri land within municipal boundaries to the milk category, 
and vested all power to administer state properties in the Director of the Department of Land 
and Survey (DLS) (Shehadeh, 1982). Later, the State land delegation and renting Law No. 53 
of 1977 codified the conditions for renting or 'delegating' state land (see below). 
5.3 Land issues in the past three decades 
While all mawat and desert lands, as well as forests, had been shifted by the British under 
the category of state land, both urban sprawl, in particular to the West and South of Amman, 
and agricultural expansion in the desert came to challenge state 'ownership'. Urban sprawl 
was the result of population growth but more importantly of the settlement of Palestinian 
refugee camps in the late 60s, as well as of the families of migrants established in the Gulf 
who returned en masse after 1991, with the financial capacity to purchase flats and houses 
(Razzaz, 1992), and of tax breaks or exemption to housing companies, which all turned the 
construction sector into a very profitable venture (Madanat, 2010). More recently, in the 
2000s, the American invasion of Iraq spurred an influx of Iraqi into Jordan and a dramatic 
growth in land transactions and values (Figure 5-1), fuelling a real estate frenzy spreading 
across the Jordanian elite and a bubble which eventually partly burst in 2008 (Madanat, 
2010). 
Thirst for land, whether for family settlement or speculative purposes, put pressure on 'state 
land' and on the diverse legal mechanisms whereby state land can be used by or transferred 
to private individuals: land settlement (taswiye); land 'delegation' (tafwid); Royal gift 
(makrama malikiya). These mechanisms are briefly described and then illustrated by a 
number of cases that have made the news in the past three decades. 
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Figure 5-1. Number of transactions in the years 1973-2012 (DLS annual reports; Razzaz, 1992) 
5.3.1 Transfer mechanisms of state land to private use or property 
5.3.1.1 Taswiye 
The settlement (taswiye) procedure is drawn from the 1952 Land and Water Settlement Law, 
and is largely patterned on the land settlement operations carried out by the British between 
1930 and 1946. A group of potential owners can request the opening of a taswiye process if 
they together claim an area of no less than 6,000 du. The request is first reviewed by the 
Governorate and then by DLS, which checks conformity of the claim with the law and 
forwards it to the Prime Minister for approval. Pending a positive answer, the settlement will 
be announced in the newspapers and in public places and followed by starting a survey of the 
area, the attribution of numbers to all plots and hawds ('basins'), and the listing of present 
persons using/claiming the land in a "field book." 
Claims (and counterclaims, if any) are examined, sometimes giving way to cases in a special 
Land Court, either between claimants or between a claimant and the state, and the 
settlement officer – just like in British times – is still endowed with a substantial degree of 
discretionary power to take decisions according to the most convincing evidence. All 
documents possibly provided by claimants are important, and people diligently keep all kinds 
of official bills (water, electricity, tax, etc.), fines or documents that prove some occupation of 
the land. Although not recognized officially, the hijjeh ('proof') is a key document. The hijjeh is 
signed by an authoritative person of the tribe claiming historical rights to the land in 
question, and two to three witnesses (who certify that the land belongs to, or was reclaimed 
by, the person 'selling' the land). The 'buyer' can use this paper to sell his land thereafter, 
without any protection, of course, from possible bad surprises (e.g., several hijjeh issued by 
different sheikhs, or even fake7 ones). 
                                                        
7 We were shown by one official a hijjeh established in the name of a non-existing person, and corresponding to a plot of 
land which was found to already belong to someone else. 
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A first 'table of claims' is published in public places, with the names of claimants and 
corresponding plots, for a period of one month during which people can raise objections. In 
the absence of contestation, names are moved to the final 'table of rights' and the new 
'owners' receive a kushan (private land deed) (Jordan, 1952). 
5.3.1.2 Tafwid 
The delegation of land (tafwid) is ruled by Law No. 17 of 1974 "State property administration 
law and its amendments" and Law No. 53 of 1977 "State property delegation and renting law, 
and its amendments." People, private or public companies can rent state land from the 
government in order to build, cultivate or make a project on it. Would-be renters should 
present their project through an application directly to the DLS Director. Before the land may 
be 'delegated' for agricultural purpose it should be rented (from the state) for a minimum of 
five years, after which it can be legally registered under the beneficiary’s name (who will 
however not be able to sell the land during a subsequent period of ten years). The maximum 
area that can be delegated varies according to the location of the land, with up to 500 du in 
desert (eastern) lands. Tribes and settlers take advantage of this law to first occupy land, 
reclaim and cultivate it, and then claim it officially. 
Two points should be noted here: in practice, farmers seldom go to the DLS with a project 
and, rather, start cultivation outright, in general drilling an illegal well at the same time, in 
order to be able to irrigate. They also notify the Ministry of Agriculture, which, through its 
regional directorate, comes and checks the reality of the farming activity and registers the 
area and the type of crop, which will be needed to consider the application of the farmer to 
obtain permits for foreign agricultural laborers. After cultivation is established, they 
undertake the DLS procedure. As for taswiye, investors generally go through negotiations 
with tribal leaders and obtain a hijjeh, but they can also ignore their unofficial claim and 
choose to consider – at their own risk – the land as owned by the state ('only'). 
5.3.1.3 Land dedication 
In other instances, the state can decide to distribute land from the treasury, through a grant 
from his Majesty the King through the Royal Court (makrama malikiya). Since a ministry or a 
municipality cannot legally sell or distribute land to private persons, the land is first given to 
the Royal Court and the King then distributes it. This has frequently been resorted to for 
distributing housing plots to some categories of civil servants or specific constituencies, for 
political purposes or otherwise. For example, King Abdallah the second granted plots of land 
to employees from DLS, the Ministry of Finance, Jordan Audit Bureau, the Royal Court, 
teachers, past ministers, or judges, as in 2006 when 598 judges benefitted from lands in 
Amman, Yajouz, Tabarbour and Marka (Al Khatatbeh, 2006). The land is then allocated 
through a tafwid process. 
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and due to the volatile political situation that prevailed 
hitherto, land dedication to tribes and poor constituencies has been heavily resorted to, most 
notably in Ma’an (see later section). Another example is the land dedication process carried 
out in Wadi Rum in 2013, while another set of 223 land plots was dedicated to the Al 
Zalabieh Tribe in early 2015 (AlRabeenews, 2015). 
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5.3.2 Zarqa-Ruseifa and the Amman periphery 
The land issues generated by urban expansion are aptly illustrated by the area of Zarqa-
Ruseifa, northeast of Amman. The story started in the late 1960s, with the first hundreds of 
thousands Palestinian refugees coming to Jordan and settled by the government in this area, 
as well as in other camps. Faced with the informal settlement of refugees around these 
camps, members of the Bani Hassan Tribe started dividing the land between themselves and 
issuing hijjeh to sell plots to Palestinians. The Bani Hassan attempted to regularize their land 
in the 80s but their request was turned down by the DLS on the ground that they had not 
claimed the land when settlement was offered in the 1950s, and that, in addition, they had 
failed to cultivate the land for three consecutive years (Razzaz, 1992). 
As settlement on state land expanded, the government responded by establishing in 1980 a 
Committee for Protecting State Property which was charged "with protecting state owned 
land and maintaining law and order on those lands" (Razzaz, 1992), while armed forces 
started to demolish their houses. This resulted in riots and armed opposition from the Bani 
Hassan (Dayeh and Naganuma, 2009), and eventually in the resignation of Prime Minister 
Mudar Badran in 1984. 
After a long fight with the Bani Hassan tribe in Yajoz/Ruseifa-Zarqa, the state decided to 
legalize plots occupied by Bani Hassan members and by settlers who had 'bought' the land 
from them. In 1986, the government started a tafwid procedure between the claimants and 
the state in order to legalize houses and other constructions which were built on state land. 
Several calls for settlement were introduced, starting from early 2000 and throughout to 
2013. In 2008, a total of 11,000 citizens had taken advantage of these regularizations and 
paid the required fees, while 40,000 more were still waiting to have their situation 
regularized (Al Muala, 2008). 
The land issue rose again to prominence in the wake of the Arab Spring. In 2011, several 
demonstrations were held in Jordan to protest about the distribution of land by the 
government for housing projects for civil servants or to investors, in particular in the North of 
Amman, where several tribes were claiming ownership. For example, lands had been sold to 
finance ministry employees for housing purposes in 2004 under a cabinet decision (TJT, 
2011), and in 2009, to employees of the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Finance and its 
departments (Madanat, 2010).8 Through organizing demonstrations and a "Friday to return 
lands", unemployed youths from tribes such as the Bani Sakher, Zawahreh or Khalayleh 
blocked the roads and demanded authorization from the government to utilize lands in the 
area, which they claimed as part of their "right to use tribal wajihat" (TJT, 2012). The Royal 
Court called leaders of both tribes for a meeting and decided to delegate the land to 70,000 
tribe members. When the delegation process started the tribes were shocked to see that 
80% of their land was already owned by a private university and other individuals (Abed, 
2015). 
5.3.3 Ma’an Governorate 
The southern Governorate of Ma’an is well known for its restive population and has a record 
of riots and rebellions (ICG, 2003a). In 1989, the sudden increase in fuel prices prompted 
                                                        
8 www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=44378  
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Ma’an residents to take to the streets and the military to put the city under siege in order to 
suppress the insurrection (Bouziane, 2010). Similar clashes were witnessed in August 1996, 
after an increase in the price of bread, and again in 1998. 
Following the unrest associated with the Arab Spring, the regime decided to assuage tribal 
protests by distributing land from the treasury, through a royal grant in early 2014, with 
70,000 du of state land in Wadi Al Ateq granted to Ma’an tribal members in the proportion of 
one dunum to each person holding a national ID (Al Khatab, 2014). A number of complaints 
were raised by different Jordanian parties about this distribution of land, some other tribes 
demanding an equal treatment and to be also granted land. But another problem arose when 
it turned out that the land earmarked for distribution was located 20 km away from the city, 
which was refused by Ma’an tribal leaders (Allofjo, 2014; Al Moghrabi, 2014). 
Demonstrations were also started by the Howetat tribe in Ma’an Province, which complained 
that the land to be distributed to Ma’an’s tribes belonged to the Howetat since the 
establishment of Jordan, and that they had a hijjeh confirming this. The government lately 
decided to stop the grant procedure and study it again, taking into account these claims and 
promising to solve the problem by giving the Howetat their tribal land and choosing another 
land for Ma’an tribes (Al Moghrabi, 2014; Abd Al Hadi, 2014). 
5.3.4 Registering desert land 
The occupation of land also spread into desert areas, where people established cultivation 
based on groundwater as a means of later claiming ownership (see next section). Several 
times the DLS tried to address the problem is several ways, lastly in 2000 when it launched a 
project (named the "Unsurveyed Lands Project") to survey the eastern part of the country 
with the purpose of registering the lands in the name of both those occupying them and the 
Treasury. Indeed, despite the remarkable surveying efforts displayed hitherto, only 25% of 
the total kingdom area was registered and mapped in the cadastre, with the remaining 75% 
still unsurveyed and prone to illegal appropriation. The teams of surveyors divided the area in 
units of 10 km x 10 km and altogether 330 land tracts (with a total area of 60,834 km2) were 
registered as treasury land as a result of the project. In 56 locations which were found to be 
already in use (totaling 8,498 km2), a process of settlement was announced and carried out 
between 2000 and 2006 (Al Khatatbeh, 2006). According to DLS annual reports, 145 
settlement were announced during that period (against 18 for the 2006-2012 period), 
including land of the Srour tribe in Mafraq (Um Al Jamal), as part of the "project for the 
survey and settlement of mahlul lands (tribal lands)". 
The DLS offered potential owners to pay a minimal fee to get the land legally. However, only 
a minority of the potential owners were willing to pay, the rest refusing on the basis that they 
had already either paid for the land or 'owned' it for a long time. The DLS went as far as 
proposing a fee of only 1 JD per plot for settlers to obtain a private land title (kushan), but 
this regularization process was discontinued in 2006 by the Prime Minister, as the level of 
conflict generated by the process became unmanageable (Madanat, 2010). They were 
resumed in 2011, in the wake of the Arab Spring, when the DLS announced 13 settlement 
procedures in the whole country (DLS, 2011), but only one settlement had been officially 
published in 2012 (DLS, 2012). 
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In 2012, the Prime Minister asked the DLS and the Ministry of Interior to prepare a detailed 
map with a delineation of tribal land and boundaries (Al Khatatbeh, 2015). Altogether 4,000 
requests from tribes from all over the country were received by the DLS, together with 
various old documents, from Ottoman, British times or otherwise, purporting to prove 
previous delegation or ownership. Todate, the DLS is still studying the requests and preparing 
a map showing tribal lands (Allofjo, 2012), but one Key Informant stressed that this was more 
of a delaying tactic, since such a map would open the way for unthinkable claims to massive 
tracts of land. 
5.4 Desert rights: the case of Azraq Basin 
5.4.1 Setting 
Azraq Basin is a endorheic basin located 120 km northeast of Amman (Figure 5-2), where 
surface water and groundwater naturally flow to a central wetland, a Ramsar site of major 
importance. Because of the shallow nature of groundwater, irrigated agriculture as well as 
abstraction of water for Amman have developed to the point that water use exceeded the 
available resource, resulting in a drawdown of the water table by 0.3-0.8 m/yr (Mesnil and 
Habjoka, 2012). As a result, local springs dried in the early 90s, the wetland being currently 
only sustained, at 10% of its original area, by water extracted by wells. The depth of 
groundwater in the usable aquifer varies from a few meters in the center of Azraq Oasis to 
350 m in Mafraq, in the northern part of the catchment area (Abdalla et al., 1999). According 
to the Ministry of Agriculture there are about 104,285 du of lands cultivated in Azraq District, 
the main crops being winter vegetables, bersim, fruit trees, grape and olive trees (MoA, 
2010). 
 
Figure 5-2. Azraq groundwater basin and oasis 
The area is home to two major tribes (Beni Sakhr and Al Sarhan, to which can be added the Al 
Rtmeh clan from the 'Abad Tribe), and also to Chechen and Druze minorities, the former 
settled by the Ottomans in 1902 as they were fleeing from the Russian army, the latter 
coming in 1920 from Jabal Al Arab, after confrontation with the French (GIZ, 2010). It is 
reported that tribes showed a good hospitality to both groups, perhaps on account of the 
limited numbers of settlers and existing population at the time. Chechen settled in the 
southwest of the wetland, while Druze stayed in North Azraq. 
Most Bedouins dwell outside of municipal boundaries in the eastern part of Azraq, where 
they claim large tracts of state land. Bedouins are in general involved in extensive agriculture 
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(olive trees and bersim for their animals), as a means of occupying and claiming the land, and 
later generating revenue from land trading. According to a DLS officer, Bedouins are "not 
attached to land, they keep moving, and look down at farmers as if they were slaves". An 
investor feels that "Bedouins do not like agriculture that much, they prefer to sell land and 
take money". This image has to be balanced, however, by the fact that tribal members 
sometimes do indulge in intensive farming (for example in Mafraq), an Al Sirhan sheikh 
underlining that "a lot of tribe members sell a part of their land in order to succeed in 
agriculture because they need money to invest". 
Most of the farms in Azraq belong to investors, around 90% of whom reside in Amman or 
other large cities, or even in foreign countries (Iraq, Kuwait). Many are of Palestinian origin, 
and frequently have other farms in the Jordan Valley or Mafraq. Among them feature 
powerful figures such as former ministers, heads of the public security and intelligence 
apparatus, senators, members of parliament and big investors like owners of shopping malls. 
They were attracted to Azraq by cheap land prices, compared with other areas in Jordan, and 
water availability, since the water table is only between 10-20 m below the surface 
(compared with over 150 m in Mafraq).9 Investing in a farm that uses one or more wells is 
much cheaper than in Mafraq, the reason for which investors in Mafraq look down to Azraq 
farmers as poor investors,'10 'Sunday farmers', or land speculators. 
One Sheikh mentioned that he came to invest in Azraq in the late sixties not only because he 
used to go there as a child but also because, with the wave of Palestinian refugees after 
1967, many people expected that a refugee camp would be established in Azraq (there were, 
in particular, talks than one camp in Lebanon would be transferred there). After the start of 
the wars in Iraq and Syria, some people started to invest in the area for the same reason, 
expecting that the availability of water and the proximity to Saudi Arabia and Syria would 
designate the area for the establishment of refugee camps (this indeed happened in 2013), 
and therefore would raise land prices. This illustrates speculative strategies linked to 
expectation about the changing importance of the area in the future. 
5.4.2 Land conflicts 
Relationships between Chechen, Druze and Bedouins are commonly said to be good, but 
there is also a clear will not to report or emphasize conflicts. Despite this fact, we heard 
about instances of conflicts, such as for example a disputed land between Chechens and 
Bedouins along the road to Amman, and also one instance of death of a Druze at the hand of 
a Al-Sarhan member in a land-related conflict. 
Sheikhs from both Al Sarhan and Bani Sakher tribes reported they had a document from 
Ottoman times indicating their rights to the land, but this is often a standard claim and could 
not be verified. It is common among Bedouin Sheikhs to emphasize that "each tribe has its 
own specific control area. Each tribe knows where its lands are… and people know the 
pasture used by each tribe, so they avoid using it" (an Al-Sarhan sheikh). Although it is 
difficult to substantiate these claims, which are contradicted by instances of conflict, we did 
                                                        
9 Wells in Azraq are typically 60-100 m deep and have discharges from 30 to 120 m3/h. 
10 According to one of them "small investors will come to Azraq and when he gets money he will move to Mafraq [to invest 
there]. 
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chance upon an agreement between three tribes shown to us by a sheikh of the Al Sarhan 
Tribe (Figure 5-3). The document dated 5 January 1934 is signed by a Druze Sheikh named 
Muhammad Atieh (Abu Sharash), a Chechen leader and Saleh Al Sarhan, in the presence of 
M. Saleh, member of parliament for Azraq, and defines demarcations between them: "Sarhan 
tribes’ boundaries are located between the old Sarhan’s house to the north, to the old 
Sarhan’s graves to the south, and from the old mountain in the east of Qaisie spring to the 
old castle and palm trees to the west. Any member from any of the three tribes who claims 
others’ land boundaries will have to pay 300 (geneh) and will go to prison for 3 years". 
Relationships between investors and Bedouins (or Druze) are in general reported to be good 
but this partly reflects a clear intent to avoid referring to conflicts in a context where power 
relations are often lopsided. One Palestinian investor for example, while claiming that he had 
excellent relations with all Bedouins – and frequently demonstrated that by helping them in 
different ways such as transportation to the hospital, gift of fruits or other productions – 
admitted that some of them were considering themselves above the law or superior, and 
liked to display an implicit power of intimidation or subjection.11 Another Palestinian investor 
in Mafraq was forced by his neighbor to deliver water to his fields which, even though he 
paid for the associated energy costs, is clearly prohibited and punished by law. He felt he had 
no solution other than complying, for fear of seeing his vehicles or trees damaged. One could 
be tempted to see a continuity between the khuwwa (protection money) that was historically 
exacted by tribes on settled farmers (Jaussen, 1948), and the way this is now done through 
the issuance of hijjehs.12 
Conflicts within tribes also occur but are not frequently reported. Land demarcation, in the 
absence of clear mapping or cadastre, gives way to contestation, as tribal members make 
marks on the soil, or dig trenches by tractor, to indicate the limit of their land, while some of 
them also build a small house without a roof to strengthen their claim to the land in front of 
the state patrol. Furr and Al-Serhan (2008) report the case of a bloodshed that occurred in 
1996 in the tribe of Al Sarhan, where an elderly man was killed after allegedly trying to 
extend his land by shifting and digging new landmarks. 
                                                        
11 One anecdote referred to a shopkeeper who sells different types of agricultural products, and who would never dare 
reminding one Sheikh of his debts, since this would be seen as unacceptably instructing him to pay. 
12 The Beni Sakher were known to extract money from lesser tribes and haj pilgrims (Fischbach, 2000: 15), until they were 
defeated by the Ottoman army in 1867. 
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Figure 5-3. Old inter-tribe agreement (1934) 
The principal cause for disagreement (and resentment) within tribes is associated with the 
way tribal land has been partitioned between tribe members. When asked according to what 
criteria tribal land was divided between its member, one member answered "according to 
the influence and power", while stressing that his father not only distributed land equally, 
400 du to each family, whether sheikh or 'herder', but also to people "outside the tribe". By 
contrast, an Al Zubi sheikh was reported to have taken all the land for himself. In another 
case "the sheikh got 400 du while the 'herder' got 4 du". One of the Bani Sakher sheikhs in 
east Azraq reportedly claimed 6,000 du for himself and distributed the rest between his 
brothers, sisters and children. 
One Sarhan tribe member insisted that "tribal land distribution is not fair. The sheikh got the 
land from the king and it was written that this land was for the sheikh and his people… When 
I grew up I went to the DLS to check if there was land for me, I found out that the Sheikh had 
sold the land to people outside the Al Sarhan family, mainly to people from Syria. I wanted to 
raise a complaint in the court against the sheikh, based on the king’s document. Our sheikh 
did not give us anything from the land he received". The sheikh had reportedly sold 100,000 
du of tribal land to Syrian at the price of 1JD/du in an area near the Saudi border. 
5.4.3 Land markets and policies in Azraq 
Land policy in Azraq has followed the usual pattern of carrots and sticks, alternating land 
regularization and coercive measures. The government controlling encroachment on state 
land through the patrol has tried several times to quell the occupation of state land and to 
destroy illegal farms. For example, a Chechen farmer reported that he put some empty land 
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into cultivation 30 years ago but that the government intervened and destroyed his crops. He 
later cultivated the plot again and after 10 years of cultivation went to DLS to claim 
ownership of the land. This coincided with the time when, a few months later, DLS 
considered his hawd (no. 12) for regularization (taswiye). One Palestinian investor is 
cultivating illegally a plot that is on state land, expecting the patrol to come anytime to 
destroy his cultivation, but yet preferring "to deal with that risk since in the meantime [he] 
can obtain profit rather than stopping cultivation or waiting for a loss if the plot is destroyed". 
One of the investors interviewed bought the land from a Druze family through hijjeh in 1999 
and then regularized the land after 3 years when the DLS opened a settlement procedure. 
But after registering the land he extended his cultivation illegally. The government spotted 
his land, recorded his infringement of the law and sent the case to court. It is apparent that 
whether or not the state intervenes is strongly related to the social power of the owner of 
the farm, with Bani Sakher sheikh’s social power widely reported in different ways by farmers 
to be "much stronger that the DLS patrol", especially with elements of the Bani Sakher tribes 
in the parliament and in influent positions in the government. 
The way access to land is mediated by social and political power is therefore highly 
personalized is also well illustrated by the case of two Chechen widows (and sisters) which 
settled on treasury land not far from Azraq city, and illegally built a house there, claiming 
6,000 du of land. This was spotted by the Treasury Land Protection Department and they 
were asked to leave the land. They refused to do so and went to her Royal Highness Princess 
Alia bint Al Hussein to ask for her kindness, who reportedly requested the government to 
officially register a smaller plot of land (6 du) around the house in the name of the two 
sisters. 
It is hard to establish exactly when settlement operations have been carried out in Azraq, 
over which surface area, and for how many beneficiaries. The first reason is that DLS does 
not divulge such data, for fear that other tribes in other areas of the country would demand 
equivalent land allocations. Second, a taswiye process unfolds over several years and farmers 
remember the year in which they received their property title (kushan) rather than the year 
or the period of the process itself. Many times, properties are registered but the final 
delivery of the kushan is put on hold because the property contains a non-registered well, 
which entails that the processes of registration and officialization of land and water (wells) 
are intertwined. With this uncertainty in mind, we have nevertheless identified settlement 
decisions by the DLS in 1972, 1980, 1987, 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
The period of land regularization that opened in Azraq in 2000 was part of the "unsurveyed 
land project", where 17,839 du from hawd no. 3 and 4 in Azraq South were registered in 
people’s name, while 21,082 du of land were leased by the state to local people for 
agricultural purposes for a period of five years, after which the lands might be delegated to 
their users (Al Khatatbeh, 2006). Beneficiaries of land settlement had to pay a minor fee 
corresponding to 0.016% of the actual market price. 
An influential Chechen resident indicated that a royal grant (makrama malikiya) was 
announced in 2006, after a visit by the King to Azraq, to dedicate one dunum of land to each 
(new) family in Azraq, so they could build a house on it. The dedication concerned lands 
along Azraq main road, near the city, and was mostly targeted at Chechen and Druze; 
however, Bedouins also largely benefitted from this grant, something that Chechen and 
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Druze resented because they consider themselves as the first people to have settled in what 
is now Azraq City, unlike the Bedouins who, they stress, "keep traveling between Azraq and 
Saudi Arabia or Iraq". A total of 70,000 du were eventually distributed in 2009, at a nominal 
price of 30 JD/du (8% of the estimated land value of 350 JD/du, price for bare soil). 
Problems linked to the partial informality of the land market and to the issuance of hijjeh are 
illustrated by a Palestinian in the North Azraq area, who bought his land from a Bedouin 
sheikh in 1998. After one year of buying the land it appeared that there were several 
Bedouins with hijjeh for the same land. He was eventually forced to buy the land again from 
them. This clearly shows that the conditions of buying land, and the risks attached to them, 
reflect the perceived balance of power between the buyer and the seller, the latter 
sometimes not hesitating in using intimidation to extract more money from a buyer believed 
to be in a weaker position. Another story involves an investor who tried to cultivate land 
claimed by local Bedouins without paying for a hijjeh. This resulted in intimidation and 
conflict, and eventually the municipality’s intervention and the removal of his trees. The 
precariousness of the hijjeh is also illustrated by the taswiye in 2007, when some Bedouins 
pressured hijjeh holders to sell their hijjeh back to them at the same price they had bought it, 
so that they could regularize their land and benefit from its massive increase in value… 
Out of the 54 farmers interviewed in Azraq, 41 claimed to have official private land deeds 
(kushan), while out of the 13 remaining cultivating land illegally, five reported to have hijjeh, 
the remaining eight cultivating state land without permission. Because of the sensitivity of 
the issue it can be hypothesized that some farmers cultivating land illegally reported to have 
legal documents. 
5.4.4 Land prices 
The evolution of the price of land in Azraq reflects the evolution of the land market in Jordan 
in general, and local characteristics in particular. Figure 5-4 shows the differences in land 
price according to the area and year in Azraq Region, based on transactions recorded during 
field work. Note that prices have now notably increased, with current land prices in Azraq 
Chechen at around 4500-5000 JD/du. 
It is important to note that the prices indicated in the graph originate from direct interviews 
with farmers in Azraq, and reflect the price that was paid by them when they got the land. 
There are a number of farms 'owned' and cultivated illegally where, as a result, the owner did 
not pay anything for the land. It is however difficult to compare prices because it is 
influenced by whether the land had an official state title deed (kushan) or a vernacular 
contract (hijjeh), whether it already included a well or not, whether this well was legal or not 
(more on this later), what was its discharge and the quality of water, and whether electricity 
from the grid was available. The data as shown on the chart referred to legal land (with some 
additional unconnected isolated points corresponding to hijjeh transactions). 
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Figure 5-4. Reported prices (JD) of land transaction according to place and time 
North Azraq farmers are mainly Druze, while South Azraq is home to the Chechen. Land 
prices have been quite low and stable, on account of the fact that their lands were 
regularized at their request by DLS, against the payment of 0.016% of the actual land value, 
and that the farms are small in size, typically 20 du, which make them unattractive to 
investors. In addition, the situation in South Azraq has notably deteriorated due to the over 
abstraction and the increase in the salinity of groundwater, which explains why land prices 
are much lower than in North Azraq. Land transactions are limited in number and prices are 
stable. 
In Ratameh, located to the east, and Al Awshaq to the northeast, conditions are favorable for 
investment. Vast swathes of land of good quality are available for large-scale farming, water 
is less saline compared to South Azraq, and landownership has already been regularized by 
DLS, allowing investors to buy land with a kushan and avoid the uncertainty inherent in hijjeh; 
some investors also rent the land directly from the government for agricultural purposes. 
Since the land is registered it can benefit from municipal services (electricity, piped water,…). 
It is clear from the graph that land prices in both areas are the highest, compared to other 
regions in Azraq. The land market is very active in both areas, with most recent prices ranging 
between 2,000 and 4,000 JD/du, while some investors recall that in the 70s land in this area 
could be obtained for 1JD/du… 
In Mafraq, one dunum of land which was sold at 30 JD in 1995 now reaches 1,000 JD. One 
landowner recalled that his father was a land trader and had bought a plot of land at the time 
at 20,000 du. It seems that the land was divided up among the big families and the sheikh, 
then parceled it out. An influential Srour Sheikh, who belonged to a Syrian tribe, was given 
land by the late King Hussein in 1964. As a member of parliament with good relations with 
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the King, he obtained Jordanian Nationality for 5000 of his people as well as 200,000 du in 
Mafraq area to be distributed among them (despite the opposition of the Bani Hassan tribe). 
Cultivation has also expanded eastward, to areas known as Al Mathayel, Dghela or Hora. 
Eastern farmlands are normally state land occupied – legally or not – by Bedouins (notably 
from the Khuraysha Clan), who claim it as their tribal land, and investors, who have either 
bought land through hijjeh at their own risk (with prices around or under 500 JD/du). Roads 
are not paved, and there is no electricity and other services. Energy is sometimes sourced 
from solar panels. 
It is also interesting to note a trend towards renting land, often on a yearly basis. This 
reduces or even cancels the risk for the person willing to invest in cultivation, whether the 
land is officially registered on not. This is also a way for Bedouins who have to keep large 
plots of land under cultivation to do away with the burden of cultivating them, while ensuring 
a steady revenue and waiting for future taswiye operations. A well with attendant irrigated 
fields between 200 and 500 du is rented at 20,000 - 30,000 JD per year (10,000-12,000 
JD/100 du, that is, 1/20th of the price of land, in order of magnitude). 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1 Legal and state administration 
On the face of it, land administration in Jordan is highly centralized and organized along 
western bases, following the model of land management established by the British. And 
indeed, the legal land system has delivered substantial benefits to the country, reducing 
conflicts and investment risk, stabilizing state-citizen relationships, and ensuring a relative 
degree of professionalism, equity and openness, at least with regard to the 25% of the land 
under private tenure. The DLS generates a substantial income and has computerized all 
transactions and cadastral maps with plot-level information (Madanat, 2010). 
Although several problems are reported (ranging from mistakes with names, the confidential 
nature of the information, or instances of corruption), DLS’s administration compares very 
favorably, for example, with the "disastrous management of public land" in Egypt, as bleakly 
described by Sims (2015). Dysfunctional property titling, registration, and transfer systems 
are prevalent and only 15% of private land parcels are registered; land is not taxed, and no 
maps are available (ibid.). Unlike in Jordan, there are 11 ministries and 13 government 
authorities or holding companies with stakes in public land. Since 2007 numerous land scams 
involving officials and influential people have been unearthed and publicized. According to 
Sims (2015), the mess is not cleaned for a purpose – "to keep the machine producing 'rents' 
and windfall profits for vested interests and space for pervasive corruption". 
While in countries like Sudan (Gertel et al., 2014), Egypt (Sims, 2015) or Morocco (Mahdi, 
2014) the state has mediated the commodification and transfer of 'state land' to private 
hands (national or foreign developers or companies), often at give-away prices, Jordan has 
favored local and smaller investors (with the exception of the land leased to three large 
companies in Disi, whose contracts have now been discontinued). This may be partly due to 
much scarcer land (and water) resources and a more professional land administration, but 
also to the heavier weight of tribal politics (see below), and a fairer regime of land 
distribution constitutive of a relation of trust between citizens and the state (Fischbach 
2000), making looting and corruption at the scale witnessed in Egypt more difficult. It 
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remains, however, that accessing state land is a key avenue of capital accumulation and that, 
as such, the politics of land allocation are deeply enmeshed in wider national politics and 
games of influence and power. 
5.5.2 Legal pluralism and the multiplicity of claims 
While the Jordanian (formal) land system is centralized, it is apparent that Jordan is a classic 
case of legal pluralism, whereby several registers of legitimacy (Islamic, tribal, official, 
international…) are simultaneously mobilized and resorted to when dealing with land issues.13 
Antagonistic references and interests are also visible in the contradictions between different 
sectoral policies (see § 5.3). A prime example of contradiction between practices and the law 
is the fact that although the exploitation of treasury land is prohibited by law (Madanat, 
2010), the practice of exploiting treasury land for agriculture with the hope of later 
regularizing it with the DLS (through a tafwid or taswiye campaign) is a key strategy of both 
agricultural expansion and access to land. 
The rangelands and desert lands, formally under ownership of the treasury, stand at the 
confluence of several claims: some investors consider their 'right' to revitalize/reclaim desert 
land, as legitimized by the Coranic principle14 of ihya and made possible by the 1977 Law on 
tafwid, while local tribes consider them as part of their community dira or wajiha and dismiss 
state control over them. As we have seen in the preceding section, these claims are also very 
much about securing a stake in the wealth-generating land market. In the badia, the state is 
seen as an external actor, "state-legislated tenure [as] usurping customary law" (Patrick, 
2002), and legitimacy of claims to land based on agreements between tribes and on 
arrangements within each of them. While the government considers most of the badia to be 
state land "the Bedouins consider themselves the real owners of these areas" (Al-Sirhan, 
1998). As stressed by Sait and Tempra (2015), "the modernisation of land tenure has not 
erased the community and Islamic tenures, at least at the unofficial level". Others appeal to 
international laws, such as the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1957, 
which stipulates that they "have the right to live according to their customs…and have the 
right to own and exploit all the land they were living in at the time of the demarcation of 
frontiers and establishment of the state", or Article 14 of the International Convention No. 
169 of 1989 on the Protection of Tribal Peoples which "provides for the recognition of the 
rights of indigenous peoples and tribal ownership and possession of the land which they 
traditionally occupy" (Abed, 2015). 
The status of the hijjeh provides a telling example of how the boundaries of legitimacy are 
blurred. At the time of tafwid or taswiye, hijjehs are considered in settlement and disputes, 
although their theoretical/legal validity is nil in the eyes of the State. The extent to which the 
state is ready to accept the legitimacy of a hijjeh is variable, thus reflecting a typical situation 
of legal pluralism. Wherever political considerations dictate a privatization of state land in 
areas with few competing claims or expected future use by the state, hijjehs will be 
                                                        
13 Legal pluralism is taken here as "the presence in a social field of more than one legal order" (Griffiths, 1986: 1), adding, 
with Dupret (2007) that law (or the fragmented spectrum of law) is "what people consider as law" and what they make of 
it and how. 
14 Like Casciarri (2015) in Sudan, references to Shariaa or Islamic principles did not feature prominently during our 
interviews. 
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considered as a central element of land attribution. Conversely, typically in the periphery of 
Amman, where land prices have now skyrocketed, and where until the 1970s the Bani Hassan 
Tribe would commonly claim and sometimes register this good and fertile land (Razzaz, 
1992), the government stands more firmly by its claim to state land because of its growing 
awareness of its future needs to access land (e.g. for the construction of universities, military 
or refugee camps or airports). But this is also dependent on the wider political balance (see 
next section), as illustrated by a state policy that follows a typical fluctuating pattern, 
alternating between stick and carrots, legalization and destruction. Property rights on land 
can be conceived of as 'bundles of rights or claims', referring to competing claims or 
entitlements, that are continually negotiated among groups and individuals (Islamoglu, 
2000). 
The hijjeh itself can be endowed with different degrees of symbolic value. Some try to 
enhance the symbolic value of the hijjeh they deliver by using an official letterhead (Razzaz, 
1992), while we saw one hijjeh signed by a Katib el Adl,15 and bearing several official stamps! 
Some hijjeh are signed by minor sheikhs, while others can be signed by the paramount sheikh 
of the tribe, in which case its value will be higher because of the lowest (or nil) risk to see a 
respected sheikh failing to honor his word or engaging in malpractices. The identity and 
reputation of the witnesses also matter. Patrick (2002) stresses the importance of the moral 
aspects of the economy, particularly in tribal areas "where reputation is a key element in 
developing and maintaining social capital". 
Arbitrating between different claims and sources of legitimacy is a highly political game. One 
lawyer interviewed by Ainnews (2011) called for "creative solution" (hal mubtakar) to get out 
of these claims. A Key Informant at the DLS recognized that in practice there was a need "to 
balance between official rights and traditional rights". 
5.5.3 The state and tribal power 
The tribal politics of Jordan, and their constitutive role in state-building have been the subject 
of much scholarship (Kark and Frantzman, 2012; Alon, 2007; Massad, 2001). We focus here 
on how the power to access land, or to control the access to it, has played and is still playing 
a paramount role in maintaining the internal political balance of the country, and in shaping 
relationships between the state and its citizens, following Fischbach’s demonstration (2000), 
that "In a predominantly agricultural society as Jordan was during the period under study, 
land and the control of its fruits are powerful factors in determining the socio-economic and 
political contours of state and society. To no small degree have social forces in modern 
Jordan been linked to land and land tenure". 
The Jordanian regime, since the time of King Abdullah I and the crucial necessity he was in –
after being placed on the throne of a 'foreign' territory (Patrick, 2002) – to win the support of 
local tribes to the new Hashemite power, has been built upon a give-and-take relationship 
with local tribes. This included the enrolment of Bedouins in military units and the state 
administration, the co-optation of tribal leaders as members of the cabinet, the distribution 
of tax relief and land grants. Access to land has long featured highly in state-tribes 
relationships. The tribal Council formed by King Hussein bin Talal in 1970 (but discontinued in 
                                                        
15 Katib El Adl is a person endowed by the government with the power to approve legal transactions and procedures, like 
wakalat, ratification, verification and translation of documents. 
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1976) had among its four roles "to delegate (tafwid) the lands of the government to needy 
tribal people" (Dayeh and Naganuma, 2009). The sensitivity surrounding land issues can be 
sensed from several confrontational events in the past three decades, as described earlier. 
Land-related wealth is increasingly intertwined with politics. New money made on the sale of 
tribal tracts around the Queen Alia airport enriched the Al-Qaisi and Derabani tribes and, as a 
result, representatives of these tribes were able to run a highly organized and expensive 
campaign, and to beat eight Al-Abbadi tribal candidates in the 2010 Parliamentary elections 
(Weir, 2013). Participating in parliamentary elections and accessing positions of power are 
essential to "maintaining wasta, or individuals who provide informal goods and services in 
office" (Strakes, 2011), and having kin members in official state positions ensures the 
allocation of resources according to their interest (Bouziane, 2010). Political crises or tribal 
uprisings are invariably soothed away by changing the cabinet and appointing tribal leaders, 
or opening employment opportunities to youth (Weir, 2013). 
The power to allocate state land can also become a critical weakness. In 2011, for example, 
36 tribal leaders sent a letter to the king, calling on him "to return to the treasury land and 
farms given to the [queen’s Rania] Yasin family. The land belongs to the Jordanian people" 
(Zecchini, 2011), an accusation condemned in vehement terms by the Royal Court (Ma’an 
News, 2011). Irrespective of whether it is founded, the accusation – a rare instance of 
criticism of the regime directed by the tribal leadership supposed to be loyal to the King – 
illustrates how the wealth associated with the distribution of state land and the sensitivity of 
the tribes to losing the (partial) control they have on this rent can both strengthen and 
destabilize the regime, just like the events that occurred with the Bani Hassan Tribe in 1983. 
An extremely telling and significant manifestation of this state of affairs is, maybe, the fact 
that the legal contradiction between the 1977 Law allowing wada yadd and the prohibition to 
occupy state land is routinely swept under the carpet and goes largely unquestioned. 
Gerber (1986) and Fischbach (2000) have posited a link between the stability of Jordan, a 
small and vulnerable country lacking natural resources, and the regime of land distribution 
that has both established a relation of trust between citizens and the state (which allocated 
and registered land with neutrality and equity) and dramatically normalized ownership and 
reduced conflicts. The fact that Jordan largely escaped the political upheavals and agrarian 
crises/reforms that raged throughout the Middle East from the 1920s to the 1950s is seen by 
Fischbach (2000) as somehow related to its peculiar land regime, a statement that might be 
extended now to the crisis following the 'Arab Spring' and the continued use of land for 
smoothening political relations. More generally, as emphasized by Islamoglu (2000), "state 
practices are power fields in which both state and social actors confront each other, and 
negotiate the terms of domination and subjugation which this kind of property implied". 
5.5.4 Accessing land, labor and water 
The wealth-generating land market is at the core of the interface between tribes, which claim 
the land, and the government, which has the power to dictate its relative value not only 
through its decisions to distribute land by the different means at its disposal, but also 
through the degree of law enforcement it chooses to exert on a particular individual. In 
Azraq, mediating access to land is clearly the first 'resource' of members of local tribes. When 
we asked one of the interviewees where one could meet some land middleman (simsar), he 
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said that "any person you meet along the road is a land simsar" and will be able to take you 
to would-be 'sellers'. 
But gaining access to land, with the promise that it will one day be regularized and reach a 
very high value, is associated with transactions in the labor sector. People with registered 
agricultural land in the Ministry of Agriculture have the right to ask for migrant labor permits 
(most of the times from Egypt), on the basis of one per 10 du, and even 5 du, if one cultivates 
vegetables. Someone with 200 du irrigated has the right, theoretically, to 20 workers, 
although he might only need two or three in practice. This surplus labor can be transferred to 
the construction sector, for which middlemen will pay between 300 and 800 JD to the farmer 
for ceding 'his' workers (the monthly salary of a worker is 300-350 JD in Azraq, but 750 in the 
construction sector in Amman). Having a farm also allows one to buy pickups or four-wheel 
vehicles at a discounted tax. 
But more crucially, the agricultural exploitation of the piece of land in desert conditions 
requires water, that is, a well! While the Ministry of Agriculture has in general been 
sympathetic to the idea of expanding cultivation, turning a deaf ear to expressed concerns 
about the sustainability of groundwater-based agriculture, the Ministry of Water Resources 
and Irrigation has been at grips with the problem for more than 25 years (Venot and Molle, 
2008).16 
From a first ban on the drilling of wells for agricultural purposes in 1992, through the 2002 
Bylaw and its policy tools (registering of all wells, metering, free quota and block-pricing of 
water, etc.), to the 2007 bylaw which indicated that non-licensed agricultural wells drilled 
after the first of July 2005 would have to be backfilled, and a 2013 decision to backfill wells 
not legalized by the end of the year, mounting regulatory pressure on groundwater is starting 
to constrain land acquisition and expansion of agriculture. Farmers are caught up in a 
contradictory mechanism where no well can be regularized if drilled after 2005 and if the 
farmer does not have a kushan. At the same time, he needs to have water (a well) to be able 
to reclaim a piece of land before hoping to see it one day regularized. But all this is 
dependent not only on whether land will eventually be distributed for political reasons but 
also on exploiting several loopholes in state regulations and enforcement. 
The enforcement of stricter regulation has been weakened by unsustained political will, and 
corruption, reported at several levels, on both the agricultural and water sides. For example, 
'friendly' meter readings (many meters are, in addition, tampered with), illegal drilling, 
replacement wells (with old wells not backfilled as they should be), etc., illustrate various law 
enforcement problems, while the 'laborer market' also gives way to bribes and faulty 
reporting of cultivated areas. Other factors include the insufficient means and staffing, and 
lack of incentives of the state administration, and the raw power of tribal members. As 
illustrated by one interviewee’s comment on a Bedouin farmer: "it is a tribe and the tribe has 
power; the small government employee cannot say no to the big tribe". 
5.6 Conclusion 
In most of the Arab world accessing land has always been at the core of capital accumulation 
and Jordan is no exception. Urban sprawl away from core historical settlements into desert 
                                                        
16 We address the issue of groundwater use regulation in a forthcoming companion paper. 
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land and the opportunities for high returns on investment in groundwater-based agriculture 
have fuelled a demand for initially little-valued and non-registered arid land; and have 
concomitantly resulted in overexploitation of groundwater resources. 
While earlier studies on land tenure in Jordan have focused on provinces settled during the 
British Mandate or in the 50s, and on Amman peri-urban areas, this paper has attempted to 
shed light on the current dynamics of land settlement, distribution and occupation in the 
Azraq Basin. At the core of ongoing dynamics are the conflicting claims of the state (which, by 
law, claim ownership of all non-registered and/or desert lands) and the tribes (which draw on 
several levels of traditional legitimacy to substantiate their claims). That the stakes are high 
can be inferred from the fact that unregistered land represented 75% of Jordan’s territory in 
2000, with the government endeavoring to strike a balance between sticking to pure legalism 
and turning a deaf ear to tribal claims on the one hand, and giving in to pressure, with the 
unthinkable prospect of having to parcel out to private individuals three quarters of the 
country, on the other. On balance, while in many other countries the transfer or lease of 
'state land' to developers and companies have been described as displacement and a new 
frontier of capitalist expansion, Jordan has developed a fairer land regime favoring Bedouins, 
small to medium-scale agricultural investors, rather than –despite some rich or influential 
urbanite investing in Sunday-farming or land speculation– large-scale developers. 
So far the state’s land policy has fluctuated between 'carrots' (distributing state land by 
tafwid or taswiye) and 'sticks' (destroying illegal houses, plantations or wells), in a 'tango' that 
largely reflects the shifting political bargaining power of tribes in their support to the King, 
who in turn, has tried to sustain what is generally seen as a successful "balancing act" 
between tribes (Alon, 2007). But land distribution or regularization by the King and/or DLS in 
a particular area, tends to generate claims from other tribes, which explains the high 
sensitivity of this give-and-take strategy (and also why DLS is loathed to communicate on its 
operation in order to avoid fostering more claims). 
Tribes are keen to constantly refer to 'traditional rights to their wajihat' and to seize political 
'windows of opportunities', such as the 2011 'Arab Spring', to voice their discontent and 
transform political threats into land and other political rewards (such as positions in the 
Cabinet). In a typical case of legal pluralism, non-state conceptions of landownership are able 
to exist and challenge state concepts, depending on the shifting and negotiated social power 
that can be mustered behind them. 
Investors find themselves caught up in that game. They often have to cope with diverse 
degrees of illegality (regarding both land and water) and intimidation (sometimes bordering 
on extortion) from tribal members. They can hardly afford to fall out with local Bedouins, 
unless they are endowed with, or backed by, very high political power. They are moved not 
only by possible high rewards of intensive irrigation in the deserts, but also by speculative 
motives and expectations of ever skyrocketing land prices, and associated benefits such as 
those coming from 'trading' foreign laborers. But this wealth-accumulating 'game' is, 
eventually, threatened by the sustainability of the water resource base. The more stringent 
regulations being enforced in the past months might be a game-changer and herald changes 
which, however, can be overturned at any moment by the political volatility that 
characterizes the region 
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6 Chapter Six: Controlling Groundwater over Abstraction: State Policies vs. 
Local Practices in Jordan Highlands 
 
Abstract: The control of groundwater over abstraction is a vexing problem worldwide. Jordan 
is one of the countries facing severe water scarcity which has implemented a wide range of 
measures and policies in the past 20 years. While the gap between formal legal and policy 
frameworks, and local practices on the ground is widely acknowledged, few studies 
investigate how local users react to state regulations and document their tactics to 
circumvent them. This paper examines the major tools implemented by the Jordanian 
government to control well expansion and water abstraction and how farmers in the Azraq 
basin have responded to these measures. It then documents how, in response, the Ministry 
of Water and Irrigation has recently enacted a series of creative counter-measures, both 
direct and indirect, in an attempt to toughen law enforcement and raise pressure over 
groundwater users. The lessons learned are highly relevant for countries with similar 
situations, both in the region and elsewhere. 
Keywords: Azraq; Groundwater management, Jordan; Over abstraction; Water governance; 
Water policy 
6.1 Introduction 
The use of groundwater resources has long been overshadowed by the more prominent and 
visible use of surface water; but as the exploitation of surface water reached (or exceeded) 
its limits in many river basins, groundwater has gradually taken center stage and now makes 
up 26% of total withdrawals at the global level (Margat and van der Gun, 2013). The 
continued expansion of irrigation worldwide in the past 30 years has largely been fuelled by 
increasingly resorting to groundwater (FAO, 2015), but the annual contribution of 
nonrenewable groundwater abstraction to irrigation globally has tripled from 75 to 234 Bm3 
over the 1960-2000 period (Wada et al., 2012). This worrying situation, where half of 
groundwater-based agriculture is unsustainable, is nowhere more explicit than in North 
Africa and the Middle East, where unsustainable groundwater development for irrigation is 
taking place in arid or desert land (UNDP, 2013a; FAO, 2015; Famiglietti, 2014; Voss et al., 
2013). 
Although a lot of research has been conducted on physical aspects, the question of how 
groundwater is and should be governed by societies remains largely a moot issue, bedeviled 
by a baffling diversity of situations (Mukherji and Shah, 2005; Burke and Moench, 2000) and 
the thorny issue of common property resource management (Ostrom, 1990). Following 
standard views on IWRM and governance (Rogers and Hall, 2003), emphasis is often put on 
the structure and roles of state administrations, as well as on the legal and policy 'tools' they 
deploy, beside a conventional call for participation. The overemphasis on law and 
regulations, fuelled by donor-supported policy reforms, has led to a situation where most 
countries ‘have state-of-the-art policies and regulations, but the problem is enforcement and 
implementation', as this ubiquitous statement goes. Little attention has been devoted to 
documenting the reasons for such failure and how local actors effectively evade or 
circumvent the law. 
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Jordan is a prime example of a country critically dependant on groundwater that has enacted 
and tested a large range of policies. It is ranked as the world’s second poorest country in 
terms of per capita water availability, with a yearly water abstraction that fluctuated between 
800-900 million m3 (Mm3) during the past 15 years, and an average available resource of 602 
Mm3 (Humpal et al., 2012; MWI, 2013b), the shortfall coming from groundwater depletion. 
The pressure on water resources is increasing under several external and internal factors, 
such as the huge increase in population generated by successive waves of refugees in the 
country’s history, and what economists consider to be a sectoral misallocation of its limited 
available water resources. The percentage of supply going to agriculture in Jordan averages 
53%, followed by domestic (42%) and industrial uses (5%) (MWI, 2013b), despite the fact that 
agriculture only contributes to 3% of the Jordanian GDP and employs 2.6% of the Jordanian 
labor force (DoS, 2014). 
Jordan draws 60% of its supply from groundwater, while the remaining comes mainly from 
the Yarmouk River, with some contribution from the Jordan River and side wadis along the 
Jordan Valley (Humpal et al., 2012). Reuse of treated wastewater now amounts to 123 
Mm3/year. The municipal sector stands out as the first user of groundwater (48%), followed 
by agriculture (46%) and industry (6%) (DoS, 2014), with a total abstraction of 540 Mm3 
(MWI, 2013a). This foreshadows the competition between cities and farmers for precious 
groundwater resources, and the political costs of favoring the latter over the former. 
Amman-Zarqa and Azraq basins make up 42% of the total renewable groundwater resource 
and are the most over-abstracted aquifers nationwide, with abstraction estimated at 176% 
and 215% of the safe yield (MWI, 2009). 
Groundwater-based agriculture started in the highlands in the early 1960s (Demilcamps, 
2010). With the dramatic expansion of irrigation and the growing abstraction by cities, 
Jordan’s groundwater resources started to decline and to deteriorate in terms of quality. 
With average drops in water tables around 1 m/yr (Goode, 2012), the unsustainable nature 
of the groundwater economy became apparent and triggered a series of institutional and 
legal changes, starting in 1988 and including the 1998 water policy, which established the 
priority of domestic water over other uses, leaving agriculture as the main sector to be 
impacted by reallocation. 
This paper starts by briefly describing the chronology of groundwater policies in Jordan and 
then moves to documenting and analyzing their application on the ground, focusing on the 
aquifer of Azraq basin (with the two distinct areas of Azraq proper and Mafraq). It illustrates 
how water users have responded and adjusted to the successive measures taken by the 
government, but also to changes in their wider economic and political environment; and 
how, in response, the Jordanian government has recently taken further measures and 
toughened law enforcement. 
Although there are numerous reports on, and studies of, formal groundwater regulations and 
policies, it is much less common to see studies on farmer/users’ local practices and responses 
to policies on the ground (exceptions include, for example, recent works by Reis (2015) on 
Mexico, or Aarnoudse et al. (2012) on China). We believe however that careful 
documentation of local practices is key to understanding how measures can be designed 
more efficiently and farmers behaviors influenced towards a shared goal of sustainability. 
Jordan’s experience in groundwater management is extremely compelling due to its 
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exceptional situation of limited resources and the broad range of policies that have already 
been implemented and tested. Lessons that can be drawn from Jordan’s experience for other 
countries, most particularly from the Middle-East and Northern-Africa, may prove to be 
extremely valuable, at a time when the government is showing unprecedented resolve to 
'tighten the knot' on users through various creative measures. 
6.2 Key steps of groundwater policy in Jordan 
The modern management of water in Jordan started in 1952 with the Land and Water Law, 
which already considered allocating water through water entitlements, followed by the 
Groundwater Monitoring Bylaw No. 14 (1961) that focused on the drilling of wells and the 
licensing of drilling activities through permits granted by the National Authority for Natural 
Resources that was established in 1965. Groundwater exploitation for irrigated agriculture 
was encouraged by the government in the early 1970s because it held the promise to provide 
a reliable source of income, improve social welfare and stability in rural areas, and help settle 
Bedouins (UNDP, 2013b). 
Well licenses and soft loans for drilling private wells have been granted to users by the state. 
The licenses indicated in general a maximum annual volume of 50,000, 75,000 or 100,000 
m3. These volumes were, however, not respected due to weak to non-existent law 
enforcement and monitoring of groundwater, and to the lack of metering system (Chebaane 
et al., 2004). Consequently, the highlands became one of the most important agricultural 
regions in Jordan, with olives, grape, vegetable and fruit trees (MoA, 2010). 
The management of groundwater resources remained with the National Authority for 
Natural Resources until 1984, when it was handed over to the Water Authority of Jordan 
(WAJ), and to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI), later established by the Water 
Authority Law No 18 of 1988. 
6.2.1 The Water Authority Law No 18 of 1988 
Law No 18 defined the distribution of roles and decision-making power among state 
administrations and established the WAJ, which was, among other things, to 
 survey and conserve all water resources and set priorities for their utilization; 
 regulate the drilling of public and private wells, and 
 explore water sources through exploratory wells; issue licenses for drilling rigs and 
drillers. 
This law clarifies the fact that all existing water sources, whether surface or groundwater, 
within the borders of the Kingdom are considered as state property and may only be used or 
transferred in accordance with the provisions of state laws. Law no 18 was the first piece of 
legislation to introduce fines and prison penalties on illegal well drilling, or when the 
conditions stipulated in the permits are not respected. 
6.2.2 The Groundwater Bylaw of 2002 
Most of the measures pushed by donors and the World Bank in the 1990s and expressed by 
the Government in its policy papers eventually coalesced in a watershed Bylaw enacted in 
2002, under which the WAJ was reaffirmed as the only legal entity allowed to issue drilling 
licenses to users. Legal well owners have to renew the abstraction licenses yearly, by paying 
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50 JD. Licenses specify the type of use and the area of land to be irrigated (it is illegal to 
irrigate more than one land plot or property with a given licensed well). In order to obtain a 
license, the land area to be irrigated has to be larger than 10 ha and the minimum distance 
between wells has to be 1 km. The authority has the right to backfill the well if groundwater 
is sold as drinking water without a special permit, when wells have been drilled without a 
license, or if well owners do not comply with the terms of the licenses/permits granted. 
An owner can also apply for a permit for cleaning, deepening and/or changing the location of 
an existing (licensed) well. Theoretically, a license for a new well is only given after the 
original well has been backfilled. Following the bylaw, each well has to have a metering 
device and the well owner should inform the WAJ within 48 hours if the meter stops working. 
Transitional measures were necessary to take into account pre-existing illegal wells. Wells 
ended up classified into four types: 1) legal wells with a license (rukhsa) from the WAJ; 2) 
illegal wells registered in the WAJ database but which got a permit (ijaza) when it was 
considered that "there are economic or social factors justifying continuation of water 
extraction"17; 3) registered wells which did not receive a permit; 4) illegal wells unknown to 
WAJ (or to which they turn a blind eye) (not explicitly referred to in the law)18. Wells with 
permits drilled on a land without official title may be regularized if/when private land 
ownership is confirmed. Permits are renewed every 3 years (at the cost of JD150) and WAJ 
has the right to modify or cancel them. 
The Bylaw 85 introduced block-tariffs for groundwater, which vary with the type of wells 
(Table 6-1). Licensed wells were granted a generous free block of 150,000 m3/year and rather 
limited tariffs for blocks beyond this volume. Areas with saline water are granted lower tariffs 
(on account of associated low agricultural revenues). Illegal wells, by contrast, faced much 
higher tariffs starting from the first cubic meter. Wells with permits stood in the middle with 
a free block of, generally, 50,000 m3. If a well has no meter, the abstracted amount can be 
estimated by WAJ according to the irrigated area, cropping patterns, or the energy 
consumption of the pump (if there is any electric connection). 
Several amendments to the Water Bylaw have been made in 2003, 2004, 2007, 2013 and 
lastly in 2014. In 2003 the WAJ modified the tariff of the second block for legal wells (from 5 
fils/m3 to 25 fils/m3), which generated political opposition and the intervention of some 
members of parliament who exerted political pressure on the then Minister of Water 
(interview with official, 2015). The rise was eventually cancelled by another amendment in 
2004 (Addustour, 2004). 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 Against payment of a fee of 150 JD/meter of well. 
18 Recent official data indicates that Jordan has 1,559 (identified) illegal wells, out of which more than 50 wells are owned 
by influential people (such as former ministers, former parliament representatives, senators, and former political and royal 
councilors) (Sawaleif, 2015), which seems an understatement if judged from the situation observed in Azraq. 
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Table 6-1. Water tariff for registered and unregistered wells (Bylaw 85-2002/4, and 
amendment 2014) (1Km3 = 1000m3, 1 JD = 1000 fils = 1.21 US$) 
Water blocks Wells with 
license/permit 
(2002/4) 
Wells with permits 
in Azraq (2002) 
Illegal wells 
(registered) (2002) 
Illegal wells 
(registered) (2014) 
0 – 10K m3 Free Free Free 25 fils/m3 
10K – 30K m3 Free Free Free 30 fils/m3 
30K – 50K m3 Free Free Free 35 fils/m3 
50K – 100K m3 Free 20 fils/m3 25 fils/m3 35 fils/m3 
100K – 150K m3 Free 60 fils/m3 30 fils/m3 35 fils/m3 
150K – 200K m3 5 fils/m3 60 fils/m3 35 fils/m3 35 fils/m3 
> 200K m3 60 fils/m3 60 fils/m3 70 fils/m3 35 fils/m3 
6.2.3 Amendments to the 2002 Groundwater Bylaw and Law No 18 of 1988 
The establishment of water tariffs and quotas with the aim of influencing behaviors and 
controlling abstraction was a bold step, since there is no other place in the world where 
administered prices for groundwater have been set up with such an objective (see Molle and 
Closas, 2017). This policy, however, has been weakened from the start because farmers 
tended not to pay their bills and regulation was not enforced; some wells had meters 
installed by the WAJ but others not; farmers’ tampering with meter was widespread; the 
consumption figures collected on the ground were distorted by different mechanisms 
clarified later in this article. On the other hand, the generous free block and the relatively low 
water tariffs made this payment for water modest compared with actual pumping costs or 
incomes, which defeated the measure (Venot and Molle, 2007). 
The 2007 Amendment indicated that a permit might be obtained if the well owner had asked 
for a settlement with the MWI before July 2005. Well owners in this case had in general dug 
a well illegally because their land was not legal, expecting their land to be legalized later 
through a settlement procedure carried out by the DLS (Department of Land Survey). The 
2014 Amendment went one step further and specified that all the wells not having initiated 
such a process of regularization before 2005, as well as all other unlicensed wells, should be 
backfilled by their owners at their cost and under the supervision of WAJ. Failing this, the 
WAJ would close them (with police or border patrol support if necessary). Farmers should 
also install metering systems and new (minimal) quotas were issued for registered illegal 
wells. Corresponding tariffs were dramatically raised, to the point of virtually making any use 
unprofitable, showing the government’s resolve to end illegal wells. In 2014 the WAJ started 
closing illegal wells, first acting, however, upon the non-working or unproductive wells. 
Other important policy measures were introduced through an amendment of Law No 18 of 
1988 (also in 2014): 
 Farmers cannot initiate or request anything from the administration until all due 
water bills are paid. 
 The penalty for drilling illegal wells was changed from 6 months to two years in prison 
to one to five years, with a payment of 2000 to 7000 JD; while not respecting the 
Chapter 6 
132 
conditions of the license would attract fines between 1000 JD and 5000 JD and prison 
between one and three years. 
 Illegal abstraction will be estimated according to the cultivated area, cropping 
pattern, energy consumption, or remote sensing images, and charged to the user. 
Current policy objectives are well delineated in the 2008-2012 national Water Strategy (HKJ, 
2009), which emphasizes the willingness to enforce by-law 85/2002 and a strict monitoring of 
groundwater use, introduce metering, use tariffs to discourage planting crops with high 
water requirements, and close down illegal wells. 
6.3 Methods and context of the case study 
6.3.1 Methodology 
The present case study on Jordan’s highland focuses on the aquifer of Azraq basin (with the 
two distinct areas of Azraq proper and Mafraq). Fieldwork was carried out in 2013 and 2014, 
and included interviews of 80 farmers (local residents, investors, past farmers), line agencies 
personnel, wetland manager, and local leaders, completed by semi-structured interviews of 
nine policy makers, staff in water, land and agriculture administrations, and water experts in 
Amman (2014 and 2015). The questionnaires covered issues of land tenure, cropping 
patterns, production, water and energy sources and use, animal breeding, crop/farm 
budgets, future perspectives on Azraq, and responses to/perceptions of water policies. 
Because of the sensitivity of the topic and the reluctance of some interviewees to be cited, 
the information gathered is anonymized and interviewees are referred to as either 'Official' 
or 'Farmer'. Additional information is drawn from newspapers and the general literature. 
6.3.2 General physical features of Azraq Basin 
The Azraq Basin is located in the North-eastern part of the country with an area of 12,710 
km2 (Figure 6-1). The largest part of the catchment (94%) lies in Jordan with smaller parts in 
Syria (5%) and Saudi Arabia (1%) (Shahbaz and Sunna, 2000). The basin is a semi desert area 
characterized by a hot and dry summer and fairly wet and cold winter. The mean annual 
rainfall ranges from 50 mm/yr in the Azraq Oasis area to 500 mm/yr in Jabal Al Arab area, 
with an average of 87 mm/yr (JMD, 2011). The average potential evaporation rate in the area 
is 2,400 mm/yr (El Naqa et al., 2007). The dominant soil type in the region is a silty clay loam 
soil with high soluble salt content in the subsurface horizon. 
The Azraq basin consists of three aquifer systems (upper, middle and deep aquifers) that are 
hydraulically connected in certain parts. The depth of groundwater in the upper aquifer 
varies from a few meters in the center of Azraq oasis to 400 m in the northern catchment 
area. The Azraq basin safe yield has been established by the Ministry at 24 Mm3/yr 
(Demilcamps, 2010; MWI, 2009), while the total estimated recharge is about 34 Mm3/year 
(Bajjali, 1990; MWI, 2010). Groundwater flow moves from the north east and south west of 
the basin to its centre, the qa’a, that is, the depression where a permanent wetland was 
initially found (Figure 6-1). Likewise rainfall generates runoff that flows in the same directions 
through wadis and accumulates in the qa’a, while recharging the aquifer. 
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Figure 6-1. Azraq basin elevation and streams 
6.3.3 Azraq oasis and communities 
Three main communities are found in the Azraq basin: Chechens, Druze and Bedouins. Even 
though Bedouins were mostly pastoralists, some of them started farming when agriculture 
boomed in the area. Others preferred to work as land brokers. At the beginning of the 20th 
century Chechen and Druze settled in the city centre, close to the natural springs, the former 
in the south and the latter in the north. Most Chechens engaged in farming but agriculture’s 
productivity remained limited by the relatively saline groundwater found in the lands located 
near the central mudflat (Qaá). 
The Azraq Oasis (or Azraq wetland) initially had a naturally flooded area of 12000 du and was 
declared an international Ramsar site in 1977 (Al-Eisawi, 2012). It was an important reserve 
for migratory birds and a breeding site for about 70 bird species. The oasis was fed by surface 
runoff but sustained during the dry period by three springs which eventually dried up in 1992 
(Daoud et al., 2006), due to intensive pumping for agriculture and water supply to Amman. 
This caused the deterioration of the wetland and a decrease in the flooded area, leading to 
an environmental catastrophe and a reduction of the site’s tourist attractiveness. The oasis is 
now artificially recharged with groundwater supplied by one public well and covers 10% of its 
original extension (Hresha, 2013). 
6.3.4 Agriculture and the water situation in Azraq basin 
Initially, subsistence agriculture depended on traditional surface irrigation techniques and 
shallow dug wells with low abstraction rates. Modern groundwater-based agriculture 
developed in the 1970s/80s with the introduction of diesel engines (Venot and Molle, 2007); 
the availability of modern irrigation techniques such as drip and sprinkler irrigation systems 
(MWI, 2015a, 2015b); improvements in well-drilling techniques; subsidized energy costs; 
cheap and easy access to land and water licenses (MWI, 2015a, 2015b), good water quality, 
and very favorable export market conditions, especially to Gulf countries (USAID, 2014). 
These factors contributed to making agriculture a prime investment option in the highlands 
in general and Azraq in particular. 
The expansion of agricultural land continued in the 1990s with the introduction of new 
irrigated cropping patterns in Azraq, including grapes, and pomegranates later in the early 
2000s, farmers diversifying away from olive trees. Although water salinity problems resulted 
in a few farms being abandoned, especially in south Azraq area (Demilcamps, 2010), 
agricultural expansion continued in north and east Azraq, with deeper drilling and a typical 
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drawdown of the aquifer by one meter per year and the introduction of new crops such as 
date palm and alfalfa. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, and despite the toughening of 
state regulations, the cultivated area increased, between 2005 and 2011, from 61200 du to 
114,330 du (MoA, 2012). 
Although desert land is officially state land, Bedouins consider it as their tribal land and while 
some of them found in agriculture a good investment, others 'sold' their land to investors 
from Amman, Iraq or the Gulf countries. A key driver of the expansion of land cultivation in 
Azraq is therefore land speculation, with tribal leaders mediating the (paid for) transfer of 
land to investors moved by the returns of agricultural and/or (more often than not) 
speculative motives, claiming land in the hope that it will be later regularized, with its value 
increased many-fold (Humpal et al., 2012; Al Naber and Molle, 2016). But well drilling is 
costly (especially in Mafraq where depths of 350 m are common) and establishing a 200 du 
farm with drip irrigation costs around half a million JD. 
Azraq groundwater is also a major source of drinking water for Amman, Irbid and Zarqa as 
well as the Azraq area itself. Via a series of well-fields, the government abstracts about 23 
Mm3 of groundwater from the Azraq basin every year for drinking purposes (WAJ, 2010), 
while agriculture abstracts around 28 Mm3, nearly the equivalent of the basin’s safe yield (24 
Mm3 per year) (MWI, 2009). This clearly indicates the magnitude of the challenge of 
achieving sustainable use, since this means that agriculture should be basically 
discontinued.19 The total abstraction is estimated at 215% of the safe yield (MWI, 2009), but 
two recent studies conducted in the Azraq basin have found that actual groundwater use for 
agriculture in the basin exceeded twice the official recorded data (Al Bakri, 2015; USAID, 
2014). 
6.4 Policies in action: local practices in the Azraq Basin 
Laws and regulations have been introduced in order to monitor and control groundwater 
abstraction. After presenting Jordan’s water policies and the context of Azraq, this section 
illustrates the common gap between formal policies -on paper- and local practices, identifies 
enforcement difficulties, and analyzes the tactics adopted by Azraq groundwater users in 
response to these policies. (The information has been provided by farmers or 
officials/experts; when this is not the case the reference is given.) The strategies pursued are 
to evade taxation and circumvent restrictions on groundwater use, whether at the extensive 
margin (new illegal wells) or at the intensive margin (consumption from an existing registered 
well). 
6.4.1 Farmer tactics to circumvent regulations 
6.4.1.1 Well licenses and permits 
Farmers without legal land titles have dug wells and obtained a permit for their illegal (but 
registered) well. Some farmers later legalize their land through 'settlement or 'delegation' 
processes (see Al Naber and Molle, 2016) and then legalize the well accordingly. But this is 
now constrained by the fact that any well considered should have been drilled before 2005. 
                                                        
19 Unless abstraction for domestic use is reduced. WAJ’s promise to do so once water from Disi aquifer would reach 
Amman has not been kept, officially due to the pressure on water resources added by the refugees. 
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Legalizing land/wells substantially increases the value of the land and, as mentioned before, 
the water tariff for legal wells has a generous 'free block' and is much lower than for illegal 
ones. Farmers are therefore bent on legalizing their wells by either exerting pressure on the 
DLS to have their land status corrected (Farmer, 2014), or making the farm where the well is 
dug look older than 2005 in order to be able to claim land in case a settlement procedure is 
announced. It was reported that fake land deeds were also used to obtain a license for a well. 
6.4.1.2 Well maintenance (cleaning, replacement and deepening) 
Three types of well maintenance can be done for licensed wells: well cleaning, well 
deepening and well replacement. Well cleaning is used to remove plants, roots, earth or 
anything that can have an effect on water quality and pumping. Well deepening is made 
necessary by the drop in the water table. Well replacement is accepted if there are technical 
problems with a well. Each well maintenance procedure needs a specific license from the 
WAJ. 
Some informants indicated that these lawful operations are used to bypass the 1992 drilling 
ban (later officialized in the 2002 bylaw): some apply for a well cleaning license but instead 
deepen the well to get more water (especially if groundwater is saline in the area); others, 
who obtained a well deepening license, do not respect the stipulated depth. Farmers can also 
seemingly damage a working well in order to be able to apply for a replacement license. They 
may fill it with soil or obstruct it superficially, so that when the WAJ inspects it a replacement 
license is approved. After the new well is drilled they remove the obstacles and open the old 
well again. 
6.4.1.3 Metering systems 
As indicated in the bylaw each well must have a functioning metering system, but the reality 
is far from the theory (Fitch (2001) found that a few years only after having been installed 
40% of the meters were out of order). In many farms visited during the fieldwork wells were 
found without a metering system. Some farmers complain that their meter is broken and is 
not working, while others would tamper with the meter so that it records less water 
consumption (for example by using a drill to rewind the meter backward). Some farmers 
would also bypass the meter with a parallel derivation pipe, so that not all the water pumped 
is metered. 
It is also indicated that the WAJ should visit the wells every 3 months to take meter readings. 
This is clearly way beyond the capacity of its limited staff (there are 420 working wells with 
licenses or permits in Azraq, and as many 'non-working' wells), and frequency is rather every 
year. Some are asked their readings by telephone. 
6.4.1.4 Requesting a well for domestic or industrial use 
Drilling new agricultural wells was banned in 1992. Some farmers then tried to apply for 
domestic or industrial well licenses to dig a well, and later use it for agricultural purposes. 
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6.4.1.5 Sealing wells 
It was already stipulated in the 2003 amendment that illegal wells without permits should be 
backfilled within six months, but such measures were not implemented. A government 
campaign to close illegal wells started in 2013. In some cases well users would use a fake well 
with a pipe in the ground pretending to be a well and would have it sealed. The original well 
would be reopened after the inspection. Another reported technique is to insert in the well a 
smaller pipe, which is only a few meter long and closed at the bottom end. After being filled 
in and obstructed with earth and rocks, the pipe is later removed to make the well 
operational again. 
6.4.1.6 Hiding illegal wells 
Farmers can drill illegal wells to make for a declining existing (registered) well, or to mix 
waters when the existing well is getting more saline, and/or to expand cultivation. This is why 
it is common that farmers with one (or several) licensed wells also have additional illegal 
ones. Another reason is the rule that a farm can only be irrigated by one given well, which 
means that larger farms are all likely to have illegal well alongside a legal one. 
The relationship between a well and the irrigated area is not always straightforward, 
especially if the well is not metered and its yield therefore unknown. This also helps hiding 
additional illegal sources of water. Such wells are also dissimulated and hidden (such as the 
case reported by a MWI official of a well in the Jordan Valley that was hidden under the bed 
of the owner), covered with plants or rubbish; or the road reaching the farm can be cut in 
order to prevent easy access by officials (Addustour, 2004). 
6.4.1.7 Bribing 
The transaction costs of checking the situation on the field (existence or effective use of a 
well, meter readings, etc) are quite high. WAJ only has three staff in Azraq who can engage in 
monitoring tasks, which is clearly insufficient to carry out what is expected from them. 
Some farmers will also pay for WAJ staff to underestimate the meter readings or to turn a 
blind eye to an illegal well. Such practice is likely to be quite widespread, judging from the 
gap recently found between official and estimated abstraction figures. The social proximity of 
WAJ staff and farmers in some cases (they are from or live in the same area) can also limit 
the effectiveness of rule enforcement and control. 
6.4.1.8 Social power and intimidation 
In other cases, WAJ staff work is made difficult by intimidation tactics (cases where visits are 
discouraged by a show of weapon), or by display of social power by some influential land 
owners. As illustrated by one interviewee’s comment on a Bedouin farmer "it is a tribe and 
the tribe has power; the small government employee cannot say no to the big tribe". An 
example, reported during the interviews, was a case in which three farmers attacked WAJ 
staff during a field inspection, opening fire and injuring one of the staff. Abbadi (2003) 
recorded eight similar attacks but without injuries. 
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6.4.1.9 Transfers of water 
Although it is prohibited to use water from a well in a farm that is not the one cultivated by 
the owner of the well, some farmers have circumvented the difficulty to drill new wells by 
transferring water by pipe from neighboring legal or illegal wells, over distances that can 
reach several kilometers. If these wells are not metered, abstraction is calculated based on 
the nearby cultivated area (only) and can therefore be greatly increased. This transfer can be 
paid for but, in a case observed in Mafraq, an investor had to supply his Bedouin neighbor, 
for fear of reprisals if he did not agree. 
6.4.1.10 Dividing the land 
Article 30 in the bylaw states that it is "prohibited to grant more than one drilling or 
extraction license for one plot of land". To evade this measure, Bedouin sheikhs occupying or 
claiming large tracts of land which cannot be irrigated by one single well divide their land 
between their sons or relatives. 
6.4.1.11 Illegal drillers 
The Ministry is trying to monitor and control the presence of illegal drillers by introducing 
tougher penalties on those drillers. But these drillers also find ways to circumvent the law. 
Some hide the drilling machines between trees, others install it on a broken machine said to 
be out of order and use it at night (Addustour, 2013). A recorded witness highlighted that 
one driller with the help from some locals tried to cut the road to get time enough to hide 
the drillers before WAJ visit. New types of rigs can now be loaded upon and transported by a 
pickup and are more difficult to spot (interview with official, 2016). 
6.4.2 Policy responses by the government 
Faced with a situation of insufficient monitoring and enforcement, the MWI has tried to 
toughen its stance and practices, and developed several parallel 'counter-measures'. 
6.4.2.1 Departmental coordination 
After the passing of the 2002 bylaw, groundwater tariffs were increased in 2003, and then 
decreased in 2004, so farmers did not take the new law amendment seriously and most of 
them did not pay. In July 2009 WAJ distributed the bills again, covering the period from 2003 
to 2010. Some farmers still refused to pay their bill while others did. In 2014, the government 
sought to interconnect all governmental departments by a computerized system, so that any 
governmental procedure (purchase transaction, passport or driving license request, etc) 
would be refused, had the farmer not paid his water bill. This is in particular the case for 
farmers willing to hire labor for their farm (the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture being 
made conditional upon payment of the water bill), or willing to sell their land. 
6.4.2.2 New water tariffs 
Illegal well drilling thrived in the past 20 years and WAJ tried to tackle existing illegal wells by 
introducing a new and very high water tariff in 2014 (Table 6-1). It is hoped that this new 
tariff combined with the administrative measure described above will strongly discourage 
farmers from drilling new wells, and will force them to either use little water so that they stay 
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in the lower tariff blocks (30,000 m3) or discontinue operation. This measure acknowledges 
the difficulty to backfill illegal wells and attacks them through taxing and the indirect 
enforcement measure described above. 
6.4.2.3 Controlling drilling companies 
The registration of drilling companies and the conditions/constraints established for their 
activity have been specified in the 2002 bylaw. Equipment spotted while carrying out illegal 
drilling is liable to seizure. Official statistics mention the number of rigs seized every year and 
such actions are frequently reported in newspapers. In 2013, the Ministry confiscated 14 
illegal drills (Assawsana, 2015) and repeatedly publicized its action in the newspapers. It is 
not clear, though, how much of a deterrent to illegal well drilling this is since similar 
announces were also made in 2003 in the wake of the bylaw (Addustour, 2004). 
6.4.2.4 Satellite imagery 
MWI is now using satellite imagery to control the expansion of cultivated area and illegal well 
drilling. Satellite imagery also allows for a comparison between reported abstracted volumes 
and water requirements estimated based on the cultivated area and crop type. Recent 
studies (Al Bakri, 2015; USAID, 2014) have indicated that abstracted volumes were seriously 
underreported, prompting a toughening of the policies pushed by the Minister. 
Satellite imagery was used as far back as 20 years to check cultivated areas (and was already 
mentioned in the 1988 law – Article 30). However, the situation has now significantly 
changed because of a dramatic drop in the price of these the images, a much easier 
availability, and more powerful computer processing. They can now indicate yearly changes 
and even spot pump houses on the fields. 
6.4.2.5 Destroying illegal wells 
The law indicates that illegal wells should be backfilled at the cost of the well owner. Given 
the different user tactics to avoid control and well sealing discussed above, the Minister has 
decided to use dynamite to close wells, to ensure that they cannot be used again, while 
ordering pictures to be taken for each case. 
6.4.2.6 Stopping land settlement processes 
Opening a 'settlement' or 'delegation' procedure (where state land ownership or use is 
transferred to individuals) encourages Bedouins and investors to claim more lands in the 
hope to see this land eventually legalized as private property. Land 'ownership' (that is, 
occupancy) has to be proved either by cultivating the land or by building a house on the land 
plot. Most people choose the first option as it is easier and the loss more limited if that claim 
is not accepted and their cultivation destroyed by the government. In 2010 a rumor went 
around Azraq saying that the government would release more land for farming. As a result, 
people started claiming state lands and planting trees (sometimes old ones to pretend that 
the farm was old), and 16000 du of new land ended up "cultivated" in Azraq within 2 weeks. 
The Ministry was able to remove 10000 du of newly cultivated land but the other 6000 du 
remained as they were cultivated by an influential sheikh from the Bani Sakher tribe. During 
an attempted visit to the land by the Ministry, the sheikh used weapons to intimidate the 
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visitors. As a result of such a situation settlement and delegation processes in Azraq, and 
more generally in Jordan, were discontinued by the DLS. 
6.4.2.7 Naming and blaming 
The Ministry started a new procedure for unpaid bills. Officials claim the unpaid amount from 
the well owners and give them a period of 15 days to pay. After that, the Ministry publishes 
the names of the well owners and the unpaid amount in the newspapers (including the 
Official gazette) and gives them an additional period of 60 days to settle down the charges. If 
the owner still refuses to pay the amount then the Minister has the power to seize the 
account of the well owner (Alwakeelnews, 2015; Khaberni, 2014). At the end of 2015 the 
Ministry had already published a first list of 70 well owners in the official newspapers. 
Unsurprisingly, some of them are well known and influent people in Jordan (owing, for some 
of them, more than 200,000 JD of unpaid water bills) (Mbayden, 2013; Khaberni, 2014). In 
Azraq only, the Ministry sent 495 notifications for water payment, out of a total of 1493 
(Alwakeelnews, 2015). The Ministry has also opened the possibility for well owners to settle 
unpaid bills by installments (Sarayanews, 2013). 
6.4.2.8 Cutting other benefits 
Another important decision taken by the Ministry has been to stop giving agricultural loans or 
credits to illegal well owners and to cut off the electricity supply to farms with illegal wells. 
Also, through the Ministry of Agriculture, owners can be refused labor permits (when it 
comes to employing full-time workers) (Petranews, 2014). 
6.4.2.9 Constraining access to labor 
The registration of the cultivated plots with the Ministry of agriculture gives the right to the 
investor to 'import' farm labor (in general from Egypt), with a generous allocation of one 
worker per 10 du, and even 5 du if one cultivates vegetables. Someone with 200 du irrigated 
theoretically has the right to 20 workers, although he might only need two or three in 
practice. This surplus labor can be transferred to the construction sector, for which 
middlemen will pay between 300 and 800 JD to the farmer for letting go one of 'his' workers 
(the monthly salary a worker is 300-350 JD in Azraq, but 750 in the construction sector in 
Amman). This 'labor market' also gives way to bribes and faulty reporting of cultivated areas 
(to maximize the number of workers). But this 'right' has now been reduced to one worker 
for each 50 du. And a new law has been passed to disallow the granting of work permits to 
farms with illegal wells. 
6.4.2.10 Raising awareness 
The Ministry has also been using public debates, publishing a series of articles highlighting 
the water problem in the country, and public awareness-raising campaigns and school 
programs (Subeh, 2006). Such campaigns have also been directed at judges and imams. 
Actions such as seizing rigs, sealing illegal wells, fining people for illegal fixtures on mains are 
repeatedly and insistently publicized in the newspapers since 2013; the Minister of Water 
and Irrigation also makes frequent appearances on TV channels (El Naser, 2013). In 2014 
there were more than 15,000 cases of groundwater-related offenses reported by the WAJ, 
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some for tampering meters, others for digging illegal wells, or sabotage of WAJ’s water 
distribution pipes (Jordannews, 2015). 
Also, the King formed a Royal Commission on water resources in 2008, which issues frequent 
reports describing the country’s water situation and needed strategies to conserve water 
(PM, 2008), directed to the public but also to members of Parliament. 
6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
Since the first ban on agricultural wells in 1992, Jordan has experimented with a wide range 
of regulations and policies aimed at controlling groundwater abstraction in the country, most 
notably in the Highlands. The 2002 bylaw has been seen as a watershed legislation but 
implementation on the ground has been lacking and the drilling of new wells has continued 
unabated, fuelled by the profitability of irrigated agriculture as well as land speculation. To 
deal with pervasive problems of illegal well drilling, meter tampering, and unpaid water bills 
the government has used both direct and indirect tools. 
Direct measures include well licensing, establishing annual quotas per well, sealing illegal 
wells (and destroying them with dynamite), licensing and monitoring drilling companies, 
limiting the number of well licenses to one per plot of land, banning well drilling for 
agriculture. Indirect measures include a block tariff pricing system, increasing the water tariff 
of illegal wells, constraining the granting of labor permits, publishing the names of violators in 
newspapers and publicizing tough actions on the ground, using satellite imagery to estimate 
and charge water consumption, and improving inter-departmental coordination to force 
users to pay water bills. 
Application of direct tools in the fields proved to be bedeviled by the transaction costs of 
reading meters, checking the existence and characteristics of wells, or demanding payment. 
Such direct enforcement requires heavy presence in the field, something that clearly 
exceeded the capacity and the material means given to WAJ few field staff, not to mention 
the constraining factors associated with the social proximity of WAJ staff and farmers, 
incentives to bribery, intimidation by local Bedouins, and the feeling that the degree of 
resolve of higher-level authorities in enforcing the law was wavering. Direct metering, a 
standard recommendation of groundwater policy packages, appears to be more of a conduit 
for corruption than any kind of real monitoring. Indirect metering through satellite imagery is 
being developed at the moment in the Ministry and provides a better solution in a desert 
environment where cultivation is clearly visible. Acting forcefully on illegal agricultural wells 
in use and on tree plantations proved to be politically problematic. The Chinese case 
described by Aarnoudse et al. (2012) remains a kind of exception linked to exceptional 
circumstances (Molle and Closas, 2017). The backfilling of illegal wells used to irrigate crops, 
particularly trees, is almost unheard of (ibid.). As a result the Ministry concentrated its action 
on the violations on water supply mains, including illegal fixtures on the Disi-Amman pipe, on 
reducing non-revenue water in urban networks (still around 50%), and put a greater 
emphasis on indirect tools. 
Indirect tools such as reducing the attractiveness of land reclamation (stopping settlement 
processes) and constraining it (through denying labor permits or connections to the 
electricity grid for illegal wells), are sound measures. Water pricing, however, has proved 
marginal if not illusory with regard to legal well owners for whom it is hard to justify high 
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levels of taxation. The Ministry, in 2014, therefore concentrated the tool on illegal wells, with 
tables of tariffs that make open-field cultivation virtually impossible. But a (too) big stick 
becomes hard to use and it is not yet clear whether the measure will succeed in phasing out 
illegal wells. Exacting payment of such massive bills is uneasy but the Ministry has come up 
with a very innovative additional stick by connecting the various administrations (and making 
any procedure dependant upon the settlement of the water bills) and even threatening to 
freeze the accounts of violators (whose names are published in newspapers). 
Even though the law should target all users equally, some farmers in Azraq complained that 
the government was selective and enforcing the law only onto them. This raises the crucial 
issue of the political economy of policy implementation. Political considerations explain why 
some of the instruments have been lacking 'teeth' (for example the overly generous 'free 
block' of the water tariff –it is now envisaged to halve the free allowance–, the leniency 
towards illegal well drilling or meter tampering, land encroachment, etc.). The country largely 
holds thanks to the support of tribes and investors, both being the main actors of land and 
water development. The tribal politics of Jordan and their constitutive role in state-building, 
have been the subject of much scholarship (Alon, 2007; Kark and Frantzman, 2012). The 
Crown, in order to win their support to the new Hashemite power, has always been engaged 
in a give-and-take relationship with local tribes, a crucial balancing act for the sustainability of 
the regime. Likewise many high-ranking officials and wealthy individuals have stakes in the 
land reclamation business, and therefore in accessing the key factor that makes it possible: 
water (Zeitoun et al., 2011). Last, settlers and smaller scale farmers - more generally rural 
dwellers - are often suffering from the current political and economic situation, making it 
politically costly to antagonize them, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring in the region. 
Several factors, however, are slowly reshuffling the cards. First, groundwater is increasingly 
considered as a key strategic resource to ensure domestic water supply, the Minister 
emphasizing publicly that the alternative sources (through desalination or the Red-Dead 
project) will be six to seven times more costly (El Naser, 2013). Second, there is a growing 
awareness of the water crisis among Jordanian citizens in general and politicians in particular 
(as expressed by a MP interviewed). Outrage at the violations on the Disi pipe and water 
mains slowly extends to illegal wells, undermining the overall tolerance for abuses. Some 
powerful people have been heavily fined, named and shamed in the newspaper, which is 
certainly a rare instance in the MENA region in general. Last, the current Minister has shown 
an exceptional level of leadership in attacking the problem of several fronts, while securing 
high-level support, not least from His Majesty the King. While donors (most particularly 
USAID), had been influential in the past in pushing for measures such as metering and tariffs, 
there is a feeling that the government is now coming to grips with an issue that threatens the 
country’s stability. 
Although it is too early to make a definite assessment of the policy reforms recently 
undertaken, a few important lessons that are relevant to the region and beyond can be 
mentioned. First direct measures are hard to implement on the ground and often 
overestimate the power of the state to act on the ground; this is in particular the case of 
metering which can be replaced by indirect measurement through remote sensing imagery. 
Second, too big 'sticks' (sealing wells or prohibitive water tariffs), while signaling the gravity 
of the violation, may turn out to be non-credible and even counterproductive (by pushing 
people into illegal solutions). Third, the creative tools deployed (administrative 
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interconnection, naming and blaming, etc) may be inspirational for other countries. Fourth, 
aggressively raising awareness not only of citizens but also MPs, judges or imams may well 
bear fruit over the long term. Last, it is hard to assess the effectiveness of each measure and 
it is likely that success depends on both articulating a diversity of tools and the advent of a 
felicitous mix of leadership and high-level support. Whether the resolve currently shown by 
the Ministry, buttressed against a growing sense of urgency and water crisis, will succeed in 
balancing private interests remains to be seen, and also exposed to being overturned at any 
time due to the region’s political volatility. 
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7 Chapter Seven: Water and Sand: is Groundwater-based Farming in 
Jordan’s Desert Sustainable? 
 
Abstract. Irrigated agriculture in Jordan’s highlands relies on overexploited groundwater. 
Drops in water tables and water quality, but also tougher policy measures by the 
government, threaten the sustainability of this activity which has long thrived on lax law 
enforcement and cheap desert land. This paper is based on field work in two locations of 
Azraq groundwater basin [around the Azraq oasis and in the northern part (Mafraq)], and 
first presents farm typologies which show the variability of farm gross margins and the 
contrast between the two zones. While Mafraq stands for capital-intensive fruit-tree 
cultivation on legal land/wells, Azraq’s agriculture is largely based on olive cultivation and 
wells that are either illegal or granted permits with higher block tariffs, and has a return that 
is only one tenth of Mafraq’s. The paper reviews the constraints and changes in land, energy, 
water, labor and input costs and reflects on their bearing on current dynamics and future 
prospects. While Mafraq is found to be largely immune to policy changes and resilient to 
foreseeable changes in factor prices or markets, Azraq’s future is threatened by various 
vulnerabilities, including salinization of groundwater, rising energy and labor costs that, in the 
long run, are likely to be overcome only by farmers emulating the Mafraq intensification 
model, or accepting temporary losses in the hope of a future legalization of land and wells. 
Solar energy now emerges as a trump card, in particular for illegal farms which, on the other 
hand, are challenged by recent tough water pricing regulations that are shown to make them 
unprofitable. The government’s resolve in enforcing these regulation is put to test and will 
largely decide the future of Azraq’s agriculture. 
Keywords: groundwater overexploitation, irrigation, farming systems, desert agriculture, 
Azraq, Jordan 
7.1 Introduction 
The continued expansion of irrigation worldwide in the past 30 years has largely been fuelled 
by increasingly resorting to groundwater (FAO, 2015). Not only hast the total consumptive 
groundwater use for irrigation now reached an estimated 545 Bm3/year, that is, 43% of the 
total consumptive irrigation water use (Siebert et al., 2010), but the annual contribution of 
nonrenewable groundwater abstraction to irrigation globally has tripled from 75 to 234 Bm3 
over the 1960-2000 period (Wada et al., 2012). This situation, where half of groundwater-
based agriculture is unsustainable, is nowhere more explicit than in North Africa and the 
Middle East, where unsustainable groundwater development for irrigation is taking place in 
arid or desert land (UNDP, 2013a; FAO, 2015). Whether this groundwater economy will 
follow a 'soft landing' or a 'crash' scenario is a matter of heightened concern (Gorelick and 
Zheng, 2015). 
In Jordan, groundwater has been used since the early 1960s for different purposes, including 
domestic, industrial, agriculture and environmental use. The yearly total quantity of 
groundwater available is assessed by the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) at 511 Mm3, 
of which 427 Mm3 are renewable (MWI, 2013a, 2013b). Irrigated agriculture is the major 
consumer of groundwater, with 46% of groundwater going to the agriculture sector, 
especially in the Highlands. Groundwater-based agriculture boomed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
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boosted by government policies, favorable export market conditions, subsidized energy, 
improvements in well-drilling techniques, land affordability and accessibility, availability of 
good water quality, and transfer of agricultural know-how from the Jordan Valley (MWI, 
2009; Demilecamps, 2010). This resulted in the growth of the agriculture sector but gradually 
impacted groundwater resources in terms of quality and quantity. At present the water 
abstracted from the two major aquifers of the Northern Highlands –Amman-Zarqa and 
Azraq– is estimated by the MWI to be above the safe yield by 179% and 242%, respectively 
(MWI, 2014). 
In the early 1990s the government acknowledged the excessive increase in groundwater use 
in the highlands and the drop in water tables, and tried to tighten well licensing procedures, 
banned the drilling of agricultural wells (1992), introduced water meters (mid 1990s), and 
established water tariffs to be paid by users (2002). Yet the development of agriculture 
continued unabated, with 710,000 du of land irrigated in the highlands in 2013, against 
420,000 in 2000 (DOS, 2015). With irrigated agriculture responsible for 55% of the country’s 
water withdrawals and 46 % of groundwater abstraction on the one hand, but contributing 
only 3% of the GDP on the other, agricultural groundwater use easily comes under criticism. 
Jordan’s highland agriculture can therefore be looked at through two different lenses: on the 
agricultural side, questions revolve around who is investing in agriculture, to produce what 
with what economic results, and the evolution of both drivers and profitability. On the 
groundwater resource/environmental side, key issues are related to the overdraft and its 
(uneasy) control, environmental impacts on Azraq wetland, water productivity and the 
sectoral competition with non-agricultural uses, which are granted a higher priority and claim 
a larger share of groundwater resources. 
This paper builds on earlier work dedicated to farming systems in the highlands, notably Fitch 
(2001) on Amman-Zarqa basin (AZB) Venot and Molle (2008) on Mafraq and Demilcamps 
(2010) on Azraq, and first offers a typology of current farming systems as well as an analysis 
of trends and evolutions in the past 20 years. It then ponders on the challenges faced by 
agriculture in the highlands through an analysis of its production factors in general, and the 
implications of recent changes in water policy and regulations in particular. The main 
questions investigated are: given the pressure and the restrictions affecting input markets, in 
particular labor, land and water, and the current toughening of groundwater policies, what 
are farmers’ responses and is groundwater-based agriculture in Jordan's Highlands doomed? 
Or can it weather these constraints, evade regulations, and reinvent itself? The analysis is 
based on 80 farm surveys conducted in Azraq groundwater basin, and on interviews with 
different stakeholders, including national and local government officials in the land, 
agricultural and water administrations, experts, and local personalities. The discussion and 
the results of the case study speak to the many situations, notably in North Africa and the 
Middle East, where unsustainable groundwater development for irrigation is taking place 
(UNDP, 2013a). 
7.2 Setting and methods 
We focus here on groundwater-based agriculture in the highlands of northern Jordan, most 
specifically on the Azraq groundwater basin, with a few references from the literature on the 
Amman-Zarqa basin (AZB). As can be seen from Figure 7-1, these two aquifers largely 
correspond to the Amman-Zarqa and Azraq surface water catchments. The northern tips of 
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these two aquifers are located in Syria and although they only make up around 5% of the 
total basin areas they correspond to the main recharge areas in Jebel Al Arab (Shahbaz and 
Sunna, 2000). Figure 7-1 shows the two main agricultural areas covered by this research 
work: Azraq proper (located around Azraq oasis itself); and Mafraq’s Northern Badia district 
(Mafraq, in what follows), near the northern border, which overlays Azraq aquifer. 
Azraq area is located 120 km northeast of Amman and is part of the Zarqa governorate, with 
a population of around 12,000 (IUCN et al., 2007). The area is home to two major tribes (Beni 
Sakhr and Al Sarhan) and to Chechen and Druze minorities who settled there at the beginning 
of the 20th century (Mesnil and Habjouka, 2012). Azraq Basin is a closed basin, where both 
surface water and groundwater naturally flow to a central wetland, a Ramsar site of major 
importance. Because of the excessive exploitation of groundwater for both irrigated 
agriculture and water supply for Amman, the water table dropped by 0.3-0.8 m/yr (Mesnil 
and Habjoka, 2012). As a result, local springs dried in the early 90s and the wetland, now 
reduced to 10% of its original area, came to be sustained with (public) well water. The depth 
to (usable) groundwater varies from 20 m in the center of Azraq Oasis to 350 m in Mafraq 
(Abdalla et al., 1999). Azraq basin’s safe yield has been established at 24 Mm3 per year (MWI, 
2009). The main recharge of the upper aquifer system originates from infiltration through the 
basalt layers from high rainfall areas at Jabal Al Arab in southern Syria (Bajjali, 1990; MWI, 
2013a, 2013b). 
 
Figure 7-1. Groundwater and surface water basin in Azraq (adopted from Schmidt et al., 
2004) 
The basin is a semi desert area characterized by hot and dry summers and fairly wet and cold 
winters (with frost being common). The mean annual rainfall ranges from 100-150 mm in the 
west and north of the basin to 50 mm to the south and east of the basin, including the oasis 
Azraq
Mafraq
Main agricultural areas
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itself (JMD, 2011). The mean daily temperature varies from less than 10oC in winter to 
extremes of 45oC in summer. Soils are primarily composed of limestone or covered by basalt 
boulders that resulted from volcanic outcropping (DLU, 1994). 
Agriculture first started in Azraq around the oasis, based on the springs’ water and shallow 
dug wells, and then expanded to Ain el Baida, eastern Azraq and Mafraq (Figure 7-2). Thriving 
on good water availability and cheap land, agriculture in Azraq first appeared as a bonanza. 
Mobilizing water to transform valueless land into an asset attracted numerous investors, rich 
urbanites from Amman and abroad with speculative objectives as well as some investors 
more interested in agricultural production itself. During the mid-2000s the decline in water 
table levels, the decrease in well productivity, and (localized) increases in water salinity 
affected farming, with a number of farms being abandoned, especially in south Azraq area 
that is underlain by a saline aquifer. Nevertheless agricultural expansion continued in Azraq 
north and eastern farm areas, reaching about 114,000 du in 2011, according to the Ministry 
of Agriculture. All wells dug after 2005, when the time for the regularization of existing wells 
elapsed, are considered as illegal and are now the object of increasingly strict measures (Al 
Naber and Molle, 2017). 
 
Figure 7-2. Azraq district and roads 
This study is based on both written and oral material. Historical data have been gathered 
from different governmental agencies to study the evolution of the cultivated area, cropping 
patterns, number of wells and water consumption, and all the available literature on 
agriculture in the highlands has been collected and mobilized. Empirical data was collected 
during fieldwork conducted between 2013 and 2015 in both Azraq and Mafraq areas. We 
Ain el Baida
Deghaila
Um al Mathayel
Eastern farms
South Azraq
North Azraq
Omari
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randomly selected small farms owned by locals as well as farms owned by investors (a few 
farmers having abandoned their farms were also interviewed for complementary 
information) with the help of a community organizer knowledgeable of the area. The 
questionnaires included aspects regarding land status, water status, cropping patterns, 
production, water and energy sources and consumption, animal breeding, farm revenue and 
future perspectives on Azraq, solutions, challenges and opportunities. 54 farmers were 
interviewed in Azraq region and 26 in Mafraq. 
Several methodologies can be used to derive farm typologies from a sample of farm-based 
data (either structural, performative, or related to strategies), including Principal 
Components Analysis, Multiple Factorial Analysis or Cluster Analysis, or from participatory or 
expert ranking (Righi et al., 2011; Alvarez et al., 2014; Goswami et al., 2014). Following 
Demilcamps (2010), we have chosen a farm typology mostly based on cropping patterns and 
farm size, which somehow also reflects farmers’ strategies, as will be shown. It proved 
difficult to resort to more sophisticated approaches because of the limitations in data 
acquisition. These limitations included economic data often non-disaggregated by crop (e.g. 
pumping, fertilizer or labor costs given for the whole farm), various uncertainties (either 
because data vary from year to year (e.g. olive tree production), or the farmer did not have a 
very clear idea of the value (e.g. total cost of agro-chemicals used), wanted to minimize 
economic benefits or distort some values in order to cover up illegal aspect of his farm (e.g. 
minimizing water use, the number of wells used, etc), or even did not want to give any 
information (e.g. water bill paid, yield,…). Whenever missing or non-credible (~21%), values 
of water consumption and/or associated water bills were replaced by average values from 
the literature (see later section), and so did we for the gross margin of three minor crops, for 
which our sample data was deemed insufficient. 
7.3 Main current farming systems 
7.3.1 Cropping patterns and cultivated area 
Modern groundwater-based agriculture was developed in the 1970s based on the 
introduction of diesel engines and modern irrigation techniques such as drip and sprinkler 
irrigation systems (MWI, 2013a, 2013b), agricultural know-how tested in the Jordan valley, 
well-drilling techniques, subsidized energy costs, an environment free of diseases, cheap land 
and easy access to quality water (IUCN, 2007; Venot and Molle, 2008; ISSP, 2014). All these 
factors helped make agriculture a prime investment option in Azraq. 
The main crops found in Azraq, according to official data for 2010 from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, are: olives (80%), vegetables (9%), alfalfa (4%) and stone fruit tree and date 
palms (7%). The cropping patterns found during the field work in our farm sample were 
similar, with olive as the dominant crop (80%), but with a drop of vegetables (2%) and a hike 
in alfalfa (11%). In Mafraq we found that olive only made up 17% of the total, with 62% 
devoted to fruit trees, 4% to grape, and 17% to vegetables. Comparisons with Demilcamps’ 
(2010) data for 2009 indicate a shift of 20 points from vegetables to fruit trees which may 
partly be a sample issue but also reflects an identified trend towards more profitable and less 
burdensome fruit tree cultivation. 
Olive dominates: it is adapted to local conditions but also corresponds to low-cost land-
occupation strategies, with few supervision and labor requirements. According to the survey, 
many farmers are willing to change their cropping pattern and switch to alfalfa production. 
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However alfalfa requires larger amounts of water and is often associated with unknown 
illegal wells (and land), for which farmers do not pay water bills. Each of the ten successive 
harvests yields around 500 JD/du in revenue (1JD=1.41 $US). This is a thirsty crop clearly not 
suitable to Azraq conditions but its market has boomed and made it attractive. The 
cultivation of vegetables is the second option for farmers but they also consume substantial 
volumes of water in a short period of time, impacting the water table locally, and face 
uncertain market prices. Palm trees have been promoted by the MoA in the 2000s and MoA’s 
statistics point to a net profit of 590 JD/du. 
In Mafraq, climatic and soil conditions are much more favorable and 90% of the farms have 
legal land titles and licensed wells: although the water table is much lower and wells have to 
be drilled down to 350 m or more, secure land tenure conditions promote investments and 
the cultivation of fruit trees. Mafraq is the main producer of fruits in Jordan, including 
300,000 t of stone fruit (apricots, flat apricots, peach and nectarines). Only (5%) of its 
production is sold internally while the rest is exported to Syria, Iraq and the Gulf by truck. 
Vegetable production responds to market demand, with a current growth due to the demand 
of Syrian refugee camps. 
With regard to irrigation techniques, drip irrigation was found in 2010 on two thirds of the 
fields in Mafraq, with the remaining third under micro-sprinkler (virojet) (Demilcamps, 2010). 
In Azraq, surface irrigation largely disappeared in the 2000s and was confined to 18% of the 
area, along with micro-sprinkler (41%), drip (20%), open tubes (8%), sprinklers (6%) and 
central pivot (7%). In our sample sprinkler systems have expanded slightly with alfalfa, and 
surface irrigation remains at 6% of the area in Azraq. 
7.3.2 Farm typologies 
Five main types of farms were defined in Azraq (Table 7-1). Olive was the dominant crop in all 
types of farms but one (3 farms cultivating only alfalfa). Professional olive tree farmers partly 
diversified into alfalfa, grape or fruit trees. In addition, in our Azraq sample we found two 
types of farms with a single occurrence that we kept as a secondary category because of 
what they stood for: one large 1200 du olive farm well illustrated land occupation strategies 
through extensive olive farming into the northern (basaltic) part of Azraq. A vegetable-only 
farm illustrated a case common in Zarqa area. Because some new distant and/or illegal areas 
were unknown to us, it is possible that our sample in Azraq was slightly biased towards older 
and legal farms. 
Farm budgets were estimated without taking into consideration the initial investment cost 
because it proved difficult to assess it accurately. Gross margins were calculated based on 
farm production with no financial and other fixed costs considered. The amount of the water 
fee paid was problematic: out of the 80 farmers, only 39 were willing/able to indicate the 
amount of their water bills (some showed us their bills, other gave rounded-up values, with a 
possible bias towards understatement20). In addition to the factors mentioned earlier, results 
within a given category varied significantly according to water salinity, fluctuating yields 
                                                        
20 Some of these values were considered too low, that is, under 400 m3/du, probably on account of an intent to underplay 
the amount of water use. In such cases we used average values and in 3 instances we could re-establish the correct 
amount based on the stated water bill amount. In Table 7-1 we provide gross margins, calculated assuming that water bills 
are paid, as well as –between parentheses– the values obtained for stated payments. 
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(typically for olive), the level of intensification (e.g. the spacing of olive trees ranges from 5 m 
x 5 m to 10 m x 10 m), the type of energy used, different proportions in the crop mix (in the 
case of mixed crops, such as olive + alfalfa), and whether trees are small or already producing 
(for small trees we decided to consider average production and gross margin values of 
mature trees, to avoid transient distortions and allow for consistent comparisons between 
farm data). Production for gifts or self-consumption has been valued at market price, but not 
family labor. 
Table 7-1. Details on Azraq farm typology (5 main categories only) 
 Small olive 
tree farm+ 
Small 
professional 
alfalfa farm 
Professional 
olive tree 
farm 
Professional 
olive tree with 
alfalfa farm 
Professional 
olive tree with 
grape farm 
Number of farms 16 3 10 11 9 
Average size (du) 23 45 253 249 142 
Water 
consumption 
(m3/du/yr) 
1287 1065 1015 852 947 
Gross margin 
(JD/du/yr) 
223 (234) 168 (195) -18 (10) 50 (74) 176 (195) 
Table 7-1 confirms that the average income from professional olive farms is close to nil. This 
stands for a mix of farms that are either run at a (slight) deficit but for which cultivation is 
speculative or a side hobby, farms affected by salinity with low production, or more 
professional farms with a reasonable income. Alfalfa and grape are cash crops boosted by 
good market opportunities that raise the overall income when associated with olive trees. 
'Small olive tree farms+' are small farms which a higher average income on account of the 
fact that they rely on family labor, have electricity and relatively shallow aquifer (near Azraq), 
and partly diversify into grape, date or pomegranate. 'Single farm' categories showed a profit 
of 92 JD/du for the extensive olive farm and 338 JD/du for the vegetable farm. 
The farm typology for Mafraq (Table 7-2) was defined mainly based on cropping patterns 
since (intensive) management practices are similar and both the well and the land are legal. 
All farm types are found to be highly profitable. Farmers engaging in cultivation in Mafraq 
need a lot of capital for land and wells (whether bought or rented), as well as labor. Since all 
but one well in our sample are legal, the high cost of pumping is compensated by the 
generous free block tariff (more on this later). Both farm level water consumption and gross 
margins are of the same order of magnitude across farm types –roughly between 1100 and 
2000 JD/du/yr for the latter- but vegetable farms, or farms with fruit trees associated with 
olive trees, have lower margins than stone fruit farms (whether associated with grape or 
not). 
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Table 7-2. Farm typology in Mafraq 
 Stone fruit 
tree farm 
with olives 
Stone fruit tree 
farm with olives 
and grape 
Stone fruit 
tree farm 
with grape 
Stone fruit 
tree farm 
Vegetables 
farm 
Number of farms 5 6 5 7 3 
Average size (du) 1220 691 568 338 283 
Water consumption 
(m3/du/yr) 
1007 906 1330 1068 823 
Gross margin 
(JD/du/yr) 
1296 1123 1963 1994 1338 
Although we did not systematically evaluate the investment cost of the farms (some are over 
40 years old and have undergone several transformations), it is interesting to compare these 
economic gross margins (roughly 150 JD/du and 1500 JD/du for Azraq and Mafraq 
respectively) with typical investment costs. Investments in Mafraq are more costly than in 
Azraq in absolute value (higher well depth), typically over half a million JD for a farm of 200 
du (2500 JD/du of land + 50,000 JD/well and pump+ 120 JD/du for the irrigation system)21. 
Despite such high investments, the returns of agriculture in Mafraq ensure that investments 
are recouped after 2-3 years of nonproductive installation phase and 2-3 years of production 
(depending on the time to maturity). A similar farm in Azraq would pay itself after and order 
of magnitude of 20-30 years, but it all depends on the price of land and whether water is 
paid. 
7.3.3 Water productivity 
As indicated above, data on water use are often dubious. In order to calculate water 
productivity it may appear more sensible to use agronomic data on theoretical crop water 
requirements. This also has the merit to consider consumptive use and not gross abstraction 
values (which leave the question of what happens to return flows open). We have used the 
water consumptions values considered by Fitch (2001) and Demilcamps (2010) to fill in water 
consumption values where data was lacking (or was clearly inconsistent): 790 m3/du for 
pomegranate and olive, 1430 for alfalfa, 1040 for grape, 1045 for fruit trees and 600 for 
vegetables. 
Interestingly, alfalfa, often branded as illegal or unacceptable in such an arid environment 
because of its high water consumption, appears to have high water productivity. This makes 
it desirable from the economic point of view that is invariably put forward by donors or the 
government as a decisive criteria to govern crop selection… Just like with the shift from olive 
to fruit trees, which have higher water consumption, policy objectives to raise water 
productivity, whether through higher water prices or otherwise, have the potential to 
increase water consumption. 
                                                        
21 In 2010, a 150 du farm in Azraq cost 70,000 JD for the land and the well and 30,000 JD for the plantation and 
infrastructure (Demilcamps, 2010). Fitch (2001) computed investments in tree farms in Zarqa basin in 2001 at 1016 JD/du 
(or 1750 JD in actualized value), and around half of this value for vegetable farms. 
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At the farm level, water productivity (gross margin/water consumed) in Mafraq is five to ten 
times higher than in Azraq, despite higher running costs, reflecting the large differences in 
crop profitability (Figure 7-3). These values of water productivity can be compared with 
values in other sectors. The recent National Water Strategy (MWI, 2015) points to returns to 
water of 0.36, 25 and 40 JD/m3 for agriculture, tourism and industry respectively. (For 
comparison purposes, the average price of domestic water in Amman is around 0.14 JD/m3). 
As a result, it is understandable that the government’s pressure on farming is chiefly exerted 
on Azraq, which is considered as a priority groundwater area for domestic supply. 
 
Figure 7-3. Water productivity according to farm typology in Azraq and Mafraq 
7.4 Production factors and trends in profitability 
This section explores in more detail the costs, constraints, and trends associated with the 
main production factors, as a basis for the analysis of the future of agriculture in Azraq 
addressed in the subsequent section. 
7.4.1 Labor 
The question of labor availability naturally comes to mind in a remote place such as Azraq, 
where most farms are isolated and/or far from the city (less so in Mafraq, which is better 
connected). Two types of labor were found in Azraq basin: permanent workers, who stay in 
the farm 24/7 and usually come from Egypt or Yemen; temporary labor, brought seasonally 
during the cultivation and harvesting seasons according to farm needs, most often from 
villages in the rainfed area, or Syrian refugees. 
In order to hire foreign workers for farming, a labor permit needs to be issued by the Ministry 
of Labor with approval from the Ministry of Agriculture. The labor market is de facto (though 
unofficially) controlled by labor brokers, with whom farmers prefer to deal rather than going 
through the long procedure of applying for the official documents and permits themselves. 
Brokers can sell and buy labor licenses, facilitate the travel of workers from abroad, but also 
provide farmers with seasonal daily workers, taking a commission in return (typically 
between 0.5 and 10 JD/person/day). 
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Sustaining permanent workers has become costlier and more difficult in Azraq, as some 
farmers have faced problems with permanent workers 'fleeing'. These permanent workers 
stay at the farm for a short period of time then migrate to cities like Amman without 
informing the farmer: the monthly salary a worker is 300-350 JD in Azraq, against 750 JD in 
the construction sector in Amman. But this transfer is sometimes also planned and 
organized. Some farmers declare larger farming areas in order to get more permits and have 
surplus labor which can be transferred to the construction sector, a process for which 
middlemen will pay between 300 and 800 JD to the farmer for ceding one of 'his' workers. 
By law farmers had the right to hire one worker for each 10 dunum cultivated. This rule was 
overly generous and this 'right' has now been reduced to one worker for each 50 du. A new 
law has also been passed to disallow the granting of work permits to farms with unregistered 
wells. In addition, only farms with legal land deeds can obtain labor permits. Although the 
Ministry of Agriculture establishes the number of workers per farm according to the 
cultivated area, in many cases no one from the ministry goes to the field to check the actual 
cultivated area. The benefit drawn from labor permits also explains the incentives to bribing 
that come with this process. Farmers without land deeds resort to the services of brokers to 
hire permanent workers. 
By contrast, the availability of daily-wage labor has increased due to the Syrian crisis. Syrian 
refugees now work in Mafraq and Azraq, notably in the harvesting of olive, at a low wage of 
1JD/hr, which can be compared with a daily wage of 15 JD a few years back. 
7.4.2 Land 
Azraq became an attractive place to invest in agriculture due to cheap and easy access to 
land and water. However, uncertainty surrounding land ownership remains and affects 
agriculture investments. From a land tenure point of view, five types of land are cultivated in 
Azraq: 1) land owned legally with an official land title; and 2) land directly settled, used and 
claimed by local Bedouins; 3) land informally 'bought' from local Bedouins who claim 
customary ownership of the land and have ceded it after issuing a 'hijjeh' to the buyer 
(unofficial document signed by two witnesses establishing the cession); 4) state land 
occupied and reclaimed and/or rented from the state; 5) land rented (often with a well) from 
a legal owner or a local Bedouin. Investors with a real intent to engage in intensive 
agriculture generally prefer to buy land legally, thus avoiding uncertainty and risking their 
investments. Investors attracted by speculation or by the prospect of having their land later 
legalized and transformed into a valuable asset may buy land through 'hijjeh' (at a much 
lower price), or even occupy state land. 
Whether productive or speculative in Azraq, or highly intensive and professional in Mafraq, 
irrigated agriculture has generated windfall benefits which have fueled a boom in the land 
market in the 1990s and 2000s, with land prices skyrocketing (Al Naber and Molle, 2016). In 
Mafraq, one dunum of land which was sold at 30 JD in 1995 now reaches 1000 JD. In Azraq 
most recent prices range between 2000 and 4000 JD/du, while some investors recall that in 
the 70s land in this area could be obtained for 1JD/du… The price of land varies substantially 
depending on its tenure status, but also whether the land plot includes a well or not, whether 
the well is legal or not, its discharge, and water quality, and whether the land plot has access 
to the electricity grid. 
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The cash-generating reclamation process relies on the possibility/likelihood of reclaimed land 
being legalized. This can be done through a process of regularization (or settlement, taswiye) 
which the government may decide from time to time in order to deal with uncontrolled 
widespread land occupation, or through the 'delegation' of state land (tafwid), ruled by Law 
No. 53 of 1977 (Al Naber and Molle, 2016). In practice people start (tree) cultivation based 
on an illegal well, declare it to the Ministry of Agriculture and then go to DLS to ask for the 
land to be leased to them. After a minimum of five years of renting, the land can be legally 
registered under the beneficiary’s name (who will however not be able to sell the land during 
a subsequent period of ten years). De facto privatization of state/tribal land through these 
mechanisms has now by and large been stalled. The state has become increasingly reluctant 
to pursue tafwid and taswiye because opening the land Pandora Box proved to generate 
endless claims and severe conflicts, and also because not legalizing land prevents the 
legalization of wells and therefore contributes to constraining expansion of groundwater use 
(Al Naber and Molle, 2016). 
It was found that 12 farms out of 54 in our Azraq sample were still illegal with regard to land 
and 16 with regard to the well(s). In Mafraq the situation is the opposite, with both water 
and land used in a legal way in all but one case, on account of an earlier and more 
comprehensive land privatization process. 
There is also a poorly studied trend towards renting land and/or wells. Land is generally 
rented by vegetable growers, who may shift from one location to the other on a yearly basis 
in order to avoid soil contamination problems. As one farmer indicated, "I can buy land but it 
is not easy to register it in the DLS and I don’t want to deal with hijjeh and illegality, so I go to 
Azraq and rent a land from farmer for a period of 1 or two years". Renting 100 du with a well 
costs around 10-12,000 JD, which can be compared with 70-80,000 JD for purchasing a land 
with hijjeh (only), and 200-250,000 JD for a plot with an official property title. Ramirez et al. 
(2007) found that in Mafraq 18% of the farmers were renting a well in 2006. 
7.4.3 Water/energy 
Accessing water has three components: the initial investment in a well/pump/irrigation 
system; the energy costs of operating the pump; and the payment of water bills to the Water 
Authority of Jordan (WAJ). The drilling and installation of the well represent a large portion of 
a farm’s initial capital cost. The average cost for drilling a well ranges between 35 and 50 
JD/m, and twice that amount if the well is illegal, or 120 JD/m including the drilling costs, 
pipes (from 40 to 70 JD/m according to the diameter) and casing (but without the pump). The 
cost of submersible pumps used in Azraq varies depending on its power and discharge, 
ranging between 6,000 JD for a 30 kW pump to more than 20,000 JD for a 140 kW pump. In 
Azraq, farmers can use small pumps with discharges starting from 30 m3/hour, while in 
Mafraq farmers use pumps with discharges reaching 300 m3/hour. 
Energy costs are one of the main constraints in agriculture in Azraq and Mafraq. These costs 
vary according to the area – 0.015 JD/m3 in Azraq against 0.136 in Mafraq for electric pumps 
– and reflect in particular well depth and soil transmissivity. Most legal farms are connected 
to the electricity grid and pay a tariff of 0.06 JD/KWh. Illegal farms not connected to the grid 
rely either on diesel (but at a cost of 0.12 JD/m3 in Azraq) or on solar energy. Farms in Mafraq 
are all connected to the grid (it would be too expensive to use diesel considering the depths 
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at which groundwater is pumped). Farmers renting wells must pay for water, with an 
additional JD 0.18 per m3 observed in Mafraq in 2006 by Ramirez et al. (2007). 
On top of operation and maintenance costs farmers must pay a fee to WAJ, as specified in 
the 2002 Water bylaw (and its 2004 amendment) (see Mesnil and Habjouka, 2012; Al Naber 
and Molle, in press). Licensed wells have been granted a generous free block of 150,000 m3 
and a cheap price until 200,000 m3 (Table 7-3), while wells with permits22 in Azraq got a much 
less favorable treatment (Table 7-4), and illegal wells have no free block (Table 7-5). Pumping 
costs are much higher than water costs, and if drip irrigation is adopted to reduce water 
consumption it is to reduce the former rather than the latter. Although water tariffs are 
effective since 2003, few farmers paid their water bills until 2010 (in Mafraq in 2006 only 
25% of farmers were doing so, according to Ramirez et al., 2007). Bills with arrears were sent 
again in 2010 and various mechanisms to force payment by farmers were gradually put in 
place23; pressure on illegal wells was increased through a dramatic increase in tariff in 2014 
(Table 7-5). The impact of these measures is dealt with in section 5. 
Table 7-3. Tariff for licensed wells all over Jordan (Bylaw 85-2002)(1 JD = 1000 fils) 
Quantity of water Water price  
(amend. 2004) 
Water price  
(draft 2010) 
0 – 50,000 m3 Free Free 
50,000 – 150,000 m3 Free 10 
150,000 – 200,000 m3 5 fils/m3 10 
More than 200,000 m3 60 fils/m3 100 
Table 7-4. Water tariff for wells with permits in Azraq area (2002 Bylaw and amendments) 
2003 to 2005 and after 2010 Between 2005 and 2010 Draft 2010 
Quantity of water Water price 
(2003/4) 
Quantity of water Water price 
(2012) 
Permitted 
amount 50K 
0 to permitted amount*  Free 0 to permitted 
amount 
Free Free 
Permitted amount to 
100,000 m3 
20 Beyond permitted 
amount 
60 20 
More than 100 000 m3 60   100 
*50,000 m3 or 250 m3/du for a farm smaller than 200 du 
 
 
                                                        
22 Wells drilled before 2002 (later extended to 2005) and without licenses were given temporary permits with a small free 
block in Azraq. (In the rest of the kingdom wells with permits are treated as licensed wells.) Those who have their land 
status regularized can later have those permits transformed into licenses. 
23 Negotiations (and realism), however, led to a wholesale reduction of these arrears to 30% of their value, according to 
one MWI official. 
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Table 7-5. Water tariff (fils/m3) for illegal wells as amended in 2003 and 2014 (Bylaw 85-
2002) 
 2003 2010 
(draft) 
2014 
Quantity of water Water price  Quantity of water Water price 
0 – 100,000 m3 25  50 0 – 10,000 m3 150  
100,000 – 150,000 m3 30  70 10,000 – 30,000 m3 250  
150,000 – 200,000 m3 35  100 More than 30,000 m3 500  
More than 200,000 m3 70  100   
7.4.4 Trends in production costs and profitability 
Examining the patterns of production costs sheds light on main production constraints. The 
distribution of production costs in Azraq and Mafraq (Table 7-6) first evidences differences 
that reflect contrasts in terms of pumping costs and crops grown. The types of crops grown in 
Mafraq also require more intensive labor (fruit picking, tree care, etc.) than olive trees. 
Average total costs in Azraq are 192 JD/du/y, against 335 in Mafraq (74% higher). 
Table 7-6. Production costs in Azraq and Mafraq, according to farm type 
Farm type  Costs  
 
Av. Farm 
area (du) 
Total costs 
JD/du/yr 
Water % Energy % Labor % Input % 
Azraq 146 191 3 43 31 23 
Small olive tree+ 23 141 8 17 56 18 
Small professional alfalfa 45 224 0 21 78 0 
Large professional olive 253 219 0 38 34 28 
Professional farm, with 
olive and grape 249 207 4 51 24 21 
Professional farm with 
olive and alfalfa 142 112 4 40 34 21 
Mafraq 627 334 6 43 21 30 
Stone fruit tree and olive 1220 241 5 53 11 31 
Stone fruit tree, olive and 
grape 691 282 7 54 14 25 
Stone fruit tree and grape 568 435 11 32 18 41 
Stone fruit tree 338 507 5 30 37 28 
Vegetable farm 283 434 1 43 38 18 
In both areas, energy represents the major portion of costs –43% on average in both Azraq 
and Mafraq– followed by labor in Azraq (31%) and input in Mafraq (30%). One clear 
conclusion from farm-level data on Azraq is that diesel (pumping) costs are becoming 
prohibitive, which makes the control of connections to the grid (now only possible for 
legalized lands) a possible policy instrument for the government. Water is the cheapest input 
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in both locations (between 0 and 11%, with 3% in Azraq and 6% in Mafraq on average). This 
reflects the low tariffs for legal wells but also that a part of the water abstracted escapes 
monitoring and taxation, and –possibly- the intent of some interviewees to distort reality. 
Energy for pumping water made up 15% of total electricity consumption in Jordan in 2010 
(JHK, 2011), showing the magnitude of its impact on national expenditures. With the 
approval of the renewable energy policy in Parliament in 2012, markets opened up to import 
of solar technology. As a result, around 10 farms in Azraq were reported to use it, especially 
the illegal farms formerly using diesel as a source of energy. In Mafraq, farmers are also 
thinking to convert to this type of energy as it is more sustainable and cost-effective in the 
long run. One farmer in Azraq was reported to have imported 96 panels from China at a cost 
of 30,000 JD and to be able to irrigate 400 du with one well (75 JD/du), which is less than the 
annual electricity cost for diesel (120 JD/du) and (only) around three times that of electricity 
(22 JD/du)! 
Farming input prices (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) are controlled by private companies. During 
fieldwork interviews farmers were complaining about the high cost of fertilizers and other 
agrochemicals. Urea price, however, has been quite stable in the past ten years and since 
Jordan is an exporter of potash and phosphate it is also partly immune to world market price 
vagaries. 
7.5 Discussion: the future of agriculture in Azraq 
7.5.1 Drivers and constraints 
Farmers in Azraq pointed to a reduction in productivity and farming profitability since the 
early 2000s. The loss of productivity after that date is related in part to a decrease in water 
quality which directly affected crop production, and also to rising costs. As a result, a number 
of farms have been abandoned and locals have left the area. On the other hand, some small 
farms in Azraq south are still being cultivated not because profits are being sustained but 
because this family farming is basically subsistence farming. In line with this, studies by Fitch 
(2001) and Rosenberg and Peralta (2012) have both painted a bleak future for groundwater-
based agriculture in the highlands because of the growing costs for accessing water, and the 
anticipated dewatering of the aquifer in some parts. What do the trends identified above 
point to? 
Around the mid-2000s production costs increased, with labor wages rising from 70 JD/month 
in 2002 to 180 JD in 2008, and 280 JD/month at present. The presence of Syrian refugees 
provides abundant available labor for farm activities which drags down the costs of daily 
wage, but not of permanent workers, who form a separate 'market'. Energy costs have also 
increased, in particular following the war in Iraq in 2003 (the price of one oil barrel rose from 
6 JD to 104 JD). This not only increases pumping costs but also transportation costs. Of note 
is the fact that pumping with diesel in Azraq (often in farms distant from the wetland and the 
grid, and therefore with higher pumping depths and costs) has virtually made crops such as 
olive unprofitable. With costs around 0.12 JD/m3, 8 times more than with electricity (0.015) 
and almost as much as electricity in Mafraq (0.142 JD/m3), any massive increase of water 
prices by the government (and of its determination to enforce them) will have potentially 
deleterious additional effects. 
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But on the other hand, several factors support the idea that highland agriculture can reinvent 
itself. First Highland farmers have shown innovativeness and responsiveness to opportunities 
in adapting cropping patterns and introducing fruit trees around 1990, grape in the late 90s, 
pomegranate and then palm trees in the 2000s, and more recently alfalfa. A move towards 
highly profitable crops such as fruit trees, a permanence of olive trees maintained by land 
speculators at a loss, and the planting of salt-resistant crops such as date palm may help 
sustain agriculture for some time. Second, the political situation in Syria has spurred an 
increase in cultivated area in order to fill the gap left by the decrease of Syrian production 
(internally and for export). Economic opportunities have indeed encouraged more 
investment in groundwater development in frontier regions (even some Syrian nationals have 
been reported to rent land to grow vegetables). Ramtha area, to the west of Mafraq and 
bordering Syria, has witnessed fresh illegal drilling met with leniency from the authorities. 
According to one official, this leniency is partly due to the sensitivity of border areas 
(development benefits compensate for tougher clamp down on smuggling and border 
control), and to the recognition that groundwater in this area flows towards Syria and should 
be exploited. Third, solar energy is proving to be cost-effective and could be a game changer 
in that in reduces energy costs and frees farmers from the constraint of obtaining an electric 
connection, boosting illegal expansion at the very moment diesel prices were jeopardizing it. 
The question arises as to what is the future of groundwater-based agriculture under current 
abstraction rates, when one considers increases in salinity, growing pumping costs and those 
of retrofitting wells and pumps. A study by Rosenberg and Peralta (2012) came up with bleak 
conclusions and estimated that as much as 79% of olive and vegetable farming in Azraq might 
become economically unviable in the next ten years, leaving concerned farmers with the 
choice of either shifting to higher value crops or quitting farming altogether. Some farmers 
acknowledge that this process is likely to put a significant number of farmers or investors out 
of business, with only the 'fittest' surviving, namely those who have the connections, capital 
and know-how to ever intensify, tap export markets, and shift to solar energy or even 
desalination of brackish water (as observed in the south of Jordan valley), and –perhaps– 
evade thorough investigations of their well/water use situation… There is some resentment 
amid local farmers against outsiders who have the capital to continue mining groundwater, 
or to keep leisure/prestige farms at a loss, while they themselves are displaced. 
During the 11 meetings of the Highland Water Forum (a multi-stakeholder platform set up to 
discuss groundwater issues) held between 2010 and 2013, several ideas were proposed and 
discussed regarding future options (Demilcamps, 2010; HWF, 2015), including adopting 
plants tolerant to arid environments and salinity, saving water by different farm practices and 
technologies, developing income-generating alternative activities such as 'solar farming' or 
ecotourism, or having the state buying out farms or wells. But these mitigating measures are 
unlikely to significantly affect on-going trends. The game changer might be government 
policies, now geared towards toughening and enforcing regulations on illegal wells. 
7.5.2 Water pricing and other groundwater policy measures 
Since 2002, The MWI is trying to increase the control, rule enforcement, and monitoring of 
water use and consumption in agriculture. It also tries to use the block tariff water pricing of 
the 2002 bylaw as a tool to both elicit water savings and squeeze illegal farms out of 
agriculture (Venot and Molle, 2008). An amendment of the 2002 Bylaw was floated in 2010 
but was never passed, due to the opposition it raised. The free block for legal wells all over 
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Jordan was to be reduced from 150,000 to 50,000 m3, but Azraq would keep distinct and 
higher tariffs for higher blocks. All wells with permits in Azraq would have the same 50,000 
m3 free quota, pay 0.02 JD for every m3 until 100,000 m3, and 0.1 JD beyond (see Table 7-3 to 
Table 7-5). Last, the tariffs for illegal wells would be increased for each block. 
In 2013 the Ministry started a campaign to close all unproductive wells as a first step towards 
closing all illegal wells in the country. In 2014 a bylaw amendment targeted illegal 
(registered) wells, raising their water tariff table to very high levels (see Table 7-5). Lately in 
2015, the free abstraction block in Mafraq was also changed officially from 150,000 to 75,000 
m3/yr for any well deepened or drilled to replace an old well. Satellite imagery and remote 
sensing tools are now used to monitor and observe agricultural activities in the basin and to 
spot farms with inconsistency between the visible crop area and water data. 
We can use our sample to estimate the impact of changes in tariffs on the average gross 
benefit of each farm category. Because of the missing data regarding actual water bills and 
whether farmers have paid them or not, we take as our baseline a situation where farmers 
are supposed to pay as per the 2004 tariff table. We then use our sample to consider several 
scenarios (Si) and evaluate their impact: 
 Application of the (aborted) 2010 amendment in Azraq and Mafraq (S1) 
 Simulation for Azraq assuming that 1) all wells are given permits [S2], 2) all wells are 
illegal [S3], 3) all wells are illegal and the 2014 tariff for illegal wells is applied [S4] 
 Simulation for Mafraq, where basically all wells are legal, assuming that the free block 
is 50K (like in S1) but the second block (50, 000 to 200,000 m3) is charged 60 fils 
instead of 10 [S5] 
Table 7-7 provides the results of these simulations. The impact of S1 is limited in Azraq, 
where some farms (constrained by a 250 m3/du limit) even benefit from the uniform 50K free 
block which improves their situation. In Mafraq, (legal) wells see their water charges almost 
doubled but because of the limited weight of these costs the impact on gross margins is 
limited. S2 shows that if all wells in Azraq were given permits24 margins would improve 
slightly and these margin values can be compared with S3 to see the impact of all the wells 
being legal or not: gross margins do not vary much on account of the fact that current tariffs 
for illegal and permitted wells differ little. In S4 we apply the new 2014 water tariffs to the 
wells (now all considered as illegal) and we find that all categories become markedly 
unprofitable due to a ten-fold increase in water costs, showing that if these tariffs are applied 
farms with illegal wells will be bankrupt right away. One option for these farms is to reduce 
the area planted drastically and grow fruit trees. S5 tests a 50K free block, like in S1, but 
applies a 60 fils price to the second block instead of 10 fils. Water costs are only marginally 
increased, reflecting the fact that they are mostly made of volumes in the third block that are 
(already) charged at 100 fils. The conclusion is that Mafraq agriculture is unlikely to be 
substantially affected by changes in tariffs (that are politically conceivable for legal wells). 
 
                                                        
24 Very few wells in Azraq (and none in our sample) have licenses like in Mafraq. Around half of the wells have permits and 
the other half are illegal. 
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Table 7-7. Average gross margins for different farm categories under several water pricing 
scenarios 
Farm type  Gross margin (JD/du/y) 
 Baseline S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 
Azraq       
Small olive tree+ 223 232 225 214 -45  
Small professional alfalfa 168 142 179 168 -118  
Large professional olive -18 -31 -17 -23 -388  
Prof. farm, with olive and 
grape 50 30 50 50 -331  
Prof. farm with olive and 
alfalfa 176 166 177 174 -197  
Mafraq       
Stone fruit tree and olive 1277 1258    1243 
Stone fruit tree, olive and 
grape 1117 1092    1075 
Stone fruit tree and grape 1951 1919    1903 
Stone fruit tree 1991 1968    1946 
Vegetable farm 1331 1320    1293 
Azraq – Total water fees (JD) 264,456 407,471 254,377 274,405 2972,367  
Mafraq – Total water fees (JD) 596,161 1132,309    1326,939 
7.6 Conclusions 
In the 1980s Azraq became a hotspot of agricultural development in Jordan, with investors 
from Amman or abroad capitalizing on cheap land and shallow groundwater. Unabated 
growth in irrigated areas and groundwater abstraction, however, dried up the springs and 
the wetland and caused severe draw-downs and deterioration of water quality, with 
emerging negative effects on farm productivity and profits. The northern part of the basin 
(Mafraq) stands in sheer contrast with Azraq proper, with legal farms/wells growing high 
value fruit trees and achieving gross margins of around 1500 JD/du/y, that is, ten times more 
than in Azraq in order of magnitude, despite farming costs being 70% higher than in Azraq. 
Farm typologies for Azraq show that a part of olive tree-based agriculture is hardly profitable 
and corresponds to land occupation/speculation strategies or Sunday-farming investments. 
Farms with family labor and/or diversification into grape or alfalfa fare better and have gross 
margins of around 100-200 JD/du. Declining well yields and water quality, together with 
higher Azraq-specific water tariffs, have spurred adaptation in terms of cropping patterns but 
also the drilling of illegal (unregistered) and/or deeper wells. Tough measures may well 
contribute to getting some farms out of business, especially where groundwater is becoming 
saline, a process that could be speeded up by the offer of compensations (and alternative 
economic opportunities) by the state. In other words, we observe the adaptive/coping as well 
as exit strategies observed in other settings, such as Morocco (Berahmani et al., 2012) and 
India (Shah, 2009). 
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What is specific to Azraq, however, is the increasingly strong resolve of the government to 
curb abstraction in order to protect the well field that contributes to urban domestic supply, 
and also as a consequence of the nation-wide stiffening of groundwater regulations (Al Naber 
and Molle, 2017). We showed that agriculture in Azraq is vulnerable to the tariffs established 
for illegal wells in 2014 which –if applied– would kill off farms with such wells. Norms 
regarding foreign workers permits have been changed, connections to the electricity grid are 
now conditional upon having a legal land title, and land settlement processes have been 
stalled, making the constitution of landed assets less likely and investments in land less 
attractive. Last, escalating energy costs have dented incomes. We showed that these 
combined indirect pressures through water and energy tariffs and land and labor policies 
have the potential to rein expansion in and to lead some farm owners to discontinue 
agriculture. 
Such a remarkable achievement, in view of the near worldwide failure of governments in 
reducing groundwater abstraction (FAO, 2015), is yet to be seen. First, solar energy might 
turn to be the trump card of illegal expansion at the very moment high diesel costs and state 
control on connections to the grid were starting to jeopardize it. Second, the most technically 
efficient growers of cash crops taping export markets or temporary niches such as alfalfa, 
may emulate the Mafraq model and gradually displace underperforming farms, while still 
expanding in remote areas. It may also be the case that investors will move on to less 
regulated (e.g. Ramtha, near the Syrian border) or little exploited (e.g. Jafr basin) areas25, 
merely shifting the problem spatially, as is observed in many countries. 
In contrast, Mafraq’s hefty farm investments and legal status seem to be immune to policy 
changes and resilient to foreseeable changes in factor prices or markets. Furthermore, 
market demand fuelled by the situation in Syria and a growing demand, cheap available daily 
wage labor (refugees), as well as political considerations, may well act as drivers of further 
groundwater-based expansion in areas such as Ramtha, running counter to the regulatory 
efforts deployed. Politics, whether because of regional instability, changes in the Ministry, or 
the need to keep a (delicate) balance between public objectives and individual 
claims/demands in a post Arab Spring context, may well decide the course of events 
 
 
 
                                                        
25 Despite poor water and soil quality and its remoteness, Jafr basin has already attracted the interest of the Agrobusiness 
companies which have been forced to move out of Disi. 
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8 Chapter Eight: Synthesis 
8.1 Topics of investigation 
The use of groundwater by different sectors (industries, agriculture, municipalities, 
environment and tourism) has been accelerating in many countries worldwide, as water 
demand is increasing, and most available surface water is already used (Vrba and van der 
Gun, 2004; Llamas and Martinez Santos, 2005; Hammani et al., 2009). Consequently, a 
continuous decline of groundwater levels has been observed in many countries in the past 
half century (Bajjali and Al-Hadidi, 2005; Gaur et al., 2011; Zhou et al., 2013). The 
overexploitation of renewable and non-renewable aquifers for both urban use and irrigation 
frequently results in a reduction of groundwater availability and quality (FAO, 2003; Goode et 
al., 2013). The use of groundwater for irrigation purposes has a negative effect on 
groundwater systems as it accelerates aquifer depletion and decreases the availability of 
water but, on the other hand, has a positive effect for the users as it helps in reducing the 
poverty of smallholders, provides better food security and improves livelihoods (FAO, 2015). 
This study focused on the use of groundwater for irrigation in desert or arid areas of the 
MENA region, and most specifically Jordan. Groundwater-based agriculture in arid parts of 
the MENA region has developed and expanded in 1960s-1970s in parallel with technical 
change in irrigation and well-drilling techniques, but also due to state subsidies supporting 
this activity (Imache et al., 2010; Aw-Hassan et al., 2014; UNDP, 2013b). In all MENA 
countries, groundwater has allowed the expansion of irrigation in arid/desert areas, where 
no rain fed agriculture is possible (Stack, 2009; Adriansen, 2009; Ben Hounet et al., 2011; 
Manseur, 2017). The expansion of groundwater-based agriculture into desert lands of the 
MENA region has become a strategy for either individuals or corporate entities or for the 
governments, in a bid to provide settlement/livelihood opportunities and boost agricultural 
production and/or exports (Sims, 2015). This development has been associated with a deep 
concern for the overexploitation of aquifers as water is generally extracted (far) beyond the 
so-called "safe yield." 
Faced with the overexploitation of groundwater resources, MENA countries have tried to 
control and manage the use of groundwater resources by direct and indirect policy measures 
(Chapter 2; Chapter 6). Direct policy measures/approaches are implemented by the state and 
control, allow or prohibit certain activities or behaviors. They control and monitor 
groundwater use and restrict it through well licenses and permits, sealing wells, banning new 
well drilling or the deepening of old ones, defining prohibition areas, imposing metering 
systems, establishing quotas, etc. Indirect measures work as incentives and control well 
drilling or groundwater abstraction by changing the relative cost of specific production 
factors or output prices, including block tariff for groundwater use, high water tariff for illegal 
wells, constraining the granting of labor permits, discontinuing the distribution of state land, 
raising people’s awareness, 'naming and shaming' strategies, etc (Chapter 2; Chapter 6). 
Reviewing groundwater policies in the MENA region showed many similarities across 
countries, such as the establishing of a system of well registration and permits, the possibility 
to declare specific overexploited areas as conservation or prohibition areas, the adoption of 
metering or economic tools. Despite such a panoply of tools and the promotion of 'best 
practices', controlling groundwater abstraction has been found to be almost impossible in 
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contexts where agriculture users are in high number and spatially scattered (Molle and 
Closas, 2017). 
Desert agriculture, like any agricultural activity, requires land, water, energy, labor, capital 
and agricultural input. But farming in a desert or arid environment, when water is available, is 
often associated with a number of specific constraints such as access and distance from 
markets and settlements, labor shortages, a harsh climatic environment, the need for 
considerable capital to kick start cultivation, problematic land tenure status, higher energy 
costs (e.g. no connection to the grid, pumping from deep aquifers, well drilling cost, etc.). In 
this thesis, the researcher studied and reviewed how these difficulties have been dealt with 
in Azraq basin and in the case of selected countries of the MENA region. 
This thesis investigated the physical, economic and political conditions that undergird the 
development of desert agriculture in the MENA region, most specifically in the Azraq Basin, 
Jordan. After a general overview of desert agriculture in some countries of MENA region, we 
analyzed the conditions that allowed for or encouraged agricultural development in Azraq, 
studied in more detail the modalities of accessing land and water, and explored its 
performance and sustainability under different scenarios. 
8.2 Adopted methodology 
The methodology adopted for this research is based on four successive steps (Figure 8-1) 
which are: defining and studying the general and physical context of the subject, both 
regarding historical development and the current situation; understanding and analyzing all 
the interrelated factors that drive the current situation and investigating future evolutions; 
and concluding with a focus on the lessons learned. 
 
Figure 8-1. Adopted methodology 
This research rests on the core proposition that desert agriculture faces specific challenges 
that need to be studied, understood and analyzed to better comprehend its present and 
future states. The researcher started by studying an extensive literature, reviewing the 
situation of groundwater use and depletion globally, highlighting groundwater-based 
Defining and studying
Understanding
Analysing
Concluding
Chapter 8 
167 
agriculture in the MENA region and the management options that are usually adopted, and 
then focusing on desert agriculture. Studying desert agriculture led the researcher to ask 
herself what are the driving forces fueling this kind of activity in areas that are suffering from 
water stress, how they are related to each other and to main production factors and their 
level of accessibility. Therefore, the researcher studied, understood and analyzed in detail 
the key areas of land, water and other production factors (energy, labor, inputs) in terms of 
social and policy contexts in selected countries of the MENA region, with a detailed historical 
study and analysis elaborated for the Azraq basin case study. 
Is desert agriculture economically viable? To answer this question the researcher conducted 
in-depth surveys in agricultural areas of the Azraq basin. Farm typologies were elaborated 
based on the questionnaire results and the variability in farm gross margins and factor prices 
highlighted the differences between the two agricultural areas in the basin (Azraq and 
Mafraq). Different future scenarios were developed for the case study area based on 
prospective groundwater prices and general considerations on agriculture. 
A state-of-the-art review about desert agriculture in the MENA region allowed the researcher 
to highlight the driving forces behind this activity in selected countries of the MENA region, 
singling out similarities and specificities. An in-depth case study on desert agriculture in Azraq 
basin, Jordan, has been carried out. Analysis of driving forces and access to production 
factors (land accessibility and laws; groundwater policies, measures, tools and incentives; 
how they are implemented and how users react to them; farm typologies), provided the 
researcher with a wide view about how this activity is developed by users and managed by 
the government. The researcher further reflected on the learned lessons from this case study 
by checking them against the situation of other countries in the region. 
During the study the researcher realized that the topic revealed itself to be interconnected 
with multiple issues. 'Horizontally' the issues of land and water accessibility or policies, as 
well as that of other production factors, combined in the analysis of farming systems. 
'Vertically' groundwater and land policy issues took us to a more intricate web of actors 
(locals, NGOs, investors, academics, policy-makers, etc) and to political dimensions seemingly 
lying outside of the investigation. Constrains were faced when sourcing information from a 
diversity of actors not always willing to provide information, and when reaching out to 
distant and isolated farms in the field. 
8.3 Answering the research questions 
To improve the understanding of how desert agriculture expanded and intensified in Azraq 
basin, the thesis addressed one main question as well as five sub-questions. Four sub-
questions were focused on our study area and in line with the research methodology 
introduced, while the last question reflects on this thesis’ findings and how they relate to the 
experience in the MENA region countries that are witnessing a growth of desert agriculture. 
This section concludes on how this thesis answered the research questions addressed. 
The main research question of this study is: 
 What are the physical, economic and political conditions that drive the development of 
desert agriculture in Jordan, and most specifically Azraq Basin, and what is the future of this 
type of agriculture? 
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The development of desert agriculture is allowed by the combining of different production 
factors that are illustrated in Figure 8-2. Controlling and managing the development of desert 
agriculture is very complex and difficult to achieve as the physical, economic and political 
conditions that determine the level of availability of, and accessibility to, production factors 
are interconnected and there is not a one to one causal relationship between each of these 
conditions and their respective effect on desert agriculture. Figure 8-2 presents a summary of 
the main issues and conditions that control the availability and accessibility of production 
factors in the development of desert agriculture. The relation between the development of 
desert agriculture and each production factor is described in more details in the following 
sub questions. 
  
Figure 8-2: Summary of main issues related to each production factor 
 What are the driving forces of desert agriculture development in Jordan and the Azraq 
basin? 
Groundwater-based agriculture in Jordan occurs mainly in part of Amman-Zarqa basin and 
Azraq basin in the north, and Disi basin in the south. The dependency of agriculture on 
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groundwater varies from one basin to the other, since in parts of the highlands of Amman-
Zarqa basin agriculture can resort to rainfall, surface water or groundwater. In contrast, Disi 
and Azraq basins are located respectively in the southern and eastern deserts of Jordan 
where groundwater is the only resource available for irrigation. 
The researcher identified the driving forces behind the process of desert agriculture 
expansion. The relatively easy accessibility to land and groundwater resources were found to 
be the initial main driving forces of desert agriculture in Azraq basin, Jordan (discussed in 
detail in the following question), although this accessibility was found to be increasingly 
problematic (ban on well-drilling, crackdown on illegal wells, privatization of state land 
discontinued) (Chapter 5 and 6). It was found also that groundwater-based agriculture in 
Jordan comes with two distinct (but possibly combined) purposes: a) an investment 
opportunity with a good return on investment; b) land speculation (agriculture is a means to 
obtain, with time, private ownership of state land) often associated with Sunday Farming 
(urbanites enjoying the place on weekends). Smallholder farming can be set aside, as it 
historically developed based on spring water and in parallel with settlements. It is home-
consumption oriented and increasingly residual. Agricultural development in Azraq is fueled 
by both these individual profit-making strategies and the state (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). Although 
this is now changing, the state has indirectly facilitated the process through its lax 
implementation and enforcement of laws (pervasive illegal well drilling and state land 
occupation, weak monitoring of actual water use, etc) and various types of misplaced 
economic subsidies (irrigation systems, seedlings, fuel price -before the Gulf War-, soft loan 
for drilling private wells, etc) (Chapter 5, 6 and 7). Profit-making individual investors, whether 
locals or outsiders, seize the opportunities available to invest in desert farming, navigating 
the different constraints attached to each of the production factors. 
 How do public policies deal with the resulting over-exploitation and depletion of 
groundwater resources? 
Faced with extreme water scarcity and a situation where all conventional resources and 
reuse of treated wastewater are already exploited, the Jordanian government has tried and is 
still trying to monitor, control and manage groundwater use and illegal expansion of 
cultivated areas (Chapter 5 and 6). It has implemented a series of regulatory and incentive-
based tools concerning groundwater access and use (Chapter 6). But because of the systemic 
interrelationships of water use with land, labor and energy issues – made explicit above - the 
MWI has also sought to regulate them indirectly, by supporting changes in the policies and 
rules governing these sectors (Chapter 6). 
The illegal expansion of agriculture area happens normally on state lands (Chapter 5). In 
order to curb illegality and solve land problems, several mechanisms exist within the 
Department of Land and Survey to legalize lands by taswiye, tafwid, and royal gift (Chapter 
5). Taswiye (Land settlement) generally takes place to legalize de-facto settlements of 
families on new land, while the tafwid (delegation) is linked to reclamation and agricultural 
activities on the land. Legalizing land is meant to decrease illegality in agriculture - since wells 
licenses, labor licenses and connection to the electricity grid cannot be obtained without a 
legal land deed-, and should help the government control the amount of groundwater 
abstracted. On the other hand, activating these mechanisms encourage people to extend 
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their cultivated areas or cultivate new areas illegally, in the hope to legalize them afterward 
(Chapter 5). Theoretically the government is controlling encroachment on this type of land 
through its Desert Patrol, whose job is to quell the occupation of state land and to remove 
illegal farms. But destroying illegal settlements is generally not achievable as this faces violent 
reaction from locals and generates tensions with tribes (Chapter 5). 
Groundwater-based agriculture in Jordan was encouraged by the government in the early 
1970s through the provision of well licenses and soft loan for drilling private wells (UNPD, 
2013b). With the increase in groundwater use, the government passed specific laws and 
bylaws to regulate well drilling and groundwater abstraction. The use of groundwater is 
controlled by two main laws (Chapter 6): Water Authority Law no 18 of 1988 and the 
Groundwater Bylaw 85 of 2002. Through these two laws, the government reiterated earlier 
measures such as licensing and metering, and introduced other direct and indirect measures 
and tools to control the abstraction of groundwater. Direct measures include well licensing, 
establishing annual quotas per well, sealing illegal wells, licensing and monitoring drilling 
companies and drilling activity, limiting the number of well licenses to one per plot of land, 
and banning any new well drilling for agriculture (in 1992). Indirect measures include a block 
tariff pricing system, sharply increasing the water tariff of illegal wells, constraining the 
granting of labor permits, publishing the names of violators and people with large arrears of 
water charges in newspapers ('naming and shaming'), publicizing tough actions on the 
ground in the media, using satellite imagery to estimate and charge water consumption, and 
improving inter-departmental coordination to force users to pay water bills (Chapter 6). 
Chapter 6 described the level of implementation of all these direct and indirect measures in 
detail and how users adjusted to them. Generally, the application of tools requiring 
interventions in the field was found to be frustrated by a number of factors: first, the number 
of WAJ staff and their equipment are insufficient to fulfill the tasks entrusted to them. 
Second, these field personnel often have social links with the local people they are supposed 
to control. Third, controlling illegal practices, checking well characteristics, reading meters 
(with the perspective of associated water fees), or demanding payment requires heavy 
presence in the field. These factors create a fertile environment for and incentives to bribery. 
Last, intimidation by local Bedouins, sometimes with a show of weapons, does not encourage 
field personnel to take risk of enforcing the law when, at the same time, the degree of 
resolve of higher-level authorities in enforcing it is unclear. Pressure from the top is useful 
but can also have detrimental effects. Molle et al. (2017a) have evidenced a total disconnect 
between agricultural statistics, which indicate a doubling of the irrigated area since the 
beginning of the 1990s, while data for the same period from the MWI show that 
groundwater abstraction has leveled off at around 250 Mm3/yr. They posit that this 
disconnect reflects the pressure exerted on staff from both ministries to produce (low) 
groundwater abstraction numbers and (high) agricultural areas. Using satellite images Al-
Bakri (2015) has shown that substantial expansion of irrigated areas did take place in Azraq 
and Mafraq areas during the period 1990-2014, with irrigated areas increasing from 17000 
and 36000 du in 1990 to 46000 and 134,000 du in the 2013/2014 season for Azraq and 
Mafraq respectively. 
Indirect measures which do not require periodic information from the fields have been more 
successful. Jordan has implemented a few very original strategies to enforce the law. The first 
one is the interconnection of public services and registers. Groundwater users who have 
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arrears of water bills can now see their request for a new passport, a land transaction, or a 
marriage certificate turned down, or even be barred from leaving the country. In addition, 
the biggest defaulters now see their names published in newspapers and on the internet. For 
example, recently in August 2017, WAJ published in the Official Gazette and online 
newspapers the names of defaulters who refused to pay their cumulated water bills, and the 
Authority has promised to take appropriate measures to freeze their assets within 60 days 
from the date of publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette (Alsaa.net, 2017). This 
potentially poses a huge challenge – and a threat – to owners of (registered) illegal wells on 
whom very discouraging water tariffs are being applied (although there is no information on 
how systematically these measures are implemented). 
The Ministry has also consistently and for many years raised the awareness of the 
seriousness of Jordan’s water situation of various segments of the society (Chapter 6; Molle 
et al., 2017a): users in general, but also members of parliament, judges and even imams in 
order to enhance citizens’ awareness and also to create an environment more likely to 
accept the implementation of drastic measures. 
The political will to tackle Jordan's water crisis manifested by the current minister is probably 
unparalleled in the MENA region (Closas and Molle, 2016). Yet, if anything, the difficulties 
experienced in enforcing the policy measures put in place demonstrate the magnitude of the 
challenge in controlling diffuse groundwater agricultural use, for reasons that are logistical, 
social and political. 
 How do desert agriculture entrepreneurs access the various production factors needed for 
cultivation in such a specific environment and what particular problems do they face? 
Land: Desert lands before the 1960s were out of sight and had little value. The putting of all 
desert land under state ownership in 1958, furthering the reforms of the British Mandate, did 
not arouse much reaction, as the manifestation of state power in desert areas was limited to 
the Desert Patrol (Fischbach, 2000). Bedouins were using their traditional grazing lands for 
their herds and land issues or conflicts were largely between tribes (Fischbach, 2000). With 
the development of irrigation and drilling techniques and the availability of water, the value 
of these lands changed radically and investors moved in to develop agriculture. 
In some cases, like in Mafraq, land had already largely been allotted to local tribes and 
individually appropriated, with legal land deeds (Chapter 5 and 7). Local owners invested in 
their own lands or sold it to outsiders (Chapter 5). In Disi, land was apportioned to both local 
small farmers and four large-scale companies which received long-term leases agreements 
from the state (Barthelemy et al., 2010). In Azraq, settled Druze and Chechen communities 
were the first to dig wells close to the wetland to take advantage of the shallow groundwater 
resource for small gardening agriculture. Local Druze and Bedouins gradually developed 
some commercial agriculture but also engaged in land brokering (Chapter 5). 
But who owns the land? Desert land comes under two categories. State land under the 
formal ownership of the state treasury, and state land that has not been formally titled and, 
although also under state property, which can be either transferred to citizens through land 
settlements projects (this privatization process is called taswiye) or claimed by whoever can 
prove to have put it to productive use for a number of years (this 'ihya' process is sanctioned 
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by the Islamic tradition), the plot being 'delegated' to the cultivator through a process called 
'tafwid')(Chapter 5). But such legal categories basically negate the customary rights of local 
Bedouins tribes which are loath to accept dispossession of a resource at the very time it is 
becoming valuable. As observed in other countries such as Syria or Egypt, Bedouins impose –
through their social power and sometimes intimidation- a parallel system of access to land, 
exacting financial benefits from whoever wants to settle and/or invest in land locally (Sims, 
2015). They issue a 'hijjeh' (proof) to the prospective investor against payment, which 
although officially deprived of value will be considered in case of land settlement (Chapter 5). 
As a result, from a land tenure point of view, five types of land are cultivated in Azraq: 1) land 
owned legally with an official land title; 2) land directly settled, used and claimed by local 
Bedouins; 3) land informally 'bought' from local Bedouins who claim customary ownership of 
the land and have ceded it after issuing a 'hijjeh' to the buyer; 4) state land occupied and 
reclaimed and/or rented from the state; 5) land rented (often with a well) from a legal owner 
or a local Bedouin (Chapter 5). Investors with a real intent to engage in intensive agriculture 
generally either already own the land (Mafraq) or buy it legally from the owner, in order not 
to put their investment at risk (Chapter 5). But many locals or investors have speculative 
motives, i.e. they are attracted by the prospect of having their land later legalized through 
'taswiye' and transformed into a valuable asset, and may 'buy' land through 'hijjeh' (at a 
much lower price), or even occupy state land (Chapter 5). 
The 'price' of land in the desert generally, and in Azraq in particular, is cheap due to the 
illegal nature of the 'sale' by Bedouins, and to the fact that land is far away from the city and 
often deprived of infrastructure. Bedouins issue 'hijjeh' against a payment that typically varies 
around 5000 JD/ha, or more if it already has a (illegal) well (Chapter 5). Land availability, 
relatively good access, and not too deep groundwater (between 10 and 70 m) compared with 
Mafraq (around 350 m), land settlements that boost the likelihood of land being one day 
regularized helped make Azraq a prime option to invest in land, irrespective of what type of 
agriculture is to be conducted and despite the risk. 
If taswiye and tafwid processes fuel the demand for land and the associate use of 
groundwater, what is the government’s response in front of this phenomenon that clearly 
compounds the overexploitation of Azraq aquifer? We have shown that this response is 
ambiguous and for two reasons (Chapter 5). The first reason is the contradiction between 
agricultural policy on the one hand, and water conservation policy on the other. While the 
Ministry of agriculture still aims at maximizing the cropping area and national agricultural 
production, this intent squarely contradicts the efforts deployed by the Ministry of water and 
irrigation. Mechanisms to help cultivators or encourage them to take on agriculture have 
long been in place, although they are being gradually canceled. This is the case in particular 
of the 'tafwid' mechanism which rewards those reclaiming unused land and which is 
unofficially more or less abandoned, although there is a likely political calculus to avoid 
making this fully public and official. 
The second reason is that the state is loath to intervene in the moneymaking brokering 
mechanism setup by local Bedouins, for fear of antagonizing them. It has been shown that 
Bedouin tribes are a fundamental pillar of a monarchy that has always depended on a 
delicate balancing act whereby the flow of benefits accruing to Bedouin tribes is key to the 
sustaining of their political support. However, because of the conflicts resulting from taswiye 
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processes, and the dynamics fueled by expectations that it would endlessly continue, the 
state has decided to put an end to such processes, although this is not announced as a 
definitive decision that would otherwise require legal changes (Chapter 5). 
Claims to land ownership regarding the huge portion of the country which has never been 
formally titled (around 75% of it) are a major trump card in the hands of the Bedouin 
population in its daily dealings with the state. It is therefore a 'hot issue' that is there to stay 
and explains the limitations faced by the state in quelling this source of agricultural expansion 
and associated water use. 
Water: In Azraq basin, groundwater was easy to access as it could be found close to the 
surface. The availability of both legal and illegal drilling machines and equipment has long 
allowed local residents and investors to drill wells without bothering registering them or 
asking for drilling permits from the Ministry. This was also a result of most land plots being 
under unclear tenure status, and therefore render them unable to legalize their wells. 
Mafraq stands in contrast, both because land is legally owned and because the water table is 
much deeper. Land and water are therefore very expensive, and agriculture only makes 
sense for intensive and often high-tech fruit (or vegetable) production. 
While investment costs in Mafraq are higher than in Azraq, running costs may comparatively 
be more favorable in some situations: connection to the grid allows farmers to use electricity 
rather than diesel. Most wells in Mafraq are licensed, which comes with a generous free 
block of 150,000 m3/yr/well and a cheap tariff of 5 fils for the 150,000-200,000 m3 block. In 
Azraq, wells with permits have a free block of 25000 m3/du but within a limit of 50,000 
m3/yr/well only, while the next block (up to 100,000 m3) is charged at 20 fils/m3 and the last 
one (> 100,000 m3) at 60 fils/m3(Chapter 7). 
Just like for land, the state through the MWI has long maintained an ambiguous stance 
towards controlling groundwater use. Although stricter regulations were passed in 2002, the 
ministry initially often turned a blind eye to illegal well drilling, did not enforce pricing and 
operated through field offices endowed with material means and staff that were insufficient 
to really check the situation on the ground. But beyond means, this also reflected political 
uneasiness in dealing with a resource that people do not associate with the state, which they 
have to invest in in order to be able to use it, and which allows some rural impoverished 
population to make a living. Likewise, strictly controlling groundwater abstraction would 
antagonize Bedouins who grow fodder or other crops on unregistered land. In recent years 
lax enforcement has however been gradually superseded by a much stronger stance backed 
by fresh political will and made pressing by mounting water challenges (Chapter 6). Whether 
and how new regulatory and economic tools and measures are a game changer is discussed 
below. 
Labor: Labor in agriculture is divided into two types: permanent labor and seasonal labor. 
Permanent workers stay on the farm 24/7, while seasonal workers are mobilized at harvest 
and planting time, according to farms’ needs (Chapter 7). Cultivation in the desert usually 
poses the question of labor availability, because most farms are isolated and/or far from the 
city, access roads are unpaved, climatic condition are harsh. In Azraq, permanent laborers are 
mainly from Egypt and Yemen, while seasonal laborers are either locals or Syrian refugees 
(Chapter 7). 
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How do foreign laborers end up in Azraq? Foreign laborers can be obtained either legally by 
using the right to 'import' one foreign labor for each hectare (10 du) of cultivated land, either 
through an official procedure or illegally through the labor brokers (Chapter 7). Farmers and 
farm owners often prefer to use the second methods avoiding lengthy official procedures. 
Brokers are controlling the labor market in Azraq as they can sell and buy labor licenses, 
facilitate the travel of workers from abroad, liaise with recruitment agents in Egypt or 
elsewhere. They also provide farmers with seasonal daily workers, taking a commission in 
return (typically between 0.5 and 10 JD/person/day) (Chapter 7). 
The rule of one laborer per hectare (or 10 du) opened the way for abuse. It may provide 
farmers and officials shared incentives to overestimate the cultivated areas. But it also allows 
farmers to request a number of workers far in excess of their actual needs. The result is that 
the incoming workers are sometimes diverted to the construction sector in Amman, in 
exchange for a lump sum of money to the farmer (around 550 JD/worker). This rule has now 
been changed: farmers have the right now to have 1 laborer for each 50 du instead of 10 du 
(Chapter 7). 
It is also not always easy to secure permanent labor under the unattractive conditions of 
desert farms. Some workers escape to Amman where they can get better salaries. Therefore, 
accessing labor is relatively straightforward and not a constraint to investment but securing it 
may be more problematic. As for seasonal workers, the influx of Syrian refugees have 
provided abundant and cheap labor, since they are paid at a very low wage of 1 JD/hr, while 
the rate for Jordanians is 15 JD/day, enhancing the profitability of labor-intensive crops, 
notably vegetables (Chapter 7). 
Energy: What energy can be used in desert remote farms? When it comes to groundwater-
based agriculture, energy is considered as important as land and water, because it is needed 
to extract water, and run the irrigation system. Groundwater started to be extracted through 
pumps powered by diesel. Later on, electricity came to be increasingly used, as the power 
grid was extended along the main roads and was made more desirable by skyrocketing diesel 
prices after the Iraqi war. However, electricity is not available everywhere and, in addition, 
land should be legal and registered in the Land Department for a farm to qualify for a 
connection to the grid. Accordingly, illegal land owners either have to use diesel (at a high 
cost), make illegal connections to the grid, or adopt solar energy systems. From this study 
(Chapter 7), it was found that the average abstraction cost in Azraq and Mafraq using 
electricity as a source of energy amounted to 0.015 and 0.136 JD/m3 respectively, while the 
abstraction cost in Azraq using diesel energy was 0.12 JD/m3 (Chapter 7). 
Capital: Groundwater-based agriculture requires important amounts of capital in order to 
buy land, drill the well, or obtain licenses. We have divided farms in four categories:  
1) big farms for investment purposes (big capital to buy land, well paid farm manager or 
skilled labor, knowledge of the market and possibly export channels, adoption of new 
irrigation technologies or new ways of frost- or drought-proofing the farm, paying water and 
electricity bills, etc);  
2) medium-to-small farms owned by locals looking for adequate profit (small market, unpaid 
bills, few workers, uncertainty and illegality);  
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3) hobby farms for leisure (urbanites coming occasionally, with farm run by a manager; or 
'Sunday farming'); and  
4) small-scale family farms (home consumption, family labor).  
All these types of farm are present in Azraq basin. The level of investment varies from place 
to place according to the area within Azraq basin. As mentioned earlier, investments in Azraq 
are in general less costly than in Mafraq as land is cheaper, water is nearer to the surface, 
and therefore energy costs for abstraction of water lower (Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Despite the 
lower cost, cultivation in Azraq still needs an initial capital investment of no less than 150,000 
JD for a farm of 200 du (~5,000 JD/du + 60,000 JD/well). Such large farms are therefore 
normally owned by large investors, while small farmers prefer to cultivate an average of 20 
du, with a loan from the agricultural bank (Chapter 7). 
Markets: Aside from production factors, the viability of desert farming also depends on 
market opportunities. Iraq and Gulf countries are considered to be the main export market 
for many farmers in Azraq and Mafraq, but these have been affected by the repeated crises 
in the region. Azraq is now producing alfalfa that is partly exported to UAE. The Syrian crisis 
has taken its toll on production in Syria and this, together with the food demand for the 
refugee camps, has opened up new market opportunities. These circumstances, however, 
are transient. 
Azraq’s agriculture is also affected by additional transportation costs for products with 
limited added value such as olive (oil). Farmers in Azraq either sell their olive production as 
olive or as oil. The production cost of olive at farm level is around 35 fils/kg, the production is 
sold in Amman as Azraq market is small and it is sold at 45 fils/kg with no revenue to the 
farmer as the 10 cents difference goes to the transportation cost. As Azraq olive oil has less 
acidity, a characteristic that is not favored by the Jordanian market, farmers have to export it 
outside the country, mainly to the Gulf and Israel, which adds new costs for the farmers. 
Meanwhile, Mafraq is affected by additional storage costs for stone fruit trees, as each cold 
storage room (warehouse) with a capacity of 20 tons costs about 2,500 – 3,000 JD/year for 
the storage (Al Naber, 2016). 
In summary, this section showed that the historical legal background and the relative costs of 
the production factors largely explain the differences in farm type and crop choice 
(summarized in Table 8-1). Mafraq attracts investors with big capital as land and wells are 
legal and fetch high prices, but water tariffs, water quality, road access, electrification and 
market channels are favorable. Risk is therefore low and high-tech fruit tree cultivation 
dominates. In contrast in Azraq, farmers tend to cultivate olive trees as these need less input 
and suit the parallel objective of land speculation, alfalfa (with illegal wells escaping water 
tariffs) to take advantage of the demand from Gulf Countries, while a few investors emulate 
the Mafraq model. Lands are often occupied and/or obtained from Bedouins in exchange for 
payment (much less, though, than for a privately-owned land) and not legally owned 
(although some areas have been the object of land settlements in the past). Wells, therefore, 
often only have a temporary permit (with higher water fees) or are illegal (with tariffs 
recently raised at prohibitive levels). Water is shallower and therefore cheaper to extract but 
subject to salinity hazards that increase with depth and proximity to the wetland. Risk, either 
legal or agronomic, is therefore higher. 
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Table 8-1. Accessibility of production factors in both Azraq and Mafraq. 
Production 
factors 
Azraq Basin 
Azraq Mafraq (North Badia) 
Land Frequent speculation; buy legal; buy 
illegal; inherits 
land in general private and legal (official 
titles); high prices 
Water Shallower wells, both legal or illegal; 
illegal drilling curbed but not stopped. 
Salinity growing and problematic in 
some areas; higher water fees for wells 
with permits, discouraging tariffs for 
(registered) illegal wells 
Deep wells (almost) all licensed; illegal 
drilling rare. Generous free block; water 
charges minimal in production costs. 
Good water quality 
Energy Diesel, electricity, solar energy as the 
emerging cost-effective solution for 
isolated (and/or illegal) farms  
Electricity 
Capital 
(investment) 
Moderate High 
Labor Brokers, permits for permanent (foreign) workers; seasonal workers from nearby 
areas or (increasingly) from Syrian refugee camps. 
 Is desert agriculture in Azraq Basin economically viable, and environmentally sustainable? 
What are possible prospects for the future? 
Based on our survey’s data, this research estimated the gross margin of each farm type in 
Azraq and Mafraq, it was found (Chapter 7) that four out of five farm typologies in Azraq got 
positive average incomes ranging from 50 JD/du/yr up to 223 JD/du/yr. In Mafraq, all farm 
types have a higher gross margin, ranging from 1123 to 1963 JD/du/yr. Olive is the dominant 
crop cultivated in Azraq farm typology, with alfalfa and grapes cultivated intercropped with 
olives (or sometime alone) to enhance profit. In Mafraq, more sophisticated farms cultivated 
mainly with stone fruit trees, with some grape and vegetables, are linked to well-identified 
markets, which is reflected in the high positive returns. 
In both Azraq and Mafraq energy costs followed by labor wages were shown to be the main 
costs in farming, which is explained by the high cost of using water illegally in Azraq, and by 
the depth of the water table in Mafraq. Water fees in both Azraq and Mafraq were found to 
be the least of all production factor costs. It can be concluded that agriculture in Mafraq is 
highly profitable, to the point that no foreseeable change in any of the production factor – 
included water charges – or in the market is likely to change this conclusion. The bulk of 
agriculture in Azraq is moderately-to-little profitable and vulnerable to drastic changes in 
factor or market prices, including water charges for illegal wells. But its value includes a 
longer-term speculative value attached to expectations regarding land tenure conditions. 
The researcher has investigated the economic sustainability in term of gross margin of Azraq 
and Mafraq farms for different water charge scenarios (Chapter 7). For Mafraq we found that 
agriculture is unlikely to be substantially affected by changes in tariffs (that are politically 
conceivable for legal wells), since the price of water remains secondary to other production 
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factors, even if the free block is taken down from 150,000 to 50,000 m3. In Azraq, the 'all 
wells with permits', and 'all wells illegal' scenarios did affect gross margins but not to the 
point of threatening profitability, because the differential between the tariffs of the two 
categories are not large enough. But application of the recent tariffs for illegal wells 
multiplies water costs by ten, meaning that farms with illegal wells would be bankrupt right 
away, except high-tech/greenhouse production. 
What about environmental sustainability? Since the early 2000s, many farmers in Azraq 
noticed a reduction in their farm productivity and profitability due to the drop in the water 
table and an increase in salinity. Some farmers had to deepen their well to reach water and in 
some cases, they reached more saline water. Associated negative impacts on yields 
combined with higher energy costs (after the Iraqi wars) and labor costs. As a result, a 
number of farms have been abandoned mainly in Azraq South and locals have left the area (a 
number of Chechen moved to other cities such as Wadi El Sir, Sweileh and Zarqa). Cultivation 
generates limited profit, as shown by the calculation of farm gross margins, but the most 
entrepreneurial farmers are trying to adapt to changes by converting to solar energy to 
decrease the long-term energy costs, changing cropping patterns and moving toward more 
profitable crops, planning to build desalination plants like in the south of Jordan Valley, etc. 
The situation in Mafraq is more stable compared to Azraq, as water tables are already deep, 
and farmers have the capital to adapt to changes. 
However it is not all clear to what depth can groundwater still be pumped and depleted. 
Different scholars describe the future of groundwater-based agriculture on Jordanian 
highlands as bleak because of the growing costs for accessing water, retrofitting wells and 
pumps, increases in salinity, and the anticipated dewatering of the aquifers in some parts. A 
study by Rosenberg and Peralta (2012) estimated that 79% of olive and vegetable farming in 
Azraq might become economically unviable in the next ten years, leaving concerned farmers 
with the choice of either shifting to higher-value crops or quitting farming altogether. This 
trend anticipated in 2012 can actually now be observed on the ground, albeit not with the 
expected magnitude: a number of olives trees are left to dry with no production, cropping 
patterns where partly shifted to more economical value crops as alfalfa. 
During the Highland Water Forum (a multi-stakeholder platform set up to discuss 
groundwater issues) held between 2010 and 2013, several ideas were proposed and 
discussed regarding future options in Azraq basin (Demilcamps, 2010; HWF, 2015), including 
adopting plants tolerant to arid environments and salinity, saving water by different farm 
practices and technologies, developing income-generating alternative activities such as 'solar 
farming' or ecotourism, or having the state buy out farms or wells (which is currently ruled 
out by the government). However, these mitigating measures –if implemented– are unlikely 
to significantly affect on-going trends.  
What future can we foresee for Azraq’s agriculture based on the analysis developed in this 
thesis, and what possible game changers are emerging? We are likely to see a polarization in 
Azraq, with a decline/demise of farms affected by salinity and lack of legalization prospect on 
the one hand, and the 'Mafraqisation' of a few farmers, on the other. This demise of 
agriculture will particularly affect small Chechen farms in Azraq South, who already have to 
deal with growing water salinity; 'Sunday farming' urbanites with temporary well permits but 
not willing to invest further, and/or possibly discouraged by the current lack of prospect 
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regarding land regularization; and above all farms based on illegal wells: their precarious 
status has allowed the Ministry to impose prohibitive water charges. As discussed in Chapter 
6, the effects of this policy have yet to be seen and the willingness of the government to 
implement it has yet to be confirmed. Economic calculations, recalled above, show that, if 
applied, tariffs for illegal wells would put an end to a large portion of these farms. 
But some farmers are likely to emulate the Mafraq model (and indeed some investors have 
farms in both areas): they have the connections, capital and know-how to ever intensify, tap 
export markets, and shift to solar energy or even desalination of brackish water. Investments 
in those farms, however, will be constrained by the lack of legal security regarding land and 
water, with the exception of a few farms with land titles. It will therefore chiefly concern 
existing legal farms rather than whatever expansion might still occur. 
Will the number of farms and the cultivated area be reduced? This will most probably be the 
case in the area near Azraq due to the different factors spelled out above. But it is also 
possible to see a concomitant outward expansion of farms, allowed in particular by solar 
energy. This will depend on the degree of resolve shown by the government in controlling 
this expansion by satellite images and enforcing regulations on the ground. 
Two major potential game changers – that work in opposite directions – are therefore water 
tariffs for illegal wells and solar energy. 
8.4 Zooming out – results in perspective 
What lessons can be drawn from the study of Azraq Basin for desert agriculture in the MENA 
region? 
We may now zoom out from our Azraq case study to the wider context of desert agriculture 
in the MENA region described in the introduction. How does Azraq compare with other 
situations, what is specific to it, and what lessons learned might be useful to other contexts? 
Like in most countries of the MENA, the expansion of desert agriculture in Jordan has been 
fuelled by private individuals and companies, with various direct and indirect incentives 
extended by the state. Like in Morocco, Algeria or Egypt, the state encouraged agricultural 
expansion and turned a blind eye to law infringements in terms of well license, land tenure, 
or in some case (e.g. Egypt) even illegal diversion from state canals. Initially, such livelihood 
opportunity was seen as a stabilizing factor in the settling of Bedouins (UNDP, 2013b). Unlike 
Morocco or Egypt, it was not meant to be an 'escape valve' for impoverished peasants with 
tiny or no land at all in old agricultural regions. Rather, the economic opportunity was seized 
by medium-sized entrepreneurs, many of them already farming in the Jordan Valley (and 
often with a Palestinian background) or sometimes locals. While the corporate model 
observed in Sudan, Egypt or Morocco was able to develop on the Disi aquifer, in the south, it 
did not develop in the highlands. Apart from its role in the give-and-take policy of the state 
vis-à-vis the Bedouins or other ethnic groups settled in Azraq, desert agriculture in the 
highlands is mostly the domain of medium-scale investors with productive and/or speculative 
purposes. It is noteworthy, however, that while most countries still support the expansion of 
desert agriculture (e.g. Morocco with subsidized drip irrigation, Algeria with highly subsidized 
land grants, or Egypt with President Sisi’s Million Feddan Project), Jordan is not: the MWI is 
somehow prevailing over the Ministry of Agriculture and staff clearly expressed to us the 
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(mid-term) policy objective of basically stopping agriculture in the highlands and using 
groundwater only for domestic purposes. 
With regard to land tenure, desert lands in Jordan, just like in Egypt, Sudan, Israel or Algeria, 
have been formally put under state ownership. State land located in desert/vast areas far 
from settlements, like in some place in Algeria, Egypt, or parts of Sudan can be leased or sold 
to corporations without raising much claim to land. But the situation differs in steppe lands 
(badia) used by Bedouins or other herders, as has been shown in Chapter 5. In such 
situations Bedouins make claim to land, especially when its value is enhanced by the 
possibility to use groundwater, regardless of whether the State has established legal 
ownership/custodianship of it. This research showed that a situation of legal pluralism 
prevails, where claims and counter-claims are articulated within wider political frameworks 
whereby Bedouins try to extract some of the newly revealed value of the land. This takes 
place in situations where Bedouins are displaced from grazing lands (e.g. Egypt) but in many 
cases like in Azraq the 'areal footprint' of irrigated agriculture may remain limited. Bedouins 
therefore issue hijjehs (Jordan), or exact payment (khawa) dubbed as a 'protection fee' from 
settlers, like in Egypt. A similar well-known conflict, this time between the state and 
Bedouins, is that of the Negev, where the Israeli state refused to recognize Bedouins rights 
on claimed state lands. The state has been trying to evacuate the claimed villages by 
reallocating the inhabitants to what is called "Seven State Planned Bedouins" towns, while 
Bedouins refuse to leave the lands for which they claim to have historical rights (Meir, 2009; 
Shmueli and Khamaisi, 2011). This conflict ended up in courts were the Israeli state used legal 
and historical arguments to prove state land ownership, rejecting Bedouin claims on the 
ground that they do not have land deeds and lack historical evidence that land in Negev was 
farmed by Bedouins, as all Bedouins were nomadic pastoralists with no fixed homes, 
territories or settlements (Meir, 2009). 
What does Azraq situation tell us about groundwater use and policy? Azraq features a 
ubiquitous tradeoff between well drilling/use and natural spring flow (in this case feeding an 
oasis) or qanats flow. In most of the region spanning from Morocco to Pakistan, this 
competition has resulted and is resulting in the demise of qanats and the drying up of springs 
(Closas and Molle, 2016). In that sense the Azraq story is not different from those other ones. 
The curve showing the gradual drop of both its aquifer and spring flows is, sadly, all the more 
common. The wetland is now artificially sustained on 5-10% of its original extent with 
groundwater (Hresha, 2013).  
With the increase in groundwater use and associated negative impacts, the states in the 
MENA region have in general expressed the importance of having policy instruments to 
manage and control the use of this resource. To this aim, states have developed laws, by 
laws, decrees and various regulatory and economic tools. Many similarities have been found 
between these policies, as most states have implemented well registration and licensing 
procedures, prohibition zones in overexploited areas, metering, quotas and sometimes 
pricing (see introduction). But overall in the MENA region the enforcement of these 
regulations has been extremely varied and, in general, lax. 
While some countries require only a notification for wells under a depth limit (e.g. Tunisia, 
Morocco and Lebanon), Jordan, like many other MENA region countries, requires a permit for 
both the drilling and the use of any type of well. Like Morocco or Lebanon, Jordan has faced 
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the challenge of legalizing unregistered wells at a certain point in time: it has given several 
extended legalization periods before a terminal date in 2014. The researcher found the same 
lack of trust towards the government intentions but also a specificity linked to the land 
tenure status: since the privatization of land has been suspended, all people with non-
legalized land are unable to ask for licenses: if declaring their well they will therefore be 
classified as illegal with temporary permits (if they can prove the 'socio-economic dimension' 
of their cultivation), or considered as illegal (in which case they will be temporarily tolerated 
but heavily taxed through water tariffs). 
Jordan is therefore special with regard to legalization because there is a risk for farmers to 
both declare their illegal well (which will be taxed and have a precarious status) and not to 
declare it (given the growing pressure put on illegal wells in the past few years). While most 
countries try to make registration attractive or at least neutral, to encourage farmers to 
report their wells, in Jordan the status of such wells is actually unattractive and works against 
registration. The 'stick' (cost) that goes with registering must therefore be paralleled by a 
bigger one for those keeping their well illegal/unregistered (which at the moment is only a 
threat of potential tougher actions in the future). 
There is a second major difference between Jordan and other MENA region countries which, 
typically, have between 100,000 and 300,000 wells each (Molle and Closas, 2016): Jordan 
only has around 4000 known legal and illegal wells, which can be explained by its smaller 
population, higher average drilling costs, and more limited resources. Jordan has therefore 
been able to close much of the gap between existing and registered wells, which other 
countries are far from achieving [e.g. in Lebanon, "It is believed that there are over 80,000 
wells in the country, a fourth of which are registered, and a very small part of these (~300) 
are licensed and metered" (Molle et al., 2017b)]. According to official data, there are around 
1000 illegal wells in Jordan out of 4000 working registered wells (although this does not 
account for illegal unknown wells, to be found chiefly in Azraq and in the Jordan Valley). 
With regard to the volumetric control of abstraction, Jordan also distinguished itself by the 
higher rate of metered wells, since most wells with licenses or (temporary) permits have 
meters. This research has shown, however (Chapter 6), that many of these meters were non-
functioning (around 40% in Azraq) or tampered with, which led the government to 
increasingly use remote sensing and proxies such as electricity consumption or area/crop 
characteristics to estimate use. On the one hand, Jordan, together with some Gulf Countries 
such as Bahrain, is one of the few countries in the region which attempt a volumetric 
monitoring of all groundwater users; on the other, Molle et al. (2017a) have cast doubt on 
the reliability of abstraction figures published by the government, by showing a clear 
disconnect between the evolution of groundwater-irrigated areas (doubling in the last 30 
years) and total water abstraction volumes (stable over the same period). This suggests that 
monitoring and data collection are highly contingent. 
Jordan is also noteworthy for its block-tariffs applied to groundwater abstraction. We 
concluded, however, that the free block granted to licensed wells and the relatively modest 
prices had little impact on use itself. An exception to this finding was the case of illegal wells 
for which this study showed that the new tariffs imposed in 2014 made agriculture unviable, 
except for greenhouses or very intensive cash-crop farming on small areas. In other words, 
while water pricing for legal wells faced the same limitations observed elsewhere in the 
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world (it is close to impossible for governments to tax abstraction when its role in the 
provision of groundwater is nil; see Molle and Closas, 2017), and is therefore not efficient in 
reducing use, the Ministry has attempted to use pricing to make illegal wells unviable (the 
illegal nature of the well allowing the government to do so). 
The problem of law enforcement is faced by all countries. This study found that controlling 
illegal drilling was extremely difficult; that bribing or intimidation of field staff distorted data 
collection and weakened policy implementation. This study revealed how farmers circumvent 
or evade regulations in various 'creative' ways: by-passing or tampering with meters, 
declaring a well-used for domestic purposes and using it for agriculture, making fake wells to 
be sealed by the government, etc. With bribing found everywhere in the region and beyond 
(Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, etc., see Closas and Molle, 2016), to get a permit or 
have officials turn a blind eye to an illegal well, Jordan does not escape this problem, albeit 
probably with a lower intensity. 
Another noteworthy specificity of Jordan’s groundwater policies is the set of indirect 
measures directed at other production factors involved in cultivation: this involves reducing 
access to foreign workers, not connecting illegal wells to the grid, freezing the 
distribution/privatization of state land and, last but not least, interconnecting ministries' data 
system to deprive of public services users who have not paid their water bills. To what can be 
added a 'name and shame' policy whereby violators’ names are published in newspapers and 
on the web. This experience is certainly original and of great value to other countries globally. 
All in all, and despite the various difficulties faced when enforcing regulations, Jordan stands 
out as the country in the MENA region that has both displayed the largest array of policy 
tools and regulations, and shown –at least at the ministerial level- a political will that is sorely 
lacking in most other countries. The effectiveness of the recent measures has yet to be 
assessed and will probably be dampened by several types of constraints at all levels of the 
society; but they are unparalleled in the region. We can speculate that this is due in part to 
Jordan having extremely limited water endowments, with surface waters largely coming 
from/controlled by Israel and Syria, and a general state of groundwater overexploitation; to 
its smaller population; and to the limited power/relative importance of the agricultural 
sector. 
The availability of labor in desert areas of the MENA region was also found to be varied, as 
each country has its own specificity: agricultural labor in Jordan and Gulf countries normally 
comes from Egypt and Yemen and can be obtained easily through official procedures or 
through labor brokers. In Egypt, the situation is less favorable since it is harder to attract 
labor as permanent workers in desert conditions and with the salaries proposed in Egypt. For 
Algeria and Morocco, this study has found little reporting of labor problems which suggests it 
is not a major obstacle to farming in desert. 
The source of energy for desert agriculture in the past was mainly diesel (or benzene), with 
prices and levels of subsidy decreasing and increasing according to the international price of 
oil and the regional political situation. Farmers shifted to electricity whenever available 
because in general it was cheaper (although also sometimes partly due to subsidies). But land 
and wells should be legal in order to get the benefits of using electricity and lower water 
prices. There is therefore an opportunity to use the power grid to restrict use (and therefore 
water abstraction), as implemented in India, for example (Shah, 1997), but the recent 
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availability of cheap solar panels is ruining that option: this trend is also emerging in other 
MENA countries such as Morocco or Algeria and will clearly be a 'hot issue' in coming years. 
Last, this research found that investing in desert agriculture did require substantial capital, 
most especially in Mafraq, which dictates a highly productive high-tech agriculture. This is 
less the case in Azraq, but illegal well drilling, hijjeh for land, and energy costs (not to 
mention the growing risk) have dramatically reduced profitability. Therefore, desert 
agriculture is more expensive than in Algeria, where all factors are subsidized, Morocco, 
where collective lands can be negotiated at a low price or leased by the state, or even Sudan, 
where cultivation was promoted and subsidies provided to successive large-scale national 
development plans (Fragaszy and Closas, 2016). 
With no possibility to transfer surface water (like in Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia), a very high 
rate of reuse of treated wastewater, and a general situation of overexploitation of its 
resources, controlling the expansion of groundwater use in Jordan is the highest priority. Only 
then can efforts to curb existing use through various incentives – with the drastic limitations 
made explicit in this thesis – make sense. But, because of both their limited scope and 
political constraints, the government is acknowledging that its policies will not be enough to 
respond to the increasingly deteriorated demand/supply ratio and is moving toward 
seawater desalination as its last trump card. 
8.5 Implications for the conservation and sustainable use of groundwater 
This thesis aimed to contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of limited 
groundwater resources in desert agriculture. An extensive review indicated that all MENA 
countries are suffering from overabstraction. Groundwater is mined with no consideration of 
what is called 'safe yield'. In terms of sustainability, policies and management approaches 
focus on exploiting aquifers with an allowable abstraction rate close to the safe yield. 
However, actual use is far beyond the safe yield and, in some countries like Jordan and 
Yemen, reached a point of irreversible action: groundwater abstraction cannot be reduced 
below the safe yield. Therefore, it is necessary to define a negotiated allowable abstraction 
rate that aims at extending the aquifer lifetime instead of sustaining it. The way of defining 
this theoretical number vary from aquifer to aquifer, but it is mainly based on the physical 
geography of the aquifers, social needs and water demand priorities. 
In terms of conservation, this study showed, as illustrated in Figure 8-2, that the system of 
groundwater-based agriculture is highly complex. Numerous interconnected issues and 
conditions drive groundwater-based agriculture systems in the MENA region. The system is 
driven by land accessibility, water availability and easy accessibility, labor availability, energy 
options, and feasible alternatives. Therefore, this analysis shows that there is not a standard, 
single silver bullet recommendation that could, typically, include enforcing laws and 
regulation, sealing illegal wells, improving hydrogeological knowledge, incentivizing crops 
with low water consumption, etc. Such conventional advice ignores the societal, political and 
more systemic constraints that will not be removed by wishful thinking. Rather, we have 
focused on understanding these constraints and documenting how and to what degree the 
government was working to remove them. The original and (so far) partly successful 
measures implemented are specific to Jordan's physical and socio-political equation and 
cannot be easily transferred elsewhere. 
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Yet, as indicated above, they may provide inspiration to other countries and tend to 
substantiate the facts that indirect measures are more likely to be effective, or that several 
combined 'sticks' and 'carrots' measures must be brought to bear at the same time. Water 
policies in Jordan illustrated how to tackle over abstraction through a combination of direct 
and, more interestingly, indirect measures: impossibility to obtain well licenses or permits, 
labor permits, connection to the electricity grid without proving formal land ownership; 
freezing settlement and delegation processes; raising tariffs on illegal wells; 'naming and 
shaming' defaulters, etc. Metering use has proved to be fraught with severe technical and 
social difficulties and the use of proxies (e.g. through remote sensing) emerge as alternative 
options. 
The problem of groundwater-based agriculture and overexploitation of aquifers is a vexing 
problem worldwide and has been shown to have many interconnected ramifications. All 
factors should be unpacked and analyzed with due consideration given to societal and socio-
political constrains to identify the right management approach allowing to extend the 
lifetime and availability of the resource. 
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